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ABSTRACT 
HEALTH AS EMBODIED AUTHENTICITY 
 
 
Margaret Steele, B.A., M.A. 
 
 
Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
This dissertation offers a phenomenological and existential account of health. It 
considers the model of health that is dominant in the contemporary USA. Using the 
example of fatness, this dissertation argues that the dominant model of health is deeply 
flawed, because of its largely unexamined commitment to naturalism and positivism (in 
the Husserlian senses of these terms). It concludes that purported alternatives to the 
dominant model, such as the Foucault-influenced constructivist approach to health, fail to 
respond adequately to the problems posed by naturalism and positivism. Instead, this 
dissertation proposes a model of health as embodied authenticity. This model is 
developed on the basis of Edmund Husserl’s account of embodiment and Simone de 
Beauvoir’s account of action.  
The central tenet of this model is that health is the embodied aspect of authentic 
action. That is, health is a feature not of bodies but of actions. A person is acting healthily 
-- and thus, can be said to ‘be healthy’ -- to the extent that she or he is engaged in 
physical action in pursuit of goals which are themselves conducive to the freedom of the 
agent her or himself and to the freedom of other persons. The goals themselves and the 
likelihood of the actions to be conducive to these goals must be capable of standing up to 
intersubjective critique in order for the person’s action to be authentic and thus healthy. 
This model of health is then applied to the case of fatness, in order to show that it squares 
better with lived experience than the previously available models of health. This 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of freedom as central to health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I offer a critique of, and an alternative to, what I refer to as the 
dominant model of health. I argue that this model of health is founded on what Edmund 
Husserl would refer to as “naturalism,” that is, the belief that only nature (as opposed to 
any concept of a separate ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’) exists, and thus the natural sciences provide 
the best or only means to obtain knowledge. I use the example of fatness to demonstrate 
how the dominant model of health fails to make sense of lived experience. However, in 
examining the case of fatness, I find that critique of the dominant model has itself tended 
to fall into error in two main ways. First, there are critics who dispute some particular 
conclusions drawn by proponents of the dominant model, but do not challenge the model 
of health as a whole. This is exemplified in the work of those obesity researchers who use 
naturalistic methodology to challenge dominant model claims about fatness and fat 
people. This is an inadequate response because the model itself, not just its application to 
fatness, demands much more radical critique. Second, there are critics who take what I 
refer to as a constructivist line, arguing that the dominant model ought not to be accepted 
because health and fatness are not objective realities but socially constructed concepts. 
This is also an inadequate response because it fails to take seriously the embodied, lived 
experiences of those people for whom fatness itself is experienced as a problem.  
In this dissertation, I undertake a radical critique of the dominant model of health, 
assuming neither that the naturalist thesis is true nor that it is false. I develop a model of 
health centered on action. On this model, which I refer to as the embodied authenticity 
model, one is healthy to the extent that one is acting in and through one’s body in a way 
that is conducive to the pursuit of one’s authentically chosen goals and projects. Health is 
not merely the potential to act; rather it is the action itself which is healthy. However, this 
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does not mean that one must be successful in accomplishing one’s goals in order to be 
healthy. Drawing on the existential ethics of Simone de Beauvoir, I argue that the best we 
can do is to strive to realize our values, knowing that the world is not fully under our 
control, and we will never be able to bring about exact outcomes that we have chosen. 
Health is neither about the potential nor the outcome, but about the action itself. I am 
healthy to the extent that my body is facilitating my authentic, ethical life.  
Since I am studying the topic of health by phenomenological and existentialist 
means, my example of fatness occupies perhaps more space than it might do in a study of 
health conducted by other methods. Nonetheless, my focus on isolating the essence of 
health means that I am often forced to give short shrift to the important philosophical, 
political and ethical aspects of fatness. My goal in the main body of the thesis is to isolate 
the health claims that are being made about fatness, in order to show that the dominant 
model of health is inadequate. Here, however, I would like to give a brief outline of some 
of the important ways in which fatness intersects with other identity categories. If these 
intersections are not central to this dissertation, that is only because each of them warrants 
a dissertation unto itself, not because I see them as less than crucial.   
Fatness: An Overview 
There are a number of examples I could have chosen on which to center my 
discussion of health in this dissertation. There are many phenomena that are understood 
essentially and invariably as health problems. One might choose cancer, AIDS or even, if 
one wanted to be especially timely, Ebola. No doubt important philosophical work has 
been done and might still be done in analysing the dominant understandings of such 
diseases. However, I choose fatness as my central example precisely because its status 
remains so contested even in the face of the dominant model. Almost nobody, at least in 
what one might term mainstream discourse, seriously contests the notion that cancer, or 
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AIDS, or Ebola is a disease, is a health problem and ought, ideally, to be eliminated. (The 
question of what and, especially, who is responsible for these diseases remains more 
controversial, of course.) There is, however, significant resistance to the notion that 
fatness ought always to be understood as a health problem, much less a disease, and there 
is, in some quarters, massive resistance to the idea that fatness can or ought to be 
eliminated. Because of this contested status, those who discuss fatness are often more 
explicit in making claims about how fatness ought to be understood (though, as I argue in 
Chapter Two, they are not as explicit as one might expect when it comes to discussing 
what they take fatness to be in an ontological sense). This contested status means that 
fatness is the ideal example for my purposes in this dissertation. However, using fatness 
in this way, focusing on its impact on health, I am obliged to brush over broader issues 
involving gender, race, sexuality and social class. I here outline some of these issues.  
Many commentators have long considered fat to be, in Susie Orbach’s terms, a 
feminist issue. There is no doubt that the burden of ‘the tyranny of slenderness’ (in Kim 
Chernin’s phrase) falls heavier on women than on men. Women are more likely to be 
regarded as fat, and they are more likely to suffer as a result of such regard. In the essay, 
“Part-Time Fatso”, transgendered person S. Bear Bergman describes how, “...whether the 
world thinks of me as fat depends entirely on how it interprets my gender.” (139) 
Bergman (who also identifies as “...a butch, which is its own gender” (ibid.)) writes that, 
when perceived as a man, ‘he’ is not perceived as fat, but when perceived as a woman 
‘she’ is. Bergman also points to concrete manifestations of this perception. When buying 
man’s clothes, Bergman can sometimes find ‘his’ size in mainstream clothing stores, or 
made by mainstream labels like Levi Strauss, but when shopping for women’s clothes, 
‘she’ must always shop in specialist plus-size stores. One and the same body is invariably 
defined as ‘plus sized’, that is, excessive, when it is seen as a site of femininity but not 
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necessarily so when it is perceived as a site of masculinity. (ibid. 141) Bergman writes 
that, “As a man, I’m a big dude, but not outside the norm for such things. ... As a woman, 
I am revolting.” (ibid.) Such anecdotal evidence reflects the findings of studies showing 
that fat women are, as J. Eric Oliver puts it, “...more socially isolated, less likely to find 
dating partners or marry, and more likely to be harassed and abused for their weight.” 
(Fat Politics 81) Fatness is never truly acceptable, but it is more acceptable in men than 
in women. Oliver quotes the following from a blog post:  
It’s a free country. If you wanna be a big, obese blob of human go right ahead. 
However, what I will ask is that you fat chicks stop deluding yourselves and realize 
that you are very fat and cumbersome and greasy and smelly and that no amount of 
primping or make-up can help you. Am I picking on fat women? I sure am. Fat 
men don’t try and lie about their size. Do you know what I think fat women should 
do? They should become the nicest, funniest people in the world. They need a 
redeeming quality. Fat women should dance around and laugh and fall down and 
amuse us. (Quoted in Fat Politics 79) 
As Oliver notes, this may be an extreme expression, but what it expresses, the notion that 
fat women are worthless (because they are, by definition, not sexually attractive to 
straight men) and must be made to feel so, is actually quite typical of a cultural 
perspective that is by no means marginal in twenty-first century America. The hatred, 
scorn and disdain aimed at fat women in the contemporary USA is all but inexpressible. It 
is no coincidence that feminists, and, in particular, feminist lesbians, have been to the fore 
in fighting for the rights of fat people. Fat is, without doubt, still a feminist issue, and, 
speaking more broadly, a gender issue. Even women who are not fat are socially 
controlled and disciplined by the belief that they are fat, by the fear that they might get 
fat, or by the notion that they may be seen as fat. Fat is an issue for women in general and 
not just for fat women.  
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I cannot wholly agree, however, with Oliver’s claim that white women suffer 
more under this tyranny of slenderness than non-white women. (ibid.) As I discuss later in 
this dissertation, the claim that it is more acceptable to be fat in some non-white – 
particularly black and Latina/o communities – does not hold up to scrutiny all that well. 
Feminist commentators of color have made this quite clear. The body ideal against which 
many black American women are measured within their own communities, for example, 
may indeed be ‘curvier’ than that against which white women feel measured, but this 
curvier ideal is no less an ideal, no more common, and certainly no more attainable for 
those not genetically endowed with it. The figures of Nicki Minaj and Beyoncé are indeed 
markedly different to those of Taylor Swift or Miley Cyrus, but they could hardly be 
called more attainable. Moreover, even if an American woman is part of, say, a black or 
Latina/o community with different aesthetic preferences, that woman still must function 
within the wider community where the aesthetic, cultural and social values of whiteness 
are dominant. In this wider community, which is culturally white (not to say white 
supremacist), it may in a certain sense be more acceptable for black and Latina women to 
be fat, but I suspect that this is only because, in those contexts, they are already expected 
to be ‘greedy’, ‘lazy’ and ‘ugly’ (traits which are seen as defining features of the fat) by 
virtue of their perceived race. That is, I suspect – though further research would be 
required to validate the suggestion – that it is not less shocking or less disgusting for 
black and Latina women to be fat, it is just less surprising.  
In fact, I would suggest that it is precisely when fatness is understood as a 
manifestation of moral decay that it intersects most strongly with race. In a Harper’s 
magazine cover story from 2000, Greg Critser muses: 
What do the fat, darker, exploited poor, with their unbridled primal appetites, 
have to offer us, but a chance for we diet-and-shape-conscious folks to live 
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vicariously? ... Mami buys another apple fritter. Papi slams his second sugar and 
cream. Another young Carl supersizes, double supersizes, and then supersizes 
again. Waistlines surge. Any minute now, the belt will run out of holes. (Quoted 
in The Diet Myth, 66) 
This is an unabashedly racialized, and indeed racist, way of characterizing the ‘obesity 
epidemic’. The writer calls the problem an epidemic, a term which suggests the problem 
is medical, but he then describes the problem in largely moral terms. The ‘obesity 
epidemic’, as described by Critser, is a problem centered on ‘darker’ people – Carls, 
Mamis and Papis – making poor choices because they don’t know better or they don’t 
care about the impact of their actions on themselves or others. Indeed, the fatness of black 
and Latina/o people has become a proxy for older racist beliefs that they are lazy and 
greedy. There are many situations in which it would be deemed unacceptable to claim 
that a certain race of people has greed or laziness as a moral flaw. You can, however, 
claim that fat people have such flaws. Their fatness itself is the proof. In “A Jury Of Your 
Skinny Peers”, Maggie Elise O’Grady gives the example of Galbert v. Merkle, a case in 
which a prosecutor (himself black) objected to all three black prospective jurors. When he 
was challenged on constitutional grounds, O’Grady says:  
The prosecutor defended the strike by noting the clothing, age, and hairstyles of 
the women, culminating in the observation that all were overweight. As such, he 
regarded them as fitting a pro-defense, “self-indulgent” profile. (ibid. 55) 
In this case, it seems quite likely that fatness (together with gender, clothing, age and 
hairstyles) is functioning as a proxy for race (and, indeed, for gender and social class). 
The prosecutor was barred, under the Constitution, from striking the prospective jurors on 
the basis of their race, but could use other features, including their fatness, as a basis for 
doing so. This emphasizes the moralizing that pervades the dominant understanding of 
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fatness. Unlike, say, cancer, fatness is understood as a choice or at least as the direct 
result of choice.  
In this sense, fatness has common ground with AIDS, which has at times been 
understood as a consequence of the supposed immorality of gay men. Fatness, like AIDS, 
has thus been seen both as an illness and as a result of moral failure on the part of the 
individual. Indeed, there are a number of ways in which fatness has intersected with 
queerness, historically, theoretically and culturally. In 1973, when the National 
Association to Aid Fat Americans (NAAFA; now the National Association to Advance 
Fat Acceptance) split, many of those who left to form the more radical Fat Underground, 
“...had strong ties to the radical therapy, lesbian and feminist movements.” (Gilman 2010 
128) More recently, Kathleen LeBesco (for example) argues that fat bodies can 
meaningfully be understood as ‘queer’. (“Queering Fat Bodies/Politics”) Some fat 
acceptance activists, such as Marilyn Wann (Fat?So! 11), have adopted the language of 
“coming out” in reference to taking up their fat identity. (For an overview of fat activists’ 
use of the language of ‘coming out’, see Saguy and Ward (2011).)  
It may seem odd to talk about ‘coming out’ as fat, when fatness is so clearly 
visible. However, as Linda Martín Alcoff points out in Visible Identities, “When truth is 
defined as that which can be seen, there develops an uncanny interdependence between 
that which is true and that which is hidden. ... The ‘truth’ of what we are is sometimes ‘as 
plain as the nose on my face’ but sometimes it is hidden and must be brought into the 
light.” (7) Alcoff notes that the difficulty of identifying truth with what can be seen is that 
what can be seen is effectively endless in that one can never see all of it. By committing 
ourselves to believe only what we can see, we commit ourselves to an endless 
uncertainty. Given the naturalism of the dominant model, it is fair to say that the current 
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context is indeed one in which ‘truth is defined as that which can be seen’. The current 
obsession with defining fat, and with identifying and eliminating every last ounce of it, 
can be seen as an attempt to cope with this endlessness. There is always another nook or 
cranny in which fat may be hiding. Those who are now thin must be ever-vigilant for the 
early signs of oncoming fatness. Women, in particular, must work endlessly to get or stay 
thin. Even apparently thin people may be secretly fat, as in the case of the so-called 
‘normal weight obese’ or ‘skinny-fat’. Fat people may be ‘passing’ as thin before our 
very eyes, just as non-white people may pass as white, or queer people as straight and so 
on. In this context, one may well experience fatness as simultaneously one’s defining 
feature and one’s darkest secret, and thus as something with respect to which one may 
‘come out’.  
Of course, for those who are clearly and recognizably fat, there is no question of 
‘passing’ as thin. Rather, for these people, as Samantha Murray argues, the fat body 
functions as a ‘virtual confessor’, attesting to the moral decay of the person inside. 
(“Marked As Pathological”, 82-87) There is, however, a sense in which even these people 
may ‘come out’, if they choose to respond to their fatness in a particular way. Consider 
again for a moment the quote above from Fat Politics, in which fat women (unlike fat 
men) are accused of lying about their size and deluding themselves. (Fat Politics, 79) The 
writer quoted by Oliver demands that fat women publicly acknowledge their fatness as 
something for which they must apologize and seek to compensate. As Oliver argues, this 
attitude is not as limited to the lunatic fringe as one might like to think; rather this quote is 
just an unusually explicit expression of what are actually pretty mainstream attitudes to 
fatness and, particularly, to women’s fatness. In this context, to ‘come out’ as fat is not so 
much to reveal the hitherto hidden truth that one is fat but rather to reveal the hitherto 
hidden truth that one accepts, likes, and embraces one’s fatness. Thus, to come out as fat 
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is, primarily, to reveal the secret that one does not hate oneself for being fat. In the USA 
today, that is perhaps as shocking and revolutionary a revelation as that of a hitherto 
hidden sexual orientation or gender. It is, for many, quite literally inconceivable. One 
need only look at the comments under any internet article or blog post whatsoever about 
fat acceptance to see that, for vast swathes of people, fatness is essentially unacceptable. 
Not only do these people themselves refuse to accept fatness, they regard it as utterly 
unconscionable and immoral for others to do so. “It’s just not healthy” functions in these 
debates about fatness much as “it’s just not natural” functions in debates about sexual 
orientation. In each case, what is really being communicated is, “it’s just not right.”   
Thus, fatness intersects with queerness in the sense that each has been cast as a 
moral failing, as a manifestation of unnatural and perverted greed or lust. This same 
moral reading of fatness also ties in with class. For much of human history, fatness was 
the preserve of the wealthy. It was thus sometimes associated with greed and perhaps 
exploitation of others, but also with wealth and power. (See, for example, Oliver, Fat 
Politics, 65; Kolata, Rethinking Thin, 73) But, as Hillel Schwartz points out in Never 
Satisfied, when poor people started getting fat, their fatness was seen as a manifestation of 
their “profligacy”. (86) Thinness is now a hallmark of the wealthy and privileged elite. 
Those who have the resources to ‘be whatever they want to be’ invariably choose to be 
thin, whatever else they may also choose to be. In Unbearable Weight, Susan Bordo 
describes anorexia nervosa as, “the crystallization of [late twentieth century American] 
culture.” (139-164) Her account still resonates well into the twenty-first century. Bordo 
claims that certain kinds of anorexic ideation are normalized and even glamorized in 
contemporary culture, to the point where almost any amount of fat seems like too much, 
and almost everyone seems – and, indeed, feels – too fat. Returning to the intersection 
with race, one might almost say that in wealthy, white, upper class circles there is now a 
10 
 
‘one-ounce rule’ in place. Just as one drop of non-white blood was once taken to define 
one as non-white, any fat at all is now enough to put one in the category of ‘too fat’ and 
therefore inferior. But unlike non-white genetic heritage, we believe we can work off our 
fat. The solution is thus to devote oneself endlessly to the elimination of every last ounce 
of fat. In short, there is much that rings true in Bordo’s account even today, over ten years 
after the second edition of her book was published. 
However, I would suggest that, as a society, the contemporary USA is more 
bulimic than anorexic. Anorexia nervosa is characterized by adherence to extremely strict 
rules about the quantity and quality of food one consumes and how one consumes that 
food. The obsession is with the control of appetite and the elimination of consumption. 
But in many ways contemporary US culture seems strongly to endorse unfettered 
consumption (though, as Bordo points out, this is less true for women, who are expected 
to eat less than men). In twenty-first century America, it is not consumption that is 
derided, but rather certain manifestations of consumption, including, above all, body fat. 
Thus, culturally speaking, the ideal citizen of twenty-first century America is someone 
who consumes insatiably but somehow never has too much. In support of this suggestion, 
consider the recent rash of reality TV shows about hoarders.1 Both scripted and 
unscripted TV shows have frequently presented images of unimaginably wealthy people 
with massive amounts of material possessions2, yet these people have typically not been 
presented in the pathological and/or moral terms in which the ‘hoarders’ are presented. 
The hoarders, on the other hand, are typically poor, and their material possessions are not 
                                                          
1 A&E’s Hoarders ran from 2009 to 2013, while TLC’s Hoarding: Buried Alive premiered in 2010 and 
is still running at the time of writing. Both shows have been widely syndicated, and their formats have 
been copied in other countries. 
2 MTV’s long-running Cribs, together with its spin-offs, is perhaps the perfect example. 
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enviable. They are always presented as sick, and sometimes as immoral. This suggests 
that what disgusts us, what pushes our cultural buttons, is not voracious consumption, but 
the notion of being saddled with the detritus of that consumption. The wealthy person has 
masses of material possessions, but these possessions are beautiful, desirable and artfully 
arranged in a space which can accommodate them. In absolute terms, they have vast 
amounts of possessions, but yet they do not have ‘too much’, because what they have fits. 
The hoarder on the other hand has massive amounts of possessions that other people do 
not desire, that other people find unappealing, even dirty and disgusting, and all these 
possessions are crammed into a space in which they do not fit.  
In my view, the fat person is the hoarder par excellence in the contemporary 
American psyche. Even the hoarder can, at least for a time, physically distance herself 
from her possessions. The fat person is both hoarder and hoard. Fat bodies represent, in 
the American imagination, an insane, insatiable drive to get and keep, a desire which is 
shameful and disgusting, and manifestations of which inspire, quite literally, abject 
horror. Like the hoarder’s hoard, taking over his or her humble home, the fat body does 
not fit -- and thus will not stay -- within what ought to be its confines.  Thus, as Lupton 
(2013 58-9) has pointed out, fat is the perfect example and embodiment of Julia 
Kristeva’s (1982) concept of the ‘abject’. Lupton writes that:  
For Kristeva, the abject is that which is difficult to contain, which is liminal and 
crosses bodily boundaries. Its lack of definition and its liminal status inspire 
feelings of revulsion and fear of contamination. [...] The uncontained nature of 
the fat body, its looseness and liquidity, its lack of defined boundaries and 
tendency to ooze, inspires abjection. (58) 
It is no surprise that fat people are often held to be dirty, smelly and repulsive. Indeed, I 
would suggest that fat people have come to be not only a symbol of all that Americans 
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collectively find disgusting and shameful in themselves but also a scapegoat for all the 
greed and excess of which Americans collectively feel culpable. Fat people have even 
been held responsible for climate change. (“Scientists: Fat People Make Global Warming 
A Lot Worse”; “Fat People Causing Climate Change”) But, again, fat people are by no 
means alone here; the greed and laziness of the poor, and most especially the black and 
Latina/o poor, is often cited as both the cause of and the evidence for the downfall of the 
once-great USA. Of course, it is no coincidence that those who are poor, and/or black, 
and/or Latina/o are also more likely to be fat.  
In this context, fatness is certainly a political problem, whether or not it is a health 
one. At times, in the body of this dissertation, it may seem that I gloss over these political 
aspects of fatness, or its intersections with other identities. I argue, however, that the 
solution to the political problem lies partly in how we understand and respond to the 
health problem. The objectivist assumption that there can be some neutral, fact-based 
standard to which all bodies can be held is central to the moralized claims that fatness is 
“just not healthy”, just as it is central to the claim that homosexuality is “just not natural”. 
To critique the theory behind the supposedly neutral, objectivist and naturalist model of 
health is thus to shed light on many of the unexamined assumptions behind the moral and 
aesthetic claims that are used as sticks with which to beat fat people and, by extension, to 
beat those whose gender, race, ethnic or sexual identities are deemed unacceptable.  
Moreover, I believe that the model of health I propose addresses many of the very 
legitimate and important political concerns raised by fat acceptance activists, but without 
insisting, in the teeth of the evidence, that fatness is never a health problem. In my view, 
it is a mistake to insist that fatness must be either a health problem or a political problem. 
On my model, which defines health with reference to action, all health problems are 
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political, and all political problems are health problems, in the sense that they concern and 
condition the fundamental scope of individuals for action and, thus, they inevitably 
concern and condition the workings of groups of people and societies. Fatness is not 
necessarily always a health problem for every individual but it can be one for many 
people, and is often so for women, for poor people, for people of color and for queer 
people. Offering a model of health that works better for fat people thus means offering a 
model of health that works better for all these intersecting communities. My model of 
health is one which places freedom at its center. Thus, on my model, the projects of being 
healthy and of advocating health are essentially political projects. The hope is that, since 
the political burden of the dominant model of fatness has fallen disproportionately on 
women, black and Latina/o people, queer people and other marginalized groups, then 
conversely a better model of fatness can be especially beneficial for these same groups.  
Summary of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation, I first argue for the need for a radically different model of 
health, and then I argue for the embodied authenticity model in particular.  In Chapter 
One, entitled How We Talk About Fatness, I describe the different strands of the 
contemporary debate around fatness. I identify what I take to be the three central 
assumptions of the dominant model of fatness. These are: (1) that fatness is caused by, 
and therefore represents, excessive consumption and insufficient exertion; (2) that fatness 
either is or causes illness and therefore must be addressed in order to increase health; and 
(3) that the best way to address the problem of fatness is for fat/overweight/obese people 
to lose weight. By and large, these claims are taken to be ‘common sense’. The 
assumption is that to dispute any one of them one must be, as it were, either a fool or a 
knave. In contrast to this dominant model, there exists a competing model of fatness, 
emerging from the Fat Acceptance (FA) and Health at Every Size (HAES) communities. 
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This latter model may also be expressed in terms of three central assumptions, namely: 
(1) that some people are naturally fat; (2) that fatness in itself is not unhealthy; and (3) 
that it is all but impossible to make a naturally fat person thin over the long-term.  
I characterize the first set of assumptions as ‘objectivist’, by which I mean that 
their proponents take these assumptions to be factual claims about the world, based on 
subject-neutral observation. More specifically, they are naturalist, in that they assume that 
the best kind of subject-neutral observation is that undertaken by the natural sciences. 
This objectivist approach gives rise to a narrative whereby fatness is invariably and 
essentially a health problem. Millions of Americans are now being encouraged by 
government health agencies, by media outlets, by medical experts, and by other powerful 
voices, to measure themselves and, should they find themselves in the overweight or 
obese categories, they are being told that they are, by definition, unhealthy, and that – 
again by definition – causing themselves to weigh less will make them healthier. This set 
of claims is repeated over and over in various ways, and almost never includes any 
acknowledgement that there may exist some diversity in the causes and consequences of 
fatness.  
The most prominent alternative to this model is what one might term, broadly, the 
FA and HAES model. There are two different theoretical platforms on which this model 
has been based. First, there is what I term the objectivist platform. Critics operating on 
this platform do not dispute the fundamental naturalist thesis of the dominant model, but 
simply dispute the conclusions that its proponents have drawn about fatness. That is, they 
are satisfied with the standard methods of naturalism but merely feel these methods have 
been misapplied when it comes to studying fatness and fat people. Other critics of the 
dominant model base their critique on what I call a constructivist platform. These critics 
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dispute the naturalist dominant model because, as they see it, subject-neutral observation 
is impossible. For these critics, all concepts of health and, indeed, of fatness, are entirely 
socially constructed. On this model, neither health nor fatness is, so to speak, a thing that 
exists in the world, rather each of these ought to be understood as a concept by which 
things in the world may be categorized.  
In Chapter Two, entitled The Dominant Model of Health and Its Alternatives, I 
argue that neither the objectivist nor the constructivist critique of health provides the 
theoretical basis on which to construct an adequate model of health, or even to mount an 
adequate theoretical challenge to the dominant model. Rather than following either of 
these lines of critique, then, I draw on Husserl’s critique of naturalism to highlight the 
philosophical problems of the dominant model. Specifically, proponents of the dominant 
model display an over-reliance on, and at times almost an obsession with, measurement. 
They express health, fatness and the relationship between the two in numerical terms, 
allowing no room for qualitative analysis. This reliance on measurement is a 
manifestation of naturalism. It exemplifies the methodological approach whereby 
empirical investigation is taken to the be the best and only means of knowledge of the 
world. Individual lived experience is taken to be fundamentally untrustworthy, at best a 
failed attempt at scientific investigation. However, it is precisely the return to lived 
experience that shows how problematic the dominant model of fatness is. In many ways, 
the strongest argument against the dominant model is the existence of fat people who 
display no manifestation of ill health other than their supposedly excessive fatness. 
Objectivist FA and HAES critics of the dominant model frequently use the existence of 
such people to argue that there is no causal link between fatness and health at all. 
However, I argue that this is mistaken as well.  
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I refrain from assuming either the presence or the absence of a causal link between 
health and fatness. Rather, I take a phenomenological approach and describe some of the 
patterns that recur in the experience of fat people and of fatness. To this end, I introduce 
Sarah, an imaginary fat woman. I show how the dominant model fails to make sense of 
Sarah’s lived experience. However, I show that the FA and HAES alternatives also fail to 
do so. Sarah’s experience of her own fatness as a problem is dismissed by some critics of 
the dominant model, who argue that fatness is never a health problem in and of itself. 
Some of these critics point to the fact that not all fat people experience their fatness as 
limiting. On this basis, they argue that fatness cannot be a health problem, since some fat 
people are healthy. Rather, they argue, some people are just naturally fat, and it is the 
social understanding of fatness that conditions us to assume that fatness is to blame for all 
the health problems of those who happen to be fat. Just like the dominant model 
approach, this ignores the possibility that different people may be fat for different reasons 
and that different people’s fatness may affect them differently. In short, I find that neither 
the dominant model nor the most prominent alternative makes sense of the lived 
experience of fatness. Thus, I find that neither is based on a strong model of health.  
In Chapter Three, entitled An Alternative Model of Health, I introduce my own 
phenomenological and existentialist model of health, again taking fatness as my example. 
Drawing on phenomenological methodology in the Husserlian tradition, I describe the 
experience of health both in oneself and in others. I argue throughout that action is central 
to health. Husserl’s account of embodiment in Ideas II makes clear that to experience 
oneself as embodied is to experience oneself as capable of action, and as acting. The 
everyday sense of the term ‘health’ is clearly related to the body. Health, historically, 
culturally and linguistically, has always had to do with the body, though it may be used 
more broadly to refer to overall well-being. Thus, if health is about the body, and if the 
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body is essentially a site of action, then health is about action. Mine is far from the first 
account of health to be centered on action. However, in my view, other models have made 
the mistake of focusing on the potential for action rather than action itself.  
On this point, and by way of contrast with my own model, I consider the 
phenomenological account of health offered by Fredrik Svenaeus. Svenaeus argues, in 
Heideggerian terms, that health is a homelike being in the world. In my view, however, to 
be healthy is not just to feel well or to be capable of acting in a particular way, but 
actually to be acting in that way. I agree with Svenaeus that the experience of well-being 
and capability in oneself is a manifestation of health. However, I argue that this feeling is 
not itself health. I turn to Husserl’s account of embodiment because it is focused on 
action, and thus can account for the centrality of action to health. The structure of 
experience characterized by Svenaeus as ‘homelike being in the world’ I instead describe 
in Husserlian terms as an ‘attitude’ [Einstellung], because attitude, in Husserl’s sense, is 
not merely a passive experience but is a predisposition to act in a particular way. In my 
view, what links the experience of ‘homelike being in the world’ to health is that it is the 
attitude in which one is most likely to act healthily, which in turn makes one more 
predisposed to be in this attitude, and thus to continue to act healthily, and so on in, as it 
were, a virtuous circle.  
However, if one is to characterize health as a certain kind of action, then clearly, 
one needs a criterion by which to distinguish action that is healthy from action that is not. 
The ethics of Simone de Beauvoir provides this criterion in the form of authenticity. The 
criterion which Beauvoir applies to action in general is that it is authentic, and therefore 
justifiable, to the extent that it is undertaken with the genuine aim of realising the freedom 
of all people. In my view, health is the bodily manifestation of such action. Thus, I refer 
18 
 
to my model as the ‘embodied authenticity’ model of health. This model centers on the 
claim that health is manifested, first and foremost, in action. I show that this model fits 
best with the phenomenological description of the lived experience of health. I argue that 
health is not merely the potential to act in particular ways but rather health is the 
actualizing of such potential. One is healthy to the extent that one is acting in and through 
one’s body to pursue meaningful, authentically chosen goals.  
I find Beauvoir’s account particularly compelling because, like Husserl’s account 
of embodiment, it acknowledges both the malleable and the immutable aspects of the 
human situation. To act authentically is to choose the best action possible, accepting that 
there are no absolute moral rules to which one can adhere unthinkingly, and that one’s 
actions may not lead to one’s preferred outcome. To act authentically is to do what one 
takes to be the best one can in the situation in which one finds oneself. As such, this 
embodied authenticity model of health accounts for the fact that individuals and 
communities are responsible for their own health, while also making sense of the social 
and systemic factors that condition health.  
In Chapter Four, entitled The Embodied Authenticity Model of Health Applied to 
Fatness, I return to my example of fatness to show that my model of health makes more 
sense of lived experience. I argue that, crucially, the model I propose allows one to view 
health both as it is manifested in an individual body and also as it is conditioned by (and 
conditions) the broader groups, societies and cultures in which it is situated. In the current 
discourse, there is a tendency to insist that, if fatness is a problem, it must be either a 
health problem or a political problem, but it cannot be both. For proponents of the 
dominant model, fatness is a health problem. This means that the problem is best 
expressed in terms of objective, neutral, scientific fact. For these commentators, political, 
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social or cultural debate around the issue is really just distraction. The main point is that 
people are eating too much and exercising too little and it’s killing them and affecting all 
of us. There are objectivist critics of the dominant model, who argue that a more careful 
analysis of the data show that fatness is not really such a health problem, and it is just bias 
that causes people to be so concerned about fatness. In other words, fatness is not really a 
health problem but a political problem. Constructivist critics, for their part, argue that 
there can be no neutral or objective knowledge about health, so there really is no such 
thing as a health problem. From this point of view, fatness is entirely a political problem, 
because it is just a conceptual category that some people use to exercise power over 
others. In my view, fatness may be and, in fact, is both a health problem and a political 
problem.  
I base my understanding of healthy action on Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of 
Ambiguity. In this text, Beauvoir argues that actions are justified to the extent that the 
agent is willing him- or herself and others free in the acting. Thus, the notion of freedom, 
as Beauvoir presents it here, is central to my model of health. In Chapter Five, the 
conclusion, I give a fuller account of what Beauvoir means by freedom, and again using 
the example of fatness to show how freedom works as a criterion for healthy action. I 
argue that accepting the embodied authenticity model of health does not entail wholesale 
rejection of either the dominant model or the FA and HAES alternatives. Instead, I show 
how my model incorporates the strongest aspects of those models. Briefly, the scientific 
expertise of the dominant model, when deployed in the right way, empowers people to act 
healthily by helping them to understand the impact their short-term actions can have on 
their long-term potential for future action. Meanwhile, the FA and HAES models offer 
genuine sites of resistance to the undoubted anti-fat bias of the contemporary culture, thus 
empowering fat people and others to take responsibility for their health without having to 
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suffer blame and stigma for their fatness. Indeed, my model of health, based as it is on 
Beauvoir’s freedom-centered ethics, actually addresses many of the concerns of FA and 
HAES critics of the dominant model, and in fact provides a firmer theoretical basis on 
which to rebuild stronger versions of these accounts. I argue that FA and HAES is the 
result of a grassroots movement (or, more accurately, a range of different grassroots 
movements), driven by admirable political and social motives, many of which are 
fundamentally compatible with the Beauvoirian model I propose. The potential impact of 
this goes beyond the health of fat people, or even health in general. In fact, since fatness 
overlaps with other political and social identities and problems, a better approach to 
health has the potential to benefit not only fat people but also people of color, especially 
black and Latina/o people, as well as women, queer people and poor people.  
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CHAPTER ONE: HOW WE TALK ABOUT FATNESS 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I offer a critique of, and an alternative to, the dominant model3 
of health in the contemporary United States of America. I use the phrase ‘dominant 
model’ to refer to the contemporary understanding of fatness4. Later, I also refer to the 
contemporary understanding of health as a ‘dominant model’ of health. I focus on the 
example of fatness in order to show what the dominant model of health is, and why a 
critique of and an alternative to the latter are necessary. As I noted in the introduction, the 
example of fatness gives a particularly rich insight into the dominant model of health, and 
into the philosophical assumptions on which that model rests, precisely because fatness 
and its relationship to health are hotly contested.  
In this chapter, I explain the key claims of the dominant model of fatness. On the 
dominant model, fatness is first and foremost a health problem. Thus, examining the 
dominant model of fatness necessarily invokes the dominant model of health. 
Specifically, I will argue that the dominant model of health centers on a simplistic, 
mechanical understanding of the human body, and that it tends to conflate its methods of 
measurement with the purported objects of its measurement. (In Chapter 2, I will argue 
                                                          
3 I have borrowed the phrase ‘dominant model’ from the work of Charlotte Cooper (“What’s Fat 
Activism?”), though I use it somewhat differently than Cooper does. 
4 In contemporary discourse, both expert and general, ‘obesity’ and ‘overweight’ are often used to refer to 
particular body sizes and compositions which are held to have more adipose tissue than is optimal for 
health. However, some Fat Acceptance and Health at Every Size commentators claim that no particular 
body size, shape or composition is, in and of itself, unhealthy, and, thus, they reject the terms ‘overweight’ 
and ‘obesity’ on the grounds that they are pathologizing and stigmatizing. I do not intend to defend either 
that claim or its contrary. My thesis is not, ultimately, about whether or how fatness impacts health; rather it 
is about health itself, how it is understood and how it ought to be understood. When I am recounting fact 
claims about the medical categories of obesity and overweight, I will use the words ‘obesity’ and 
‘overweight’. When I am referring more generally to persons/bodies who are fat, overweight or obese, I 
will just use ‘fat’ or ‘fatness’.  
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further that these are manifestations of the essential naturalism of the dominant model of 
health.) As well as outlining the dominant model, I also consider the critique of the 
dominant model offered by proponents of Fat Acceptance (FA) and Health At Every Size 
(HAES). I argue that FA and HAES proponents by and large fail to challenge the 
theoretical weaknesses in the dominant model of fatness because they fail to identify 
naturalism as the central theoretical problem in the dominant models both of fatness and 
of health. Given these aims, my goal is not to defend or disprove the factual claims of 
either proponents or opponents of the dominant models of fatness and health. Rather, I 
want to report the factual claims made by proponents of the dominant model and the 
counterclaims made by opponents of the dominant model, to show the theoretical 
assumptions that are common to the great majority of commentators on both sides of this 
debate. In Chapter 2, I go on to argue that these assumptions are manifestations of 
naturalism, and that naturalism is itself deeply problematic. 
The Dominant Model: How fatness, overweight and obesity are understood in 
the contemporary USA 
In this section, I look at what I deem to be the most basic and important tenets of 
the dominant model of fatness. These beliefs are common not only to a great many 
medical and scientific experts across many disciplines, but also to (arguably) the majority 
of people in the contemporary USA. In my view, these basic tenets can be expressed as 
follows:  
(1) Fatness is caused by – and therefore represents – excessive consumption and 
insufficient exertion. 
(2) Fatness either is or causes illness, and therefore must be addressed in order to 
improve health. 
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(3) The best way to address the problem of fatness is for fat people to lose weight.  
I am not primarily concerned with establishing the truth or falsity of these claims. 
Rather, I am using them as a starting point from which to trace back to what I am calling 
the dominant model of health.  
(1) Fatness is caused by – and, therefore represents – excessive consumption 
and insufficient exertion. 
From the point of view of the dominant model, the primary cause of fatness, 
overweight or obesity is excessive consumption and insufficient exertion. The word 
‘obesity’ is descended from the Latin obesitas, which means “fatness” or “corpulence” 
and which is itself derived from obesus, meaning “that has eaten itself fat”. (“Obesity”, 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) Thus, there has long been a strong conceptual link 
between obesity and over-consumption of food. Much more recently, obesity has been 
referred to as “fork-to-mouth disease”. (“If Obesity is a Disease”) Overweight is now 
often defined as a precursor to obesity, different from obesity more in quantity than in 
quality, so the same association with over-consumption exists with overweight. In fact, 
from the point of view of the dominant model, claim (1) is tautologous; from this point of 
view, fatness just is what happens when one takes in too much food and/or engages in too 
little physical activity. As one medical textbook on obesity puts it, “Weight gain occurs 
when energy intake exceeds energy expenditure.” (Moore and Pi-Sunyer 25) Thus, eating 
and exercise are referred to in biomedical obesity research as the “Big Two” factors in 
weight control. (ibid.)  
Within the dominant model, however, different accounts are given for why people 
over-consume and under-exert. Contemporary life, particularly in industrialised places, is 
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held to encourage over-consumption and insufficient exertion. As Moore and Pi-Sunyer 
put it: 
... as peoples all over the world become more urbanized and make the 
transition from hard physical labor to intensive use of labor-saving 
technology, the incidence of obesity increases. Also, as food production 
and distribution systems modernize and as people’s discretionary income 
increases, a wide variety of rich and highly palatable food is available to 
everyone. As a result, more people are overeating at a time when their 
energy expenditure is decreasing. (5)  
That is, populations all over the world are getting fatter because they live in 
circumstances in which over-consumption is easier than before, while exertion is more 
difficult (perhaps in terms of time and other resources) than before.  
This view is perhaps gaining more currency in recent times. For example, in the 
Pixar animated movie “Wall-E” (2008), we see a dystopian future in which a mega-
corporation has taken over the world and has caused people to consume more and more of 
its products. (This idea of a future in which everyone will be fat is by no means unique to 
“Wall-E”; for a list of others examples in fiction, see “Big Fat Future” on TVTropes.org.) 
In this frightening vision of the future, all humans are obese and these obese humans are 
presented as extremely lazy. They spend all their time in mobile, reclining chairs, and, 
when they fall out of these chairs, they are unable to get up of their own accord but must 
be helped to do so by robots. “Wall-E”, of course, is fictional, but the concept of fatness 
as (at least partly) the result of broader social, economic and political factors is discussed 
in, for example, the 2004 documentary “Super Size Me” and, in more scholarly terms, in 
Robert Lustig’s Fat Chance (2012).  
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While some commentators thus emphasise the social nature of the problem of 
fatness, others emphasise the responsibility – even culpability – of individual fat people. 
Saguy and Gruys (2010) conducted a comparative case study of American news reporting 
on anorexia, bulimia, binge eating disorder (BED) and obesity between 1995 and 2005. 
They found that anorexia and bulimia were mostly presented as being illnesses that 
happen to people (242-244), while obesity was presented as being primarily the result of 
individual choices to over-consume and under-exert (244-246), and BED was either 
dismissed as a laughable ‘excuse’ to engage in such behavior or else it was treated as 
somewhat like an illness, but one whose cure was essentially ‘more self-control’. (246-
247). Saguy and Gruys highlight especially the moralistic terms in which obesity and 
BED were discussed, in contrast to the morally-neutral, medical framing of anorexia and 
bulimia. 
However, while there may be disagreement about why people over-consume and 
under-exercise, there is certainly broad consensus that these factors are causing an 
alarming rise in overweight and obesity, and that this, in turn, is causing all kinds of 
health problems.  
(2) Fatness either is or causes illness, and therefore must be addressed in 
order to improve health. 
As we have seen, fatness has not always and everywhere been considered 
unhealthy – in fact, at times certain kinds and degrees of fatness have enjoyed a strong 
association with healthful abundance. In the contemporary USA, some commentators 
argue that fatness ought to be regarded as neither healthy nor unhealthy, but as a health-
neutral physical feature, like (they claim) height or being left-handed. (See, for example, 
Lessons from the Fat-o-Sphere, xi; Fat?So!, 47.) It is worth noting, however, that fatness 
26 
 
does not seem to have been widely regarded that way at any time in Western history. To 
various extents, different kinds and degrees of fatness have been regarded as either 
conducive to or representative of good health, while others have been identified as 
symptoms and causes of illness. This has been the case in the Ancient world, in the 
Middle Ages, throughout Modern times and right up to today. (See Gilman (2008 and 
2010) and Schwartz (1986) for comprehensive histories of the understanding of fatness 
throughout Western history.) At different times in history, European and, later, American 
experts have had different ways of framing the relationship between fatness and health, 
but such a relationship has almost always been held to exist; that is, for the vast majority 
of Western history, fatness – or at least some particular kind or degree of fatness – has 
been seen as linked in some way to health, whether positive or negative, and whether as a 
cause, an effect or a manifestation. This does not bear out the suggestion that health 
concerns around fatness are largely new.  
What does appear to be new – perhaps even historically unique – to the 
contemporary dominant model, is the simplicity and the lack of nuance in its 
understanding of fatness. As Gilman’s historical analysis (2008, 2010) shows, Western 
medicine has more or less always regarded certain types of fatness to be unhealthy. 
However, throughout the Ancient, Medieval and even much of the Modern eras, it 
mattered, for example, how one had become fat and how one’s fat was distributed on the 
body. Gilman writes that “... the boundaries between the obese and, therefore, unhealthy 
body and the stout, plump, heavy, well-fleshed, stately but healthy body are constantly 
shifting. What is a corpulent but healthy body in one system can and does easily become 
an obese and ill one in the next.” (2010 x) But, pace Gilman, in the contemporary USA, 
there are only a very few commentators – and even fewer who are widely regarded as 
experts – who are willing to defend the concept of a “stout, plump, heavy, well-fleshed, 
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stately but healthy body”. In reality, terms like ‘stout’ and ‘plump’ are now treated as 
euphemistic ways of referring to overweight and obesity, which are always necessarily 
health problems. Indeed the perceived need for such euphemistic usage is itself indicative 
of the near-universally negative understanding of fatness. Thus, in the contemporary USA 
(as elsewhere, especially in western Europe), there is markedly less room in public 
discourse for the concept of different kinds of fatness (with correspondingly different 
relationships to health and illness) than there was at other times and places. Granted, in 
recent literature, a distinction is made between ‘central adiposity’ which refers to an 
accumulation of fat in the abdominal area (Moore and Pi-Sunyer 7), and more general 
adiposity in which fat might be distributed in many different ways. The former is 
particularly linked with greater risk for diabetes and cardiovascular disease. (ibid.) It is 
for this reason that waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) is now considered a useful measure of the 
likely impact of an individual’s adiposity on his or her health. (ibid.) The society as a 
whole has been slow to take up this distinction, however. Significantly, BMI (which takes 
no account of body composition or fat distribution) is still widely used in clinical and 
other settings “as an index of adiposity or fatness”. (Gallagher and Yim “Measurement of 
Human Body Composition” 225) Government-sponsored websites, including 
www.CDC.gov and www.nhlbi.nih.gov, still encourage the public to check their BMI as a 
way of checking whether they are healthy or not. BMI is about as reductive a method of 
measuring fatness as it is possible to get, short of simply using weight (or, more 
accurately, mass). The widespread use of BMI (and sometimes even just mass) in both 
clinical and non-clinical settings thus points clearly to an understanding of fat that is 
much simpler and less nuanced than the great majority of those that have preceded it. In 
short, in the contemporary USA, most commentators assume that to be fat is to be in the 
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overweight or obese category (as defined by BMI), and that anyone in the overweight or 
obese category would be healthier if he or she were less fat.  
Certainly most commentators, both expert and non-expert, also agree that there are 
more people in the overweight and obese categories – that is, there are more fat people – 
than ever before. Currently, we are said to be living through an “obesity epidemic” (see, 
for example, “10 Facts About Obesity”). The concept of obesity as an epidemic emerged 
in the late 1990s and spread rapidly. (See Gilman 2008 16-17) The number of news 
stories describing obesity as an ‘epidemic’ grew exponentially between 2000 and 2004. 
(ibid.; Oliver 36) The ‘epidemic’ spread of obesity is said to be affecting the population’s 
health in serious ways. This is because, to quote the National Institutes of Health patient 
booklet, “Aim for a Healthy Weight”, “We know that an increase in weight also increases 
a person’s risk for heart disease, high blood cholesterol, high blood pressure, diabetes, 
gallbladder disease, gynecologic disorders, arthritis, some types of cancer, and even some 
lung problems.” Similarly, the CDC reports that, as weight increases, so does the risk of 
coronary heart disease, type 2 diabetes, cancer, hypertension and stroke, amongst others. 
(“Overweight and Obesity: Causes and Consequences.”) Thus, more fat people quite 
simply means more sick people. In fact, in 2000, then Surgeon General Dr. C. Everett 
Koop warned that obesity was second only to smoking as a cause of preventable deaths in 
the USA. (“The Global Spread of Obesity.”) In 2001, Koop’s successor Dr. David 
Satcher went one better, warning that obesity was about to overtake tobacco as the chief 
cause of preventable deaths in the United States. (“U.S. Warning of Death Toll From 
Obesity.”) In 2003, on the eve of the Iraq war, then Surgeon General Dr. Richard 
Carmona told a reporter that obesity was a bigger threat to US citizens’ health than 
weapons of mass destruction. (Carmona; Campos The Diet Myth 3)  
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According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 37.5% of 
adults in the US were obese in 2010. (“Prevalence of Obesity in the United States.”) In 
2004, the CDC claimed that obesity was causing as many as 400,000 deaths a year in the 
USA (“US Warning of Death Toll from Obesity”). (Indeed, it was largely on foot of this 
data that obesity was said to be overtaking tobacco as the leading cause of preventable 
deaths in the United States (ibid.)) The CDC later rowed back considerably on this claim 
(“Data on Deaths From Obesity is Inflated”), after a later study, widely held to be much 
more accurate, put the figure closer to 112,000. (Flegal et al. 2005) Nonetheless, it is still 
said that the current generation of children will be the first to die before their parents, and 
this will happen because of obesity (“Children’s Life Expectancy Being Cut Short By 
Obesity”). As one expert puts it, “... if we don’t take steps to reverse course, the children 
of each successive generation seem destined to be fatter and sicker than their parents.” 
(Ludwig 2325) Thus, there is broad – though, as we shall see, not universal – consensus 
that more people in the US are becoming overweight and obese, and that this is going to 
result in illness and death.  
Obesity is, in fact, so strongly identified with ill health that it has come to be 
classified, at least by some people and for some purposes, as a disease in itself. In the 
1980s and 1990s, two separate groups of US researchers claimed that obesity could be 
caused in part by an infectious agent – in other words, they suggested obesity was an 
infectious disease that could, at least in principle, be simply ‘cured’ by the use of anti-
viral agents. (Gilman 2010 124-126) Others have argue that obesity fulfils the standard 
criteria for disease, which are “… (1) recognized etiological agents, (2) identifiable signs 
and symptoms, and (3) consistent anatomical alterations.” (Stern and Kazaks 41) These 
latter proponents argue that, despite its behavioral aspect, obesity should still be 
considered a disease, just as lung cancer is still considered a disease even when it is partly 
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caused by smoking. (ibid. 42) Aronne, Nelinson and Lillo follow the same line of 
argument, claiming that “Obesity meets all accepted criteria of a medical disease, 
including a known etiology, recognized signs and symptoms, and a range of structural 
and functional changes that culminate in pathologic consequences.” (“Obesity as a 
Disease State”)  
Some powerful institutions have also chosen to treat obesity as a disease. In 1999, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced that it agreed that obesity is a 
disease. (“Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements.”) In a report 
published in 2000, a group of experts convened by the World Health Organisation 
describes obesity as “a serious disease” and “a chronic disease”. (“Obesity” 4) In 2002, 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that treatment for obesity was tax deductible on 
the grounds that “Obesity is medically accepted to be a disease in its own right.” (IRS 
Revenue Ruling 2002-19) In 2004, the US Department of Health and Human Services 
removed from its official policy language that defined obesity as a result of behavior and 
therefore not a disease. (“Medicare Changes Policy On Obesity.”) In June 2008, the 
Obesity Society (TOS), which calls itself “the leading scientific society dedicated to the 
study of obesity” (“About Us”), declared that it regards obesity as a disease and 
encourages others to do the same. (“Obesity as a Disease.”) In June 2013, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) followed suit. (“AMA Adopts New Policies”) 
There is by no means a universal consensus that obesity should be regarded as a 
disease, however. As we have seen, news reports on obesity and binge eating disorder 
tend to stress individual responsibility to a far greater degree than do similar reports on 
anorexia and bulimia. (Saguy and Gruys) The notion of obesity as a disease has even been 
mocked, for example by calling it “fork-to-mouth” disease (“If Obesity Is a Disease”), or 
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in the article “Scientists still seeking cure for obesity” on satirical humor website The 
Onion. Such humor is based on the idea that overweight and obesity are so clearly matters 
of individual behavior that it is ludicrous to suggest either should be regarded as a 
disease. But even amongst those who take seriously the possibility that obesity itself is a 
disease, there is dissent. For example, when it decided to regard obesity as a disease, the 
AMA went against the findings of its own Council on Science and Public Health (CSPH), 
which reported that obesity could not properly be called a disease, since there is no 
sufficiently broad consensus on the definition of disease and there is no reliable way of 
diagnosing obesity. (“Report: Is Obesity a Disease?”) The AMA CSPH report is notable 
in that it engages with ontological questions about the natures and definitions of both 
disease and obesity. Many other contributors to this and related debates do not engage 
with these questions, but rather focus on the practical, social, medical or financial effects 
of considering obesity to be a disease. The same is true of debates over whether obesity 
ought to be considered a disability, to which I now turn. 5 
There has been considerable discussion as to whether obesity is or should be 
protected as a disability under anti-discrimination employment law. Increasingly, it seems 
that “severe” obesity is so protected. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA): 
The  term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— (A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
                                                          
5 I include a brief discussion of the relationship between fatness and disability here, in the section dealing 
with fatness as illness or cause of illness, notwithstanding the important ways in which disability studies 
scholars have problematised the relationships between disability, impairment, disease and illness. (Michael 
Oliver offers a good overview of these interventions. See “Theories in Health Care Research”.) My goal 
here is to list the basic tenets of the dominant model, and, from the dominant model point of view, disability 
constitutes a lack of or loss of health, even if it is not entirely or uncomplicatedly the same thing as illness 
or disease.  
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such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment. (ADAAA Sec. 4 (a) (1).)  
In recent years, “severe” obesity has come to be seen as such an impairment, and one that 
can be a disability in certain cases. (“When Weight is Disabling”; “New Developments in 
the Law”) The attempt to protect obese employees under the ADAAA has met with some 
success. For example, in April 2012, Resources for Human Development, Inc. agreed to 
pay $125,000 to settle a disability discrimination suit filed in September 2010 by the 
EEOC. In this case, the disability was “severe obesity”. (“Resources for Human 
Development Settles”.)  
As well as legal debate, there has been medical discussion over whether obesity 
should be considered a disability. In June 2009, the American Medical Association 
(AMA), voted to endorse the following resolution:  
If obesity is designated as a disability, physicians could be sued or reprimanded 
for discrimination under the Americans with Disability Act if a patient takes 
offense at the physician discussing obesity. Therefore be it resolved that our 
American Medical Association not support the effort to make obesity a disability. 
(Cox, “Doctors Fight Labeling Obesity a Disability”) 
Note, again, how this resolution makes no claims about whether obesity is, in and of 
itself, a disability, but only claims that obesity or obese patients might be less treatable if 
obesity were designated as a disability. This implies that, even within medical circles, to 
some extent the discussion of obesity as disability is dominated by the practical issues 
involved.  
As well as being understood as a physical disease or disability, fatness is 
sometimes regarded as a manifestation or effect of mental illness. One older but still 
highly influential expression of this conception is Susie Orbach’s Fat is a Feminist Issue, 
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in which Orbach gives a psychoanalytic account of fatness in women in the late twentieth 
century USA. On Orbach’s account, fat women over-consume and/or under-exert as a 
response to psychic trauma or difficulty, specifically that brought about by living in a 
patriarchal society. Thus fatness is the result of disordered eating, which is itself a 
response to psychic trauma or difficulty. Orbach writes:  
Feminism argues that being fat represents an attempt to break free of society’s 
sex stereotypes. Getting fat can thus be understood as a definite and purposeful 
act; it is a directed, conscious or unconscious, challenge to sex-role stereotyping 
and culturally defined experience of womanhood. Fat is a social disease, and fat 
is a feminist issue. (15) 
In this conception, the fatness of women is seen as an active choice, a deliberate (albeit 
perhaps subconscious or unconscious) rejection of gender stereotypes and expectations. 
Notably, Orbach almost entirely conflates fatness with disordered eating and, particularly, 
with compulsive over-eating. It is a cornerstone of her theory that fat women have chosen 
their fatness by choosing to overeat. While Orbach’s feminist perspective could hardly be 
called ‘dominant’ in contemporary America, her understanding of fatness does fit in with 
the dominant model in significant ways. First, she treats fatness as essentially abnormal, 
as a temporary or artificial state, which is not a natural part of the ordinary run of things. 
Second, though she does not express it in dominant-model or medical scientific 
terminology, she treats fatness as a symptom of pathology. To be fat is, in some way, to 
be unhealthy, whether physically or mentally. On Orbach’s account it is a kind of 
psychic, even political, malaise that explains the physical symptom of fatness. This 
psychological conception of fatness is still present in the contemporary USA. Gina Kolata 
relates how one obese woman’s doctor told her, in 2005, that “... she had a mental 
problem because she weighed 400 pounds. She was trying to commit suicide by getting 
so fat, the doctor informed her.” (Rethinking Thin 68) Meanwhile, Binge Eating Disorder 
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(BED), which often – though not always – results in weight gain and fatness, has been 
included in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5). (“Feeding and Eating Disorders”)  
Thus, there are a number of different conceptions about how exactly fatness 
affects health, though there is very broad agreement that the effect is negative. There is, 
however, an all but overwhelming consensus between all proponents of the dominant 
model about the solution to the problem of fatness: Individual fat people need to lose 
weight by eating less and exercising more.  
 (3) The best way to address the problem of fatness is for fat people to lose 
weight 
As we have seen, according to the dominant model, most fat, overweight or obese 
people are so because they consume too much and exert themselves too little. There is 
also broad agreement that it would be better for their health if fat people were to lose 
weight. These points of agreement are based on the findings of successive studies in 
various scientific disciplines, and are disseminated to the public by various means, 
including through various government agencies. As one NIH pamphlet puts it, “Reaching 
and maintaining a healthy weight is important for overall health and can help you prevent 
and control many diseases and conditions.” (“Aim for a Healthy Weight”)  It is widely 
accepted that, “To lose weight, you must use up more calories than you take in. Since one 
pound [of fat] equals 3,500 calories, you need to reduce your caloric intake by 500—1000 
calories per day to lose about 1 to 2 pounds per week.” (“Losing Weight”; see also 
“Balance Food and Activity”, “Balancing Calories”.) There is also broad agreement 
amongst advocates of the dominant model that small weight reductions can have big 
benefits. We are often told that, “... even a modest weight loss, such as 5 to 10 percent of 
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your total body weight, is likely to produce health benefits, such as improvements in 
blood pressure, blood cholesterol, and blood sugars.” (“Losing Weight”) The overall 
message is that you should check your BMI and, if you are above the ‘healthy weight’ 
category, losing some weight will improve your health. As an article on the popular 
health website WebMD.com puts it, “Lowering body weight can reverse or prevent 
diabetes; lower blood pressure, cholesterol, and triglyceride levels; and improve sleep 
apnea and other sleep problems – along with helping you feel better about yourself.” 
(Zelman, “Lose Weight, Gain Tons of Benefits.”) 
The most common method of weight loss is dieting, sometimes teamed with an 
exercise program. The goal is to redress the calorie imbalance that has led to fatness by 
consuming fewer calories (and, sometimes, by expending more calories in exercise). 
Moore and Pi-Sunyer write that, “From a practical standpoint, there are only two avenues 
to weight control that an individual can influence – how much is consumed (i.e., food and 
drink) and how much physical activity is engaged in.” (25) Accordingly, the advice given 
to those who would lose weight is almost always to consume fewer calories (while 
maintaining a good nutritional balance) and to exercise more. In the vast majority of 
dominant model discourse, the basic assumption is that it is possible for the vast majority 
of overweight and obese people to lose enough weight to put them in the normal weight 
category, or at least enough to improve their health significantly, by simply eating 
healthily and exercising. The general consensus is that “... combining dietary restriction 
with increased physical activity facilitates weight loss and helps prevent weight regain.” 
(Butryn, Clark and Coletta, “Behavioral Approaches to the Treatment of Obesity” 262) At 
certain times, especially in the twentieth century, the emphasis has been on diet, however, 
today, neither diet nor exercise alone is considered to be nearly as effective as the 
combination of the two. (ibid.)  
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Those who struggle to lose weight in the standard way may be offered help in the 
form of drugs or surgery. At the time of writing, there is only one anti-obesity drug 
approved by the FDA for long-term treatment of obesity, namely orlistat. (Bray, 
“Pharmacological Approaches to the Treatment of Obesity” 313-314) The FDA has 
approved other drugs for short-term use in the treatment of obesity, while there is also a 
number of drugs approved by the FDA for treatment of other conditions but which have a 
side effect of weight loss. (ibid. 314-318) Four weight loss drugs are currently in phase III 
clinical trials. (ibid. 318) Some weight loss drugs that were available in the past have 
been withdrawn from the market because they were found to have very dangerous side 
effects. Perhaps the most notorious example is phentermine-fenfluramine (‘phen-fen’), 
which was widely prescribed in the 1990s, but then pulled from the market when serious 
doubts arose as to its safety. (Kolata, Rethinking Thin, 22-26)  
In the contemporary USA, many people are even willing to undergo major, life-
changing surgery if it means they can shed (what they consider to be) their excess weight. 
Weight loss surgery (WLS) or ‘bariatric surgery’ is a growth area in contemporary 
medicine. There are surgical procedures which aim to limit food intake (these are known 
as ‘restrictive’ procedures), procedures which aim to limit nutrient absorption 
(‘malabsorptive’), and procedures which combine some aspects of the two. (Bessler et al., 
“Surgical Treatment of Severe Obesity” 323) There has been a huge increase in the 
number of people undergoing such surgeries, from about 16,200 in 1994 (Robinson, 
“Surgical Treatment of Obesity”, 520) to about 177,600 in 2006 (“Benefits of Bariatric 
Surgery”). These surgeries are expensive, potentially dangerous and require extreme 
changes of lifestyle even in cases with few to no complications. Thus, the fact that so 
many people are willing to undergo them shows how highly both they and their doctors 
value weight loss. This is certainly because, on the dominant model, fatness is considered 
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to be extremely dangerous to one’s health. However, a very significant part of the 
desirability of weight loss is likely also attributable to the other aspects of the dominant 
model that I discussed in the introduction, such as the aesthetic preference for thinness, 
and the notion that fat people are greedy and lazy. Despite these factors, there is a 
growing minority of commentators, both within the scientific community and beyond, 
questioning whether significant, long-term weight loss is ever possible without severe 
side effects, and whether it is even a very important goal at all. There are a number of 
dissenting voices, some of whose critiques have begun to cohere in recent years into an 
alternative understanding of fatness. In the next section, I outline this alternative 
understanding.   
Challenges and alternatives to the dominant model 
Challenges to the dominant model come from a number of sources. Across various 
academic disciplines and professions, a growing (though still minority) number of 
commentators is challenging the dominant model of obesity. In this section, I focus in 
particular on the Fat Acceptance (FA) and Health At Every Size (HAES) approach to 
fatness, because it is FA and, in particular, HAES, that has, thus far, offered the strongest 
attempt at a genuine alternative to the dominant model of fatness and health. Below, I 
outline what I take to be the central tenets of this alternative model. Each of these tenets is 
(by no means coincidentally) a direct contradiction of one of the central tenets of the 
dominant model outlined above. Before I discuss these, however, I want to mention some 
of the researchers who, though in many cases they are not themselves directly aligned 
with the FA or HAES movements, have produced research or critique which has become 
central to arguments for the FA and HAES approaches.  
A notable example is Albert J. Stunkard, emeritus director of the Center for 
Weight and Eating Disorders at the University of Pennsylvania, who published widely on 
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obesity in psychiatry and medicine journals. Stunkard tells Kolata, “Most obese people 
are no different than non-obese people.” (Kolata, Rethinking Thin, 93) Based on his 
decades of research, Stunkard has concluded that (in Kolata’s words):  
There is no psychiatric pathology that spells obesity. And there is no response to 
food that is not shared by people who are not fat. [...] You can’t say you got fat 
because there is a lot of stress in your life. Thin people are just as likely to eat 
under stress. You can’t say it was because you used food as a reward. If that is the 
reason, then why do thin people, who also use food as a reward, stay thin? (ibid. 
93-94) 
The notion that fat people’s behavior around food is not different from that of thin people 
is clearly a challenge to the calorie balance concept of overweight and obesity. From the 
mainstream dominant-model scientific point of view, eating and exercise are the ‘big two’ 
controllable factors in overweight and obesity. If Stunkard’s claims are true, one of the 
‘big two’ is practically eliminated as a controllable factor. While this would still leave 
intact the possibility that fat people are fat because they expend less energy in exercise 
and activity (and thus that they could lose weight by exercising more and being more 
active), it still flies in the face of majority expert – and, indeed, non-expert – opinion on 
the causes and meaning of fatness.  
Stunkard’s work has been very widely published in peer-reviewed journals over 
his long career. Often, however, challenges to the biomedical obesity science of the 
dominant model come in the form of more popular books, rather than in peer-reviewed 
journal articles. For example, in Big Fat Lies, Glenn Gaesser argues that close analysis of 
the available data show that the dangers of being overweight and obese have been greatly 
overstated, and that, in fact, overweight and obesity may confer modest health benefits. 
(Gaesser 2002) In The Diet Myth, law professor Paul Campos “cross-examines” (as he 
puts it) the evidence for the idea that obesity can cause disease and even death, and he 
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claims that there is actually very little strong evidence that being overweight or obese 
increases the risk of disease or death. (Campos The Diet Myth; see especially 8-28.) 
Meanwhile, physical education expert Bruce Ross argues that, “There is little to no 
evidence to support the assumption that obesity causes non-communicable diseases such 
as non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus and ischaemic heart disease rather than being a 
symptom of those diseases.” (Ross, “Fat or Fiction”, 106) Sports science and education 
researcher Michael Gard claims that the dominant model is based on inadequate scientific 
data, that we simply do not know enough about obesity to draw any conclusions like 
those drawn by the dominant model, and that (regardless of the possible dangers of excess 
adiposity) the present ‘obesity epidemic’ has been driven primarily by moral panic rather 
than medical concern. (Gard and Wright 2005; Gard 2011) Similarly, political scientist J. 
Eric Oliver argues that much of that panic around the obesity epidemic is based on hatred 
of fatness, which is in turn rooted in racism, classism and other biases. (Oliver, Fat 
Politics, 2005)  
As I have said, these authors are not all themselves advocates of Fat Acceptance, 
nor do they all endorse the Health at Every Size approach. However, their work has been 
used extensively by FA and HAES commentators and activists to make the case for an 
alternative model of fatness. The development, discovery and dissemination of their ideas 
has been part of the work of the FA and HAES movement, many of whose members 
would see themselves as uncovering the scientific truth that has been obscured by fat 
hatred and moral panic around obesity.  
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FA itself is a broad movement.6 It encompasses activists, bloggers (the online FA 
community is referred to as “the fat-o-sphere” (see for example Harding and Kirby)), as 
well as organizations such as the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance 
(NAAFA) and the International Size Acceptance Association (ISAA). There is significant 
overlap between the FA and HAES movements, though in public discourse the latter is 
represented more prominently by nutritionists and other health professionals. Like 
proponents of the dominant model, proponents of FA and HAES are diverse in their 
beliefs, practices and aims. However, like proponents of the dominant model, they by and 
large agree on a set of basic, central claims. Below, I list and discuss these claims. Again, 
my goal here is not to argue for the truth or falsity of these claims. Rather, I want to show 
that FA/HAES does not currently provide a radical alternative to the dominant model of 
health. This is the case, I will argue, because much FA/HAES commentary either accepts 
or simply ignores the problematic naturalist assumptions at the heart of the dominant 
models of both fatness and health.   
(1) Some people are naturally fat.  
                                                          
6 In fact, not all those in the movement even refer to it as Fat Acceptance – some use the term Fat Liberation 
(Vesta44; Freespirit and Aldebaran), others Fat Activism (Cooper; “Three Dangerous Fat Activism Myths”), 
others Size Acceptance (“ISAA Mission Statement”). However, I deem the term Fat Acceptance especially 
apt. The first reason is that it is fat specifically, not size generally, that is the target of the prejudice the 
movement is trying to highlight and challenge. But this could also legitimate the use of Fat Liberation or Fat 
Activism as the umbrella term. So the second reason I deem Fat Acceptance most appropriate is that the 
terms Fat Liberation and Fat Activism suggest, and, indeed, refer to, movements united by particular political 
and activist principles. However, the political perspectives of FA writers and critics vary widely. Everyone in 
this movement (by definition) advocates fat acceptance, but not everyone in the movement argues for fat 
acceptance on explicitly political grounds, and, even amongst those who do, the political grounds vary. For 
example, in Lessons From the Fat-o-sphere (2009) Harding’s and Kirby’s arguments tend to align with 
traditional liberal principles, while in Revolting Bodies (2004), Kathleen LeBesco draws on identity politics 
to consider fatness as an “othered” identity. For these reasons, I think Fat Acceptance is the best umbrella 
term to use.  
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FA/HAES activists and writers claim that some people simply have more adipose 
tissue than others, and that someone’s body size, shape or composition, on its own, tells 
us very little about his or her health. For most in the FA movement, the word “fat” is a 
purely physical description of a person who has more than the usual amount of adipose 
tissue. It should not imply any medical, let alone moral, judgement of the person. Marilyn 
Wann claims that, “Weight, like height, is a human characteristic that varies across any 
population in a bell curve.” (“Foreword” ix) FA commentators often use the word ‘fat’ 
deliberately in an attempt to normalise it and reclaim it as a descriptive word with (as they 
see it) no more evaluative or normative content than terms like ‘tall’ or ‘young’. Harding 
and Kirby write:  
We can’t stand the word ‘overweight’ because of the implication that there is a 
single, objectively correct weight for every human body. There ain’t. ... We are 
fat, just as we are both fairly short, both have curly hair ... and both wear glasses 
some of the time. As far as we’re concerned, the word ‘fat’ has no more moral 
value than those other descriptions; it just is what it is. (Lessons from the Fat-o-
sphere xi) 
Marilyn Wann says, “...it’s just as polite to say ‘fat’ as it is to say ‘young’ or ‘tall’ or 
‘human’.” (Fat?So! 20) As Charlotte Cooper says, summing it up, “...fat rights activists 
believe that fat is something that is normal, part of a continuum of body sizes...” (Fat and 
Proud 13) Deb Burgard writes that encouraging fat people to lose weight for their health 
is comparable to, “... starving a St. Bernard because a study of dogs shows that 
greyhounds live longer.” (“What is ‘Health at Every Size’?” 44) Clearly, this way of 
understanding fat is a direct contradiction of the dominant model view, on which fatness 
is taken to be an abnormal state, and not part of the natural variation of healthy bodies.  
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 Indeed, not all FA commentators even agree that fatness itself exists in the way 
that it is assumed to exist under the dominant model. Some regard fatness as a social 
construction. Charlotte Cooper points out:  
Many of us [FA advocates] would argue that slenderness is real and quantifiable, 
while others would say that the distinctions between fat and thin are blurred and 
that slenderness only exists in opposition to fatness because it has been positioned 
as a primary desire in Anglo-American culture – that without such distinctions 
there would be no such thing as fat or thin. (Fat and Proud 6) 
Cooper herself goes on to argue against the notion of fatness as social construct, 
concluding that fatness is “a very real and tangible physical difference” (ibid. 10) 
However, she cites Nicky Diamond’s 1985 critique of Fat is a Feminist Issue as an 
example of the argument that fatness ought to be understood as social construction. That 
conception of fatness as social construction persists into more recent debates. In their 
editors’ introduction to Bodies Out of Bounds, published in 2004, Kathleen LeBesco and 
Jana Evans Braziel refer to “the restrictive constructions of corpulence within discourses 
– medical, psychological, and capitalistic – that have accumulated around the site of the 
‘fat body’...” (1). In her essay in the Fat Studies Reader (published in 2009), Elena Levy-
Navarro refers to both obesity and health as ‘constructs’ that have been ‘invented’. 
Obesity, in particular, she describes as an ‘oppressive construct’. (“Fattening Queer 
History” 16) If one takes fatness to be a social construct, then it becomes meaningless to 
ask whether some people are just ‘naturally’ fat. Those who start from the assumption 
that fatness is a social construct tend to focus more on critiquing representations of 
fatness in the social, political and cultural realm rather than on questioning the explicit 
empirical claims of proponents of the dominant model.  
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 (2) Fatness in itself is not unhealthy.  
Those critics (only some of whom identify explicitly as FA or HAES advocates) 
who consider fatness in terms of social construction generally cast the so-called ‘obesity 
epidemic’ as a moral panic rather than a health crisis. (Gard and Wright The Obesity 
Epidemic; LeBesco and Evans Braziel Bodies Out of Bounds; Oliver Fat Politics; Wright 
and Harwood (eds.) Biopolitics and the ‘Obesity Epidemic’) For these commentators, the 
focus is on the social, cultural and political context in which the ‘obesity epidemic’ is 
occurring. It is notable that, like dominant model commentators I mentioned above, these 
commentators are often more concerned with the social and political implications of how 
we label fatness than they are with the ontological status of fatness itself. For example, 
discussing the issue of whether obesity ought to be thought of as a disability, Aphramor 
(2009) argues that fatness itself is not necessarily an impairment of the kind that typically 
characterises disability (899), however, she does argue that fatness has become the locus 
of “a specific form of disablist oppression” (901-903). Aphramor is herself responding to 
an earlier paper by Cooper (1997), who also discusses the question of fatness as disability 
in political rather than ontological terms, and rejects the notion that fatness or disability 
are in themselves necessarily problematic. Brandon and Pritchard (“Being Fat”) seem to 
move closer to the ontological issue. They apply three different models of disability to 
fatness, namely, the medical model, the social model and the affirmation model. They 
find that, when considered in terms of each of these three models, fatness does overlap 
with disability to a considerable extent. Again, however, their conclusions center on the 
advantages and disadvantages of fat advocates and disability advocates joining forces 
(“Being Fat” 87-88).  
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Even those FA and HAES commentators who accept the empirical assumptions of 
the dominant model still claim that being fat, in itself, is not harmful to one’s health. This 
is not to say that every FA or HAES commentator claims that the link between obesity 
and mortality or morbidity is negligible. But, even so, they tend to argue that if there is a 
proven link between obesity and disease, that does not prove that obesity causes disease.  
In Lessons From the Fat-o-sphere, Harding and Kirby write:  
So, yeah, there’s an established correlation between obesity and excess mortality, 
but that doesn’t tell us that being fat leads to early death. What it tells us is that 
something common to many obese people sometimes does lead to early death – 
and fat ain’t the only thing a lot of fatties have in common. (Lessons from the 
Fatosphere 175)  
On the HAES side, Bacon and Aphramor claim that, “Except at statistical extremes, body 
mass index (BMI) – or amount of body fat – only weakly predicts longevity.” (“Weight 
Science” 2) On the HAES blog, Marsha Hudnall defines healthy weight as, “...an 
outcome of living according to HAES principles.” (“Exploring Healthy Weight”) So, for 
HAES advocates, there is no particular weight range within which all healthy people are 
to be found; rather, the weight of any person who lives healthily is, by definition, a 
healthy weight. Deb Burgard argues that the concepts of ‘healthy weight’ and ‘unhealthy 
weight’ are the results of faulty reasoning. She writes, “The ‘risk factor’ of higher BMI 
comes from a comparison of always-been-thinner people to fatter people, and we do not 
know whether “reduced” fat people would have the same risk profile as always-been-
thinner people ...”. (“What is ‘Health at Every Size’?” 43) HAES commentators regard 
the idea that fatness is unhealthy as more of a prejudice than a fact, thus, one of the aims 
of the HAES movement is to “... untangle the effects of weight stereotyping.” (ibid. 48) 
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Indeed, some FA and HAES commentators suggest that what Burgard calls 
‘weight stereotyping’ may be more harmful to the health of fat people than their fatness 
itself. Bacon claims, “The real enemy ... is not weight, but weight stigma. Fear of fat is 
much more harmful than actual adiposity, distracting us from true threats to our health 
and well-being.” (“Fat Stigma – Not Fat.”) Harding and Kirby claim that fat people may 
suffer negative health outcomes because the anti-fat prejudice of medical practitioners 
makes medical settings ‘emotionally and physically treacherous’ for fat patients. (Lessons 
from the Fat-o-sphere 51) Cooper writes that, “The real risk to fat people’s health is in 
our attempts to lose weight.” (Fat and Proud 74) And, from the FA and HAES points of 
view, any harm caused by weight loss attempts is particularly tragic, since FA and HAES 
advocates do not regard long term, healthy weight loss as a real possibility for most of 
people.  
(3) It is all but impossible to make a naturally fat person thin over the long 
term.  
FA and HAES advocates argue strongly that most weight loss attempts fail, and, 
on the rare occasions that they succeed, they often do so at great cost to the health of the 
person. HAES, in fact, has its roots in a rejection of dieting and other weight loss 
attempts. The notion that weight loss is neither a valuable nor an achievable health goal is 
to all intents and purposes the defining belief of HAES. According to Linda Bacon:  
The vast majority of people who try to lose weight regain it, regardless of 
whether they maintain their diet or exercise program. This occurs in all studies, 
no matter how many calories or what proportions of fat, protein or carbohydrates 
are used in the diet, or what types of exercise programs are pursued. Many studies 
also show that dieting is a strong predictor of future weight gain. (“HAES 
Manifesto”)  
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Indeed, HAES commentators often express anger and frustration at the refusal of 
dominant model proponents to abandon weight loss as a goal. HAES advocate Joanne P. 
Ikeda laments that:  
... the results of the Look Ahead study were published in 2012 with no fanfare 
because after all the years of treatment and support, the average weight loss was 
around 7 pounds. “Why? Why?” I ask myself, “Why does the scientific 
community refuse to admit this approach has failed?” (“A Dietitian’s Road to 
HAES”) 
The broader FA community is strongly allied with HAES on this point. Dieting in 
particular comes in for criticism from FA commentators. Harding and Kirby devote an 
entire chapter of their book to arguing that diets don’t work. (Lessons from the Fat-o-
Sphere 3-12) Marilyn Wann says that, “...the more we diet, the more weight we gain. In 
fact you’re more likely to survive cancer than you are to lose weight and keep it off.” 
(Fat?So! 92) However, FA and HAES commentators also reject other weight loss options 
such as medical and surgical intervention. Reminding readers of the “phen-fen” scandal 
(see Kolata Rethinking Thin 22-26) and highlighting the case of similarly under-
researched drug sibutramine, Paul Ernsberger claims that there is an “... absence of any 
safe and effective treatment for obesity....”. (The Diet Myth xiv) Weight loss surgery 
(WLS) is also rejected by FA and HAES commentators because they see it as ineffective 
at best and dangerous at worst. (See for example “Why We Oppose Weight-Loss 
Surgery”; “Mandatory Weight Loss Surgery?”)  
Some commentators (Campos; Gaesser “Is ‘Permanent Weight Loss’ an 
Oxymoron?”; Harding and Kirby) simply say that there is currently no safe, long term 
way to make fat people thin, while leaving open the possibility that weight loss might be 
a good thing for some people if it could be safely accomplished. Others, however, seem to 
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be opposed to weight loss even in principle. In her introduction to the Fat Studies Reader, 
Marilyn Wann warns academics, “If you believe that fat people could (and should) lose 
weight, then you are not doing fat studies – you are part of the $58.6 billion-per-year 
weight-loss industry or its vast customer base.” (“Foreword” ix) Such stark terms set up a 
very strong dichotomy: Either you refuse outright to consider that weight loss is ever 
possible (‘could’) or valuable (‘should’) for fat people, or you are just another lackey or 
dupe of what one might call the diet industrial complex.  
Each of the three numbered claims above is a direct contradiction of one the basic 
tenets of the dominant model, thus, they are direct contradictions of claims that are widely 
accepted in the contemporary USA. Moreover, they are direct contradictions of claims 
that are understood as scientific, and therefore reliable and factual. To challenge the 
dominant model understanding of fat, FA activists have long believed that they must meet 
that model on its own turf, that is, in the field of science. It is for this reason that FA 
commentators draw extensively on the work of HAES researchers and practitioners as 
well as the work of those like Stunkard and Gaesser who have scientific credentials and 
yet dispute the dominant model conclusions on obesity. In fact, whether they themselves 
are scientists or not, FA activists often discuss scientific issues and evidence at length and 
in detail. Saguy and Riley quote FA activist Lynn McAfee:  
I’m not actually particularly that interested in [health] and God I hate science ...  
but I recognized very early on that if we are ever to succeed, we have to get a 
foothold in the medical world and make them understand. And that’s what I’ve 
tried to do because, when it comes down to it, the last argument is, ‘oh but it’s so 
unhealthy for you. ...’ People get to discriminate against us because they’re just 
trying to help us with our health. (Saguy and Riley 878) 
Thus, whether for theoretical or practical reasons or both, many FA commentators are 
reluctant to take on the dominant model of health or, indeed, that of knowledge. That is, 
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they don’t object to the methodology of science in general, only to what they see as its 
misapplication in the case of obesity. Those who do reject scientific methodology (that is, 
those who see health, fatness and even science itself as social constructions) reject it so 
thoroughly that, by and large, they simply do not engage at all in the scientific and quasi-
scientific debates that make up so much of the discourse on fatness in the contemporary 
USA. The upshot is that, while there are many commentators who reject the dominant 
model of fatness, and some who reject the dominant model of health more generally, we 
still lack the kind of detailed critique of these models themselves, and of their theoretical 
assumptions, that I will argue is needed if we are to develop a genuine alternative to these 
dominant models.  
 Granted, on the face of it, HAES advocates may seem to be offering a genuine 
alternative to the dominant model of health. Certainly the notion that weight or BMI is 
not a useful measurement of health is a radical one in the context of the contemporary 
USA. However, by and large, HAES advocates, like FA advocates, do not dispute the 
dominant model conception of health, they only dispute its relationship to fatness. In most 
cases, they present their claims not as alternatives to the data offered by dominant model 
researchers but as more accurate interpretations of those data. In one respect, however, 
HAES does offer a path to a genuinely radical way of understanding health. This is its 
emphasis on behavior. Since I ultimately argue that health is a characteristic of actions 
rather than of bodies, I regard this emphasis on behavior as a firm and significant step in 
the right direction. I will discuss this aspect of HAES in greater detail in Chapter 2. In the 
next section of the present chapter, however, I discuss the dominant model of health in 
more detail and show that, in their present states, FA and HAES fail to critique that model 
and thus are not in a position to provide a genuine alternative to it.  
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The dominant model of health 
My goal in this section is to identify the claims that are being made about health 
itself, implicitly or explicitly, in expressions of the dominant model of fatness. In short, 
what does ‘health’ mean in the dominant model? When we examine the case of fatness, 
some key aspects of the answer to this question emerge.  
As we have seen, the dominant model of health is almost always expressed in the 
language and concepts of contemporary scientific method and discourse. This is because, 
as we have seen, fatness is understood primarily and fundamentally as a health problem, 
and because, as we will see, health is understood primarily and fundamentally as a matter 
for science and scientists. For example, consider again the concept of the calorie balance, 
a concept which is treated almost as an article of faith by proponents of the dominant 
model of fatness. According to the conventional wisdom, in order to lose weight, one 
must ‘take in’ fewer calories than one ‘uses up’, thus creating an energy deficit for which 
the body will compensate by using up fat stores. David Berreby quotes then New York 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg: “If you want to lose weight, don’t eat. This is not medicine, 
it’s thermodynamics. If you take in more than you use, you store it.” (“The Obesity Era”) 
Berreby adds: “Got that? It’s not complicated medicine, it’s simple physics, the most 
sciencey science of all.” (ibid., emphasis in the original.) As Berreby points out, the 
positions of actual obesity scientists are much more nuanced than Bloomberg’s statement 
would suggest. (ibid.) Nonetheless, Gard and Wright (The Obesity Epidemic; see 
especially the chapter entitled “The Ghost of a Machine”) argue that almost the entire 
field of obesity studies is indeed underpinned by the assumption that body weight 
operates in strict and predictable accordance with a law whereby “a – b = c, where a is 
energy consumed, b is energy expended and c is the resulting change in body weight.” 
(ibid. 40) Bloomberg is emphasising the simplicity, the certainty and the truth of the 
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concept of the calorie balance by saying it’s thermodynamics. In other words, he’s saying 
it’s pure, it’s true, it’s definite – it’s real, hard science. This expectation, manifested in the 
dominant understanding of fatness, is a key part of the dominant model understanding of 
health.  
As Gard and Wright argue, the ‘thermodynamics’ model of obesity rests on a 
wholly mechanical understanding of the human body. Language like that used by 
Bloomberg makes the fat body sound somewhat like a steam train that is weighed down 
and unbalanced by excess fuel. In order to get rid of the excess, those in charge of the 
train must make every effort to burn the fuel on board as quickly as they can, while taking 
on as little extra as possible. This conception of the human body as a machine – and a 
fairly straightforward, old-fashioned one at that – is common in the dominant model of 
health. The comparison is not necessarily entirely wrong, but it is limited for a number of 
reasons. As Gard and Wright point out, the ‘body as machine’ model:  
...appears to fail on two fronts. First, it has not produced a robust and empirically 
verifiable account of why people become overweight or obese. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, it has generated precious few insights for solving the 
problem it claims to study. (ibid. 69) 
The problem is that, unlike the inner workings of actual machines, those of the human 
body remain obscure in many ways, even to our greatest experts. We know a great deal 
about how fuel gets into machines like steam trains, and what happens to it when it gets 
there. At least at the level of atoms and molecules, if not at subatomic level, we have a 
pretty good working account of that system. But we don’t fully understand the systems by 
which human beings come to eat food (i.e. to take in fuel) or what happens to the food 
once it is eaten. If the body is a machine, it is a uniquely mysterious one; the manner in 
which ‘fuel’ is ‘stored’ and ‘used up’ in this machine is only partly understood.  
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Another point, not raised by Gard and Wright, but in my view just as crucial, is 
that the ‘body as machine’ model gives rise to a somewhat odd conception of personhood. 
It suggests that the person and the body are somehow separate, that the person is running 
the body (like one would a machine), but is not the body. The idea that I, as an individual 
person, can stand over and above my ‘fuel intake’ assumes that ‘I’ am somehow over and 
above the systems that regulate that intake, that I am independent of and in control of the 
‘machine’ of my body. FA and HAES advocates do not critique this mistaken line of 
thinking. In fact, by and large, they fall into the same kind of error. Samantha Murray 
(2008) points out that FA and HAES advocates tend to argue that fat people can choose to 
love and accept their fat bodies no matter what the contents of their particular experiences 
of their fatness. This, as Murray argues, represents a complete failure to take seriously the 
embodied nature of lived experience. One cannot simply choose to experience one’s body 
in a particular way, no more than one can simply choose to stand outside one’s own 
internal systems of appetite and consumption.  
 Of course, this claim that the mind and the body are in some way radically 
separate could possibly be true, but it is a huge metaphysical assumption, and one that is 
at odds with experience of being embodied. By and large, I believe such metaphysical 
conundrums are the outcome of the kind of thinking according to which the body (and 
therefore health) is best understood in the manner and in the terms we use for other 
physical things. This kind of thinking I will refer to as physicalism. Physicalism goes 
hand in hand with naturalism, which, as I discuss further in Chapter 2, is a major 
theoretical weakness in the dominant model, leading in turn to significant practical 
problems.  
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As well as physicalism, Bloomberg’s comment also exemplifies another, related 
aspect of the dominant models of fatness and health. This is the way in which, in the 
contemporary USA, one often uses the word ‘weight’ – the name of the measurement – as 
shorthand for all the interrelated phenomena of body size, shape and composition. 
(Strictly speaking, pounds and kilograms are measurements of mass, not weight, but in 
everyday usage, we generally refer to the measurement as ‘weight’.) When we think 
about fatness, we immediately think not just of particular body sizes, shapes or 
compositions, but also of particular body weights (or masses). It makes some sense, in 
American culture today, to say of someone, “He looks like he weighs about two hundred 
pounds”, even though bodies of quite widely varying sizes, shapes and compositions 
could have a mass of two hundred pounds. We have, to a considerable degree, conflated 
the object of the measurement and the tool with which we measure that object such that 
the one word ‘weight’ can mean both the measurement (that is, the number on the scale) 
and what it is intended to measure (that is, one’s actual body size, shape or composition). 
This reflects a broader tendency of the dominant model to conflate health itself with its 
methods of measuring health. As we have seen, many FA and HAES commentators do 
not challenge this conflation of health itself with measurements of health, but simply 
reject the idea that weight or BMI is a good measurement of health.  
One of the problems with this conflation is that it starts to seem as though 
changing the measurements is the same thing as changing the object that is being 
measured. This can be clearly seen in the case of fatness. The complex phenomena of 
body size, shape and composition are reduced to a number, often weight or BMI. This 
number is then treated as though it were a strong representation of the person’s body size, 
shape and composition. As a result, rather than being told that his or her body size, shape 
and/or composition is associated with health risks, often the person is just told that he or 
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she will be healthier if he or she loses weight. In other words, the advice given, quite 
literally, is to change the measurement. Of course, the majority of doctors or other 
medical experts is highly unlikely to advocate weight loss by any means necessary, or to 
argue that lowering the number on the scale will automatically make the overweight or 
obese person healthier. But, the frequency with which the advice to ‘lose weight’ is given 
does contribute to a general acceptance that changing one’s weight (regardless of how or 
why) has an impact on one’s health.  
In marked contrast to the perspective of the dominant model, it is practically an 
axiom of the Fat Acceptance movement that one cannot tell how healthy a person is 
merely by looking at him or her. For example, on the Dances With Fat blog, Ragen 
Chastain says, “There are exactly two things that you can tell by looking at someone’s 
size: (1) What size they are [and] (2) What your personal preconceived notions and 
prejudices about that particular body size are.” (“Things You Can Tell By Looking At 
Us”) This claim is at odds not only with the dominant model of fatness, but with the 
dominant model of health as a whole. Of course, it directly contradicts the factual claims 
of the majority of mainstream obesity researchers. However, it also contradicts the 
dominant model at a more theoretical level, because, on the dominant model, ‘looking at’ 
the body is exactly what one does to find out how healthy that body is. Granted, 
measurement of the body such as is used in medicine is not limited to mere ‘looking’, but 
uses other senses too, and, granted, the kind of observation that medical practitioners 
make use of in diagnosis is much more careful and more detailed than the kind of glance 
or once-over one might give a stranger on the street or even a friend. Nonetheless, it still 
boils down to the essential principle that looking at someone, or, more accurately, 
empirical observation, is actually a pretty good way of knowing how healthy he or she is.  
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Effectively, when someone who accepts the dominant model looks at a fat person, 
he or she makes an eyeball estimate of what that fat person’s measurements (including 
and perhaps especially his or her weight) are likely to be, and, on this basis, he or she 
deduces that the fat person is unhealthy. This is not to say that every such judgement rests 
on a conscious thought to the effect of “This person must weigh such-and-such pounds. 
I’ll bet her BMI is over 30!” Rather, it is that we are so strongly conditioned to conflate 
weight and size that, when we perceive body sizes, shapes and compositions, the 
possibility of expressing them as measurements is already part of our experience of them.  
In fact, we are to some degree conditioned to look at physical objects in (what we 
take to be) a scientific way. The dominance of the natural sciences already conditions our 
experiences in many ways. We see physical things as measurable and analysable. And we 
see human bodies, at least partly and sometimes, as physical things. Thus, looking at 
someone is understood as a quick-and-dirty version of the kind of empirical observation 
undertaken by doctors and scientists. We accept that just looking at somebody is a very 
limited kind of empirical observation. But we also assume that it is on the same spectrum 
with more accurate kinds of observation, such as clinical measurements of mass, blood 
pressure, body fat percentage or blood glucose level. We tend to assume that simply 
looking at someone gives us the same kind of information, just not as much of it, as that 
used by doctors or scientists to assess a person’s health. On this account, the idea that one 
cannot tell how healthy someone is by looking at him or her just doesn’t make sense. On 
the dominant model, to appear healthy under observation is to be healthy.  
On the face of it, it seems that many FA commentators reject this belief because 
they reject the notion that one can tell how healthy a person is by looking at him or her. 
But a closer examination of FA writing shows that, very often, this is not really the case 
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at all. In fact, as I indicated above, many FA commentators do not dispute the value of 
empirical observation at all, they only dispute the notion that just looking at a person 
constitutes an accurate method of observation. In fact, when defending the notion that fat 
people can be healthy too, they very often appeal to other empirical measurements. For 
example, Marilyn Wann says, “My blood pressure, blood sugars, and cholesterol levels 
are all normal. I feel great, and I weigh 270 pounds. I’m living proof that you don’t have 
to be thin to be healthy.” (Fat?So! 32) Harding and Kirby similarly suggest that, “The 
number on the scale is actually pretty irrelevant as a measure of health. [...] Instead of 
checking your weight, check out your numbers for blood pressure and cholesterol and 
triglycerides.” (Lessons from the Fat-o-Sphere 72) Clearly, these writers are assuming 
that, while weighing someone is not a good way of measuring health empirically, health 
nonetheless can be measured empirically – for example, by measuring blood pressure, 
blood sugars and cholesterol. This point becomes even clearer when we consider the 
following extract from a post on Ragen Chastain’s Dances With Fat blog:  
When we use weight as a stand-in for health, we are putting a middle man where 
we don’t need one.  We can test a patient’s blood pressure, give evidence-based 
interventions to lower it if it is too high, and then test the blood pressure again to 
see if the interventions are working. (“For Fat Patients”) 
The implication here is that weight is a ‘middle man’ or ‘stand-in’ for health, whereas 
blood pressure (for example) is not. So, Chastain effectively says that it is possible to 
measure a person’s health directly by means of empirical observation of her body, it’s just 
that measuring her weight (or, strictly speaking, her mass) is not a reliable means of 
carrying out such observation. In other words, Chastain and others who take up similar 
lines of argument are assuming that health itself is something that is directly measurable 
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by means of empirical observation. If health can be directly measured by empirical 
observation of the body, then health must be a characteristic or a feature of the body.  
Conclusion: Objectivist and Constructivist Conceptions of Health 
Of course, there are, as we have seen, FA commentators who regard fatness itself 
as a social construction, and who are thus sceptical about measuring fatness itself – let 
alone its impact on health – by empirical means. If fatness is not ‘a real physical 
difference’ (to borrow Cooper’s phrase), then it cannot be measured by empirical means, 
and thus it is nonsense to argue that measuring it can somehow also measure one’s health. 
This ‘social construction’ model of fatness is a particular manifestation of a broader 
understanding of health in general as constructed, an understanding which stands in 
opposition to the physicalist and naturalist dominant model of health. Dominic Murphy 
(“Concepts of Disease and Health”) distinguishes between what he calls (following 
Kitcher (1997)) ‘objectivist’ and ‘constructivist’ understandings of health. Objectivism 
centers on the belief that claims about health and disease ought to be grounded on facts 
about the human body. The dominant model of health is, both in its theoretical 
assumptions and its practical methods, objectivist. The dominant model of fatness 
outlined above also fits neatly into the objectivist approach to understanding health. 
Those who reject the usefulness of weight as a measure of health, while yet upholding the 
value of other empirical measurements of health, also remain committed to an objectivist 
conception of health. On the other hand, the notion of fatness as social construction fits in 
with the broader constructivist notion of health which rejects the idea of biomedical 
knowledge as ‘grounded’ in facts.  
As Murphy notes, other authors have referred to objectivism as ‘naturalism’ and to 
constructivism as ‘normativism’. Murphy shies away from this terminology because of 
the widespread usage and varied meanings of ‘naturalism’ in philosophy. I will, however, 
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use the term ‘naturalism’ to refer to the particular kind of objectivism that characterises 
the dominant model of health and the dominant model of fatness. I use the term 
‘naturalism’ specifically in the sense in which it is used by Edmund Husserl. Thus, by 
‘naturalism’, I mean the belief that the natural world constitutes the entirety of what exists 
and, thus, that the methodology of the natural sciences provides the best and only means 
of seeking knowledge of the world. In the next chapter, I will draw on Husserl’s critique 
of naturalism to show that the problems inherent in the dominant model of health are 
problems of naturalism and that, in various ways, HAES and FA alternatives fail to 
challenge this naturalism. Rather, I believe, it is necessary to apply a radical critique of 
naturalism itself to health (as I do in the next chapter), and, ultimately, to provide a non-
naturalist model of health (as I do in Chapter Three).  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DOMINANT MODEL OF HEALTH AND 
THE CURRENT ALTERNATIVES 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the debate over how fatness ought to be 
understood is situated within a wider debate about how health itself ought to be 
understood. Broadly speaking, this wider debate can be cast as one between objectivist 
and constructivist approaches, the former treating health as primarily a matter for 
empirical investigation and the latter treating it as primarily a matter for critical socio-
political analysis. I outlined the basic tenets of what I called the dominant model of 
fatness, and from this I extracted some key points about the dominant understanding of 
health in the contemporary USA. I showed that the dominant model is strongly 
objectivist, resting as it does on the assumption that there is a fact of the matter about 
health and about how fatness relates to health, and that this fact can be discovered by 
means of empirical investigation. I also outlined the key tenets of Fat Acceptance (FA) 
and Health at Every Size (HAES), which purport to offer an alternative to the dominant 
model of fatness and a different approach to health. HAES is, by and large, objectivist in 
its framework. Many of its proponents are themselves trained in largely objectivist 
disciplines such as nutrition or exercise science. Very often, HAES practitioners dispute 
the dominant model view of the relationship between fatness and health, and they may 
even offer quite a different emphasis in their account of health; however, their conception 
of health is still, for the most part, objectivist. FA, being a broader movement, is more 
diverse. Some FA advocates take much the same line as HAES proponents, thus also 
assuming an objectivist framework. As we saw in Chapter One, however, other FA 
advocates take a strongly constructivist line, arguing that both fatness and health are 
socially constructed issues rather than mind-independent realities.  
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In this chapter, I argue that attempts to understand health (or fatness) in either 
objectivist or constructivist terms will always fail to capture some aspect of the lived 
experience of health, because health itself (like fatness) has both ‘objective’ and 
‘constructed’ aspects. In other words, both objectivists and constructivists can offer 
valuable insights into health and fatness, but neither perspective offers unique and 
complete access, and indeed each tends to conceal important aspects. Further, I argue 
that, despite their apparent differences, virtually all the proponents of these competing 
models of health and fatness begin with an assumption of positivism and many commit, 
more specifically, to the form of positivism that I call naturalism. I conclude that a more 
serviceable model of health will require us to escape the objectivist-constructivist 
dichotomy by critiquing positivism in general and naturalism in particular.  
Objectivism and Constructivism: A false dichotomy 
Implicitly, proponents of the dominant model as well as advocates of FA and 
HAES all assume that fatness, like health, either must be understood as a fact in or about 
the physical world, something that can be empirically observed and the truth of which is 
not changed in any way by human action or understanding, or else it must be understood 
as a way of categorising the phenomena of the world, a way of thinking about things, but 
not itself, so to speak, a ‘real thing’. On the dominant model, fatness is the physical result 
of individual behavior, it is ‘thermodynamics’. For critics of the dominant model, it is 
either ‘something you’re born with’ just like ‘being left-handed’ (Fat?So! 47), or it is ‘not 
natural or “real”’ (“Fattening Queer History” 15). These are the only possibilities that 
receive any significant attention in debates on fatness or health. The majority of 
commentators describe fatness in objectivist terms, as a physical feature, whether it is 
seen as a symptom or manifestation of poor health caused by bad behavior, or as neutral 
human variant which ‘does not mean anything’ (Lessons from the Fat-o-sphere xi) and 
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‘just is what is it is’ (ibid. xiii). A significant minority counters, in constructivist terms, 
that fatness is not meaningless, that it is, in fact, nothing but meaning. This latter group 
claims that, as Hillel Schwartz puts it, “Weight is a cultural condition. ... Fatness too is a 
cultural condition.” (Never Satisfied 4)  
It is important to stress that these beliefs manifest themselves primarily in the way 
commentators discuss fatness as a problem rather than in how they discuss fatness as an 
entity. Few proponents of the dominant model of fatness deny that there are social and 
cultural aspects to the problem of fatness. For example, many respected, mainstream 
obesity experts lament what they see as the unfair treatment of fat people at the hands of 
others who (mistakenly, in the view of these experts) see fatness as an aesthetic or moral 
issue rather than a medical one. (For an overview of recent research on ‘weight bias’, see 
Latner, Puhl and Stunkard, “Cultural Attitudes and Biases Towards Obese Persons”.) This 
demonstrates a willingness to engage with questions of the framing of obesity, and to take 
seriously the social, cultural and political context of the medical problem of obesity. Nor 
does one typically find constructivists, for their part, arguing that the bodies of fat people 
are not physically different to those of thin people, that the physical feature of fatness is 
itself somehow imaginary or invented out of whole cloth. For example, Charlotte Cooper 
insists that fatness is  “... a very real and tangible physical difference” (Fat and Proud 
10), even though she also argues that, “...being fat is an identity more complex than the 
facts of my biological functioning. ... Being fat is more to do with being socially 
marginalised... .” (ibid. 77) In short, the objectivists consider the social aspects of fatness 
and health, while the constructivists also consider the physical aspects of fatness and 
health. This indicates how difficult it is for anyone with any lived experience of fatness 
(whether his or her own or that of others) to disentangle the supposedly ‘objective’ from 
the supposedly ‘constructed’. All but the most rabidly zealous anti-fat dominant model 
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campaigners concede that fatness and health have social, cultural and political causes and 
consequences, and recognize, at least to some degree, that there are, even now, in the 
scientific age, contingent and historical aspects to the ways we understand fatness and 
health. Meanwhile, even the most thoroughgoing constructivists allow that fatness and 
health are, at least partly, experienced in and through bodies, and have, therefore, an 
element of ‘objective’ existence, at least in the very loose sense that they may be said to 
be objects of direct experience. It is, in short, difficult to find anybody willing to make 
trenchant ontological or metaphysical claims on behalf of either objectivism or 
constructivism.  
In fact, the ‘objectivist versus constructivist’ debate, whether around fatness or 
around health more generally, is not, generally speaking, located on the ontological or 
metaphysical level at all. In the case of fatness, the controversy is not primarily centered 
on the question of who is fat or what fatness is, rather the question is for whom fatness is 
a problem and why. Whether as a cause or as a result (or both) of this, all too many 
participants in these debates at best take for granted the ontological and/or metaphysical 
assumptions implicit in their account of fatness, and at worst fail even to recognize that 
they are making such assumptions in the first place. The objectivist discusses fatness first 
and foremost not as a physical thing but as a physical problem, which, for the objectivist, 
means it will only be solved by recourse to the medical and the scientific. The emphasis 
on the physical – the body as a material thing, the weighing scale, the laboratory – 
appears to be a natural consequence given this framing of the problem. The constructivist, 
on the other hand, sees fat people as subject to problematic social and cultural forms of 
control and dominance; thus, for the constructivist, the problem of fatness is essentially a 
political problem, which requires a political solution. When one views fatness in this 
latter frame, analysis of discourse, critique of cultural texts and political activism seem 
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like the clear way to respond to the problem of fat people. Each side, as a rule, seems to 
start with a solution and then seems to diagnose the problem in the way that indicates the 
solution. Neither side, as a rule, gives, or pushes the other to give, a full account of what 
it takes fatness to be, or, indeed, of what it takes health to be. When one does examine the 
metaphysical or ontological assumptions implicit in these debates, it emerges that almost 
all participants share a commitment to positivism and, in very many cases, to naturalism.  
Underlying assumptions: Positivism and naturalism 
I have claimed that competing models of fatness and of health in the contemporary 
USA are, despite their apparent differences, all ultimately founded on positivism and, in 
many cases, more specifically on the form of positivism known as naturalism. In 
identifying these models as naturalist and positivist, I am drawing on the work of Edmund 
Husserl in the first half of the twentieth century. Briefly, for Husserl, positivism is the 
belief that, “Science, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the 
world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact.” (Crisis 6)  Positivism is thus 
the assumption that all knowledge claims must be claims about facts, that is, about what 
is the case in the world, independent of any particular mind or any particular subject’s 
experience. Naturalism is the belief that legitimate or coherent knowledge claims are not 
only limited to claims about mind-independent fact, but actually are limited to claims that 
can be verified by the methods of the natural sciences.  
It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that the dominant model rests on 
positivism and naturalism (though, clearly, it is much more controversial to argue, as I do 
later in this chapter, that these positions lead to a problematic understanding of health). 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the dominant models, both of fatness and of health, are centered 
on the empirical and, more specifically, on physical measurement. Their claims are 
always positivist in that their claims always, explicitly, and unapologetically purport to be 
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statements about how the world is, about facts, about mind-independent reality. Their 
claims are also typically naturalist, in that they are typically justified with reference to the 
methods of the natural sciences. The weighing scale, the callipers and the height meter are 
the kinds of tools by which fatness is defined on the dominant model, because, on this 
model, these are the kinds of tools one uses to learn about the world as it is in itself. On 
this model, for example, to measure (and then compare) a person’s hip and waist 
circumferences, is, very literally and directly, to measure his or her fatness and, it is 
understood, this, in turn, is a direct measurement of his or her health. When a proponent 
of the dominant model makes the claim that a person is overweight or obese, he or she 
believes him- or herself to be making a claim about the state of the person’s body in and 
of itself, as a thing in the material world. This claim is understood to be objectively 
verifiable by means of empirical measurement, and its truth or falsity is understood to be 
independent of any  particular mind or subject.  
As I also noted in Chapter One, there are some who oppose the dominant model of 
fatness, but who generally do so on positivist and naturalist grounds, and who generally 
accept the dominant model of health, despite their concerns about the ways in which it 
has been applied to fatness. These commentators typically accept the notion that health is 
directly and simply measurable, however they argue that fatphobia has caused a 
widespread failure to apply the methods of measurement properly to fat people. This 
approach is summed up neatly in Marilyn Wann’s statement that it makes no sense to say 
she is unhealthy based on her weight because, “My blood pressure, cholesterol, and blood 
sugars – the three best health indicators – are all normal.” (Fat?So! 10) Wann does not 
dispute the notion that it is possible to measure one’s health empirically, she simply 
rejects the notion that measuring one’s fatness is a good way of measuring one’s health. 
In other words, she does not dispute the positivist assumption that it is possible to make 
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mind-independent, objective fact claims about health, or the naturalist assumption that 
empirical measurement of the body is the best way to justify such claims. Rather, she 
simply disputes the particular fact claims that are typically made about fatness and health 
by proponents of the dominant model of fatness. This is a common position amongst 
objectivist critics of the dominant model.  
It is perhaps less obvious that constructivist critics of the dominant model are also 
implicitly committed to positivism, however, careful examination of their claims reveals 
that they are. Unlike objectivist critics, constructivists often explicitly reject the notion of 
health as a mind-independent reality. However, they justify this rejection on the notion 
that empirical measurement is not objective and does not provide neutral or objective 
access to the world outside of particular, subjective, culturally mediated experiences.  
This is to imply that, in order to make knowledge claims, one ought to be able to access 
the world in such a way. This, in turn, is to commit, albeit implicitly, to the positivistic 
standard of knowledge. The objectivist claims to know what the world is like because he 
or she can access it as it is in itself independent of any particular mind. The constructivist 
counters that there can be no such knowledge, because there can be no such access. As 
such, the constructivist cannot be said to assume naturalism, since they do not assume that 
the methods of the natural sciences are the best and only means of learning about the 
world. Nonetheless, like objectivist critics, they are committed at bottom to a positivist 
conception of what it means to know about health, whether the health of an individual or 
health as a concept. Neither disputes that, in order to make defensible claims about health, 
one would need to have mind-independent access to health ‘in itself’. In other words, they 
do not disagree over the desirability of meeting the positivist standard of knowledge, only 
over the possibility of meeting this standard. 
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In The Creolizing Subject, Michael Monahan criticizes this shared assumption of 
positivism as it manifests itself in debates on race. In debates over the reality or otherwise 
of race, Monahan uncovers the deeply held and widely shared assumption that, “The 
concept of race could only be real in [the] deepest sense, if it were biologically 
grounded.” (82) In the case of fatness and health, the battle lines have been drawn 
between medical orthodoxy and the objectivist and constructivist strands of FA and 
HAES in such a way as to parallel those drawn in philosophical debates about race, and in 
such a way that Monahan’s claim can be adapted to apply accurately to fatness and to 
health. The tacit, shared assumption is that, if the link between fatness and health is real, 
it must mind-independent, and ‘objectively’ verifiable. Thus, commentators in these 
debates share an assumption that fatness and health are only real to the extent that they 
are grounded in biology. Racial realists take race to be a feature of bodies, a biological 
and material reality, much as proponents of the dominant model take the link between 
fatness and health to be a matter of empirically verifiable reality. (However, it is 
interesting to note that racial realists are much rarer in contemporary academic debates 
than are proponents of the dominant models of health and fatness.) In opposition to racial 
realists, there stand (amongst other groups) racial eliminativists and abolitionists, who 
take a constructivist stance, arguing that there is no ‘natural’ biological criterion or 
feature by which people can be categorised into races. That is, there is no feature that all 
and only white people have in common, no feature that all and only black people have in 
common, and so on for any given racial category. On this basis, they argue that to 
categorise people into races at all, to think of them or to treat them as though they 
belonged to different races, can only ever be an exercise in power and subjugation. This 
mirrors the approach of constructivist critics of the dominant models of health and 
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fatness, who argue that health and fatness are not ‘real’ phenomena in the world, but 
rather sites of political, social and cultural struggle for dominance.  
I believe that the widespread assumption of positivism and, very often, of 
naturalism, not only weakens the philosophical arguments of participants in debates on 
fatness and health, but actually impacts negatively on the lived reality of fat people and 
others. In the following sections of this chapter, I will argue for these claims on 
phenomenological grounds, by introducing an imaginary fat person I call Sarah. Through 
Sarah, I examine the lived experience of fatness, and I show that all the currently 
available frames through which one may view fatness are limited by their commitment to 
positivism and naturalism.  
Introducing Sarah 
Sarah weighs three hundred pounds and is five feet and four inches tall, giving her 
a BMI of 51.5. (“Calculate Your Body Mass Index”) Sarah is fat. In dominant model 
terms, she is in the obese category. Thus, for proponents of the dominant model, she has a 
health problem. Her body size, shape and composition are strongly correlated with poor 
health outcomes, and she is likely to face these in the future even if she does not already 
do so. Given her body size, shape and composition, FA and HAES advocates would also 
readily accept Sarah as a fat person, though, as we saw in Chapter 1, most would reject 
the label of ‘obese’. FA and HAES proponents would certainly agree that she has a 
problem, however, for them, Sarah’s primary problem is not that she is fat, but that she 
lives in a ‘fatphobic’ (see, e.g., the chapter “Identifying Fatphobia”, pages 17-34 in Fat 
and Proud) society in which fatness is valued so negatively that she is likely to face 
marginalisation, mistreatment and discrimination, whether in medical settings (the 
primary concern of many HAES advocates, in particular) or more generally.  
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Sarah very rarely has to miss work or go to a doctor due to illness. She has never 
been admitted to hospital. However, there are aspects of Sarah’s situation that she herself 
considers problematic, some of which she considers to be related to her fatness or her 
health. Sarah finds that she gets out of breath any time she has to walk quickly, or if she 
has to run even a short distance. She always gets out of breath walking up stairs or hills. 
She experiences pain in her lower back, hips, knees and feet if she has to stand for a long 
time. She has to kneel down or sit on the ground in order to tie her shoelaces, because she 
can’t easily reach her feet from a standing position or while sitting in a chair. In some 
stores, she has to get help reaching items on the higher shelves because she is unable to 
reach them. She often has trouble getting comfortable in a restaurant booth and she 
deliberately avoids some restaurants because she knows she can’t fit in the booths at all. 
Similarly, she generally does not go to the old-fashioned, independent movie theater in 
her neighborhood, because though she can just about fit into the seats there, she finds it 
too painful and distracting to be able to enjoy a movie while squeezed in. She has to use 
an extension seatbelt when travelling on an airplane because the standard seatbelt is too 
small to tie around her hips. Sometimes a crew member offers her the belt, but usually she 
has to ask. She prefers when they offer, because she finds it embarrassing to have to ask 
and thus draw attention to herself. Sarah finds that very few stores carry clothing in her 
size, so she has to shop online. Even online, she often finds it difficult to find clothes that 
fit her well or that she really likes. Both the dominant model and the FA/HAES 
alternative offer Sarah ways to frame her situation, and to explain the nature and causes of 
these problems. However, as I show in the next two sections, each of these ways of 
framing the problem puts the focus on some aspects of Sarah’s situation while drawing it 
away from others, and thus neither frame discloses the full picture.  
Sarah and the dominant model: Get thin or die trying 
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According to the dominant model of health as applied to fatness, Sarah’s big 
problem is that she is, pretty much by definition, unhealthy. Her BMI is in the obese 
range, meaning that she is too fat and she needs to lose weight. Sarah’s difficulties with 
seating, with clothing and with travelling could all be eliminated if she lost enough 
weight. From this point of view, the seats and clothes are not too small, rather Sarah is too 
large. The problem is primarily with Sarah’s body. The seats and clothes accommodate 
people in the ‘normal’ range of sizes, and if Sarah were a healthy weight, she would be a 
‘normal’ size, and she would fit. By losing weight, Sarah will improve not only her health 
but also her life in general.  In fact, from the dominant model point of view, it is difficult 
to imagine any other solution making a real difference to Sarah unless she also loses 
weight. Fatness and weight loss go hand in hand in the dominant model. In Chapter 1, I 
noted that, for proponents of the dominant model, fatness just is what happens when you 
consume too much and exercise too little, and, similarly, the problem of fatness is ipso 
facto the problem of how to lose weight. As Schwartz observes, “A history of the 
American experience of weight and of fatness must willy-nilly be a history of dieting. 
Slimming. Reducing.” (Never Satisfied 3) From this point of view, even if Sarah’s social 
conditions were to change such that she could easily fit in seats and clothes, her most 
serious problem would still remain – she would still be unhealthy and in danger of heart 
disease, stroke, diabetes and many other diseases associated with obesity. Her body, in 
and of itself, would still be too big, too heavy, too fat. In Chapter One, I mentioned the 
film “Wall-E”, which portrays a dystopian future in which every human is hugely fat. In 
the world depicted in “Wall-E”, every effort is made to ensure the comfort of these fat 
humans. Seats, clothes and transport are all provided to meet their needs. But they are still 
depicted as living miserable and meaningless lives, at least partly because they are so fat.  
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Perhaps driven in part by fear of a “Wall-E”-style future, some dominant-model 
commentators have actually resisted what they present as efforts to ‘normalise’ fatness, 
on the grounds that such efforts will cause more people to become obese. In 2011, for 
example, a number of media outlets reported on a study in which researchers at the 
University of Bologna explored the relationship between the size of catwalk and other 
fashion models, on one hand, and the fatness, thinness or otherwise of the wider 
population, on the other. (Dragone and Savorelli, “Thiness and Obesity”) The conclusion 
that made headlines was that, as a Huffington Post article put it, “Plus-Size Models Make 
Women Fat”, because seeing fat7 bodies being presented as acceptable or desirable 
reduces a person’s motivation to lose weight or to maintain their weight in the normal 
range. (Moss, “Plus-Size Models Make Women Fat”) Following this line of argument, 
one might conclude that it is in fact bad for Sarah for those around her to facilitate her 
fatness in any way, because it is to her benefit for her to experience her fat body as 
uncomfortable and unacceptable. To facilitate her comfort is, in effect, to  shield her from 
the objective reality that her body is not of an acceptable size, shape or composition, and 
that she needs to change it.   
Even for those proponents of the dominant model who do not favor making fat 
people as uncomfortable as possible, it is fair to say that fatness is seen as a problem with 
one clear and simple solution, and that solution is weight loss. For all proponents of the 
dominant model, the discomforts, difficulties and indignities faced by fat people are 
primarily consequences of their fatness itself. Their fatness is the problem, and therefore, 
it is their fatness that must change. Naturally, most fat people themselves buy into the 
                                                          
7 Or at least fat-ish; Most ‘plus size’ models are actually pretty close to the size of the average woman. 
Indeed, many are even thinner than the average woman and certainly would not be perceived as fat outside 
of a high fashion setting.  
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dominant model, just as most thin people do. If Sarah is statistically typical, she will want 
to lose weight herself. In a National Center for Health Statistics surveys, 71 per cent of 
women responded “yes” when asked “Would you like to weigh less?” (Rethinking Thin 
65) (Notably, this is significantly more than the percentage of women that is actually 
overweight or obese.)  
Thus, Sarah almost certainly would like to be thin if she could. For proponents of 
the dominant model, the good news is that it is entirely possible for Sarah to get thin, or at 
least to get less fat. As we saw in Chapter One, proponents of the dominant model 
typically advocate behavioral modification to bring about this weight change. Sarah 
would most likely be encouraged, perhaps by her physician, by family members and 
friends, or by media commentators of varying kinds, to consume fewer calories in food 
and expend more calories in exercise. However, Sarah’s BMI is also high enough to 
qualify her for more drastic interventions, such as prescription medications and weight 
loss surgery, even in the absence of any other current health complications attributable to 
her weight. Thus, from proponents of the dominant model, Sarah most likely will get the 
message that she can and should lose weight.  
In reality, however, most weight loss attempts fail, so there is a really good chance 
that Sarah will not manage to maintain a significant weight loss. It is difficult to put a 
number on the rate of failure, not least because definitions of success vary. However, in 
an overview article in the recent Textbook of Obesity, Wing and Hill state that the most 
reliable study is that conducted by McGuire et al. (Wing and Hill 354) This study isolated 
participants whose top weight had been in the ‘overweight’ or ‘obese’ range, and found 
that, of those in this group who had attempted to lose weight, 21% were currently 
maintaining a weight loss. (ibid. 355) For the purposes of the study, this ‘maintenance’ 
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meant that, for at least one year, they had been at least ten per cent below what their top 
weight had been. In my example, Sarah weighs 300 pounds. If Sarah lost ten per cent of 
her weight, i.e., thirty pounds, and maintained that loss for over a year, she would count 
as a success for the purposes of the McGuire et al. study. However, at 270 lbs and 5 feet 4 
inches in height, Sarah would have a BMI of 46.3 (“Calculate Your BMI”), which is still 
well into the obese range, and she would thus still (according to proponents of the 
dominant model) be at much the same (very high) medical risk as she was before. She 
would still be fat enough to qualify for weight loss surgery even in the absence of weight-
related health problems such as diabetes. In other words, from the point of view of the 
medical establishment, she wouldn’t be much, if at all, healthier than she was to start 
with. Nor would she likely find it much easier to buy clothes or to fit in airplane seats. 
She might, however, find it easier to stand for long times, to walk up hills or to reach her 
toes. Nonetheless, even allowing for the fact that people as fat as Sarah are rare (and that, 
thus, for most people a ten per cent weight loss would represent a more significant change 
in body size, shape and composition), this is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a 
terribly demanding definition of weight loss success. Yet, even given this generous 
definition of success, a significant majority of people was found to have failed.  
Having managed to maintain a thirty-pound weight loss for a year, Sarah would 
also qualify for inclusion in the National Weight Control Registry (NWCR), a repository 
of data on successful weight loss. The NWCR is intended to help experts and others to 
find patterns in the behavior of successful weight losers in order to help others to emulate 
them. The NWCR (itself founded by Wing and Hill) has “over 10,000 individuals” (“The 
National Weight Control Registry”) in its ranks. “Over 10,000” is a large number of 
people in itself, but is only a drop in the ocean of the tens of millions who, according to 
the dominant model, needed or ought to have ‘shaped up’ in the time the registry has 
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existed. Moreover, anecdotal reports shared by both proponents and sceptics of the 
dominant model suggest that many people who attempt to lose weight do so multiple 
times, meaning that even those who counted as successes for the purposes of McGuire et 
al. or qualified for inclusion in the NWCR may also have had many failures under their 
belts before their success.  
At the level of expert reports and scientific papers, proponents of the dominant 
model quite readily admit this high rate of failure. According to a report on obesity 
treatments by the National Academy of Sciences, “An obese individual faces a 
continuous lifelong struggle with no expectation that the struggle required will diminish 
with time. For most people, even a brief abatement in effort will be met with a significant 
setback in control.” (Quoted in Rethinking Thin 6) This message does not always make its 
way from scientific to popular discourse, however. Popular discourse often presents 
losing weight as a short-term, once-off undertaking. TV shows such as The Biggest Loser 
only rarely show the everyday lives of former participants. From the viewer’s perspective, 
the story, in most cases, ends with the final weigh-in, after which the competitor 
presumably goes on to live a normal, happy, healthy life. Commercial weight loss 
programs such as Weight Watchers often use so-called ‘before and after’ pictures as part 
of their advertising. The very use of the term ‘before and after’ suggests that, by the time 
the ‘after’ picture is taken, the real work of weight loss is over, the person is now ‘after’ 
that work. However, as we have seen, the difficulty is not losing weight but keeping it off. 
While most obesity experts now agree that weight loss is a lifelong project and an 
extremely difficult one at that, popular discussion does not always reflect that consensus. 
This means that, even though the difficulties of weight loss are well known and widely 
acknowledged even by dominant model experts, someone like Sarah is still likely to be 
encouraged to think that weight loss is entirely achievable for her. Indeed, even those 
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experts who report the likelihood of failure still insist that overweight and obese people 
must try to lose weight. Proponents of the dominant model may look at people like Sarah 
with pity at their poor luck in the lotteries of genetics or upbringing, or they may look at 
people like Sarah with frustration and contempt since they seemingly refuse to do what is 
obviously to their and everyone else’s benefit. Either way, they look at fat people as 
people who could be thin if they chose to be.  
Since fat people could, on this account, be thin if they chose to change their 
behavior, it follows that they as individuals must bear the primary responsibility for their 
fatness and its consequences. And this responsibility, some commentators argue, is 
understood and presented by proponents of the dominant model as moral culpability. 
Sander Gilman argues that, to contemporary Westerners at least, the increasing 
prevalence of obesity is primarily a moral panic rather than a health crisis. (2008 9) That 
is, we are horrified by the spread of obesity not primarily because we perceive it as a 
threat to the wellbeing of individual bodies or persons, but because we perceive it as “a 
threat to societal values and interests”. (ibid.) Similarly, in The Obesity Epidemic: 
Science, Morality and Ideology (2005), Gard and Wright claim that “The ‘obesity 
epidemic’ is ... a modern-day story of sloth and gluttony – Western life has produced a 
never-ending array of temptations which we have not had the self-discipline or moral 
fibre to resist.” (6-7) Kathleen LeBesco measures the ‘obesity epidemic’ against Stanley 
Cohen’s criteria for a moral panic, and finds a perfect fit. (“Fat Panic and the New 
Morality.”) 
This analysis, at first glance, poses a challenge to the objectivism of the dominant 
model. But actually, such interventions tend to glance off the dominant model. 
Proponents of the dominant model frequently refer to the possible moral causes and 
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consequences of the ‘obesity epidemic’. But, for such proponents, this is by no means to 
concede that their positivist and naturalist account of health might be limited. In fact, 
from the dominant model point of view, it is the medical, physical and objective nature of 
the problem of overweight and obesity itself that gives rise to the moral panic surrounding 
the ‘obesity epidemic’. That is, it is because proponents of the dominant model assume 
positivism and naturalism that they are puzzled and worried by the problem of fatness. 
Given their assumptions of positivism and naturalism, proponents of the dominant model 
of fatness view their model not as a conceptual framing but simply as a set of fact claims 
about the world as it is in itself. From the dominant model point of view, then, it appears 
to be true that, regardless of what other complicating factors may exist, the fact remains 
that fat people would not be fat if they consumed less and exerted more energy. The very 
simplicity of the dominant model of fatness renders the continued existence of fat people 
both mysterious and terrifying. For proponents of the dominant model, fatness is a 
political, social and cultural problem not in the ‘social construct’ sense of the 
constructivists (a sense to which I return in the next section of this chapter), but in the 
rather different sense that mass obesity represents, to one who accepts the dominant 
model, a mass refusal to do something that is both entirely possible (albeit challenging) 
and indubitably best for oneself and others.  
This mass refusal, in turn, indicates (to some observers) a breakdown of some 
system or other of shared values. Burry describes the ‘healthy’ BMI range as a “‘virtuous 
mean’ to which we should all aspire” (quoted in Halse, “Bio-Citizenship” 46), and urges 
moral authority figures such as clerics and teachers to both model and encourage the 
virtuous behavior that (it is assumed) will be conducive to the maintenance of a virtuous 
BMI.  Retired U.S military leaders weigh in to warn that America’s youth is becoming 
“too fat to fight” at a time when (they claim) the country is under greater threat than ever. 
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(“Too Fat To Fight”) From the dominant model point of view, the terrifying mystery of 
the ‘obesity epidemic’ is not why so many people are fat – we know that; they eat too 
much and/or exercise too little. Nor is there any mystery about how to make them thin – 
we know that too; they need to eat less and/or exercise more. Given the tacit assumptions 
of positivism and naturalism, these appear to be simple and obvious facts. It is this very 
simplicity and obviousness that gives rise, in the minds of dominant model proponents, to 
the real mystery of the ‘obesity epidemic’, that is, why fat people refuse to be thin. Is it a 
matter of individual weakness? Is it due to social and cultural factors like the availability 
of high-calorie foods? Does the government have the right or the ability to force 
individuals to lose weight? Do businesses bear any responsibility for the obesity of their 
customers? Looked at from the dominant model point of view, it does not make sense to 
say the ‘obesity epidemic’ is a moral panic, but it makes perfect sense to be panicked, 
morally and otherwise, about the ‘obesity epidemic’. 
Thus, despite its concern with the moral, the dominant model approach remains 
thoroughly objectivist, because it is founded on the positivist and naturalist assumption 
that fatness and health are matters of mind-independent fact. Regardless of what anybody 
thinks, says, feels or does, certain bodies are, have been, and will continue to be, in and of 
themselves, healthier than others. On this model, health is thus understood as a 
characteristic that some bodies have while others do not, or that some bodies have more 
of than others. The naturalist focus on scientific measurements like BMI, blood pressure 
and so on both reflects and encourages the notion that a body whose measurements all fall 
in the desired ranges would be optimally healthy by definition. Other problems connected 
to fatness, such as not being able to fit into seats, or costing (thin people) money, 
supervene on the health problem, which is itself physical. The ill health of fat people may 
be caused by “poor choices”, but even if the causes are moral, the resulting impact on 
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health is understood as a physical, material, concrete, measurable fact. On this account, 
health may have moral, political or social causes and consequences, but health itself is a 
fact about the body that can be accessed using the methods of the natural sciences. 
Because of their implicit assumptions of naturalism and positivism, dominant model 
commentators seem to act and speak as though an expert with sufficient knowledge and 
equipment could literally look at or into one’s body and see how much health is in there.  
However, if we persist in understanding the body in this naturalist and positivist 
way, we fail to see the various ways in which Sarah’s fatness and her health are not mind-
independent facts about the material world. For example, from the dominant model point 
of view, weight loss is entirely possible, even if it is difficult, so it must be the case either 
that fat people do not really want to be thin or that they are not willing to modify their 
behavior in the necessary ways. However, this is at odds with the reported experience of 
both fat people and other would-be losers of weight, who generally report that they try 
repeatedly to modify their behavior but it is just too difficult. Changing one’s body size, 
shape and composition appears simple when viewed through the lenses of positivism and 
naturalism. But, in lived experience, it becomes clear just how problematic it is to view 
the body as just another physical thing in the mind-independent world. When one looks at 
the lived experience of weight loss attempts, it becomes clear that one does not ‘control’ 
one’s body as one might control a machine. In lived experience, the human body is 
experienced in a radically different way from that in which we experience other material 
things. As numerous phenomenological commentators have pointed out, every experience 
one has is given in and through one’s own body. The body is thus never merely an object 
but also always has a subjective aspect. In order to capture this distinction, 
phenomenologists distinguish between the lived body (Leib) and the body as a material 
thing (Kӧrper). (See, for example, Ideas II §18.) Any model of health founded on 
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positivism will always fail to account for this distinction, because in order to generate 
knowledge claims that meet the positivist criterion, one has no choice but to regard the 
human body as a physical thing. The positivist criterion demands that we make claims 
about things in and of themselves, independent of any particular experience of them. But 
it is an essential feature of the lived body that it is never independent of some particular 
perspective. To be a lived body is to be the embodiment of a particular perspective. If we 
think or talk about the body of a conscious person as though it were just another material 
thing in the physical world, we do not simply overlook ‘part’ of the lived body, rather we 
fundamentally misconstrue the kind of thing it is. If one neglects the distinction between 
the body as a material thing and the lived body, weight loss comes to seem very 
straightforward – hardly any more difficult that it is to put the right amount of fuel in 
one’s car. This means that there is immense pressure on someone like Sarah to devote 
significant resources to trying to be thin, even though, as I have noted, it is quite likely 
that Sarah never will manage to stay thin even if she does initially manage to lose weight.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the FA/HAES approach, which tends to 
assume that Sarah’s weight, far from being the result of deliberately-chosen behaviors, is 
a brute fact of physical biology that is, for all intents and purposes, entirely outside her 
control. In the next section, I argue that this approach too leads to conclusions that are at 
odds with lived experience.  
Sarah and the FA/HAES model: Anatomy is destiny 
The idea that fatness is a matter of individual control is, as we saw in Chapter 
One, completely rejected by the vast majority of proponents of FA and HAES. From the 
FA/HAES point of view, Sarah’s main problem is that she is a victim of a fatphobic 
society which has taught her to hate her body and even herself, and to blame her fatness 
for all her problems. Some FA commentators, particularly the members of the radical Fat 
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Underground group active in the 1970s, have gone so far as to present the widespread 
push for weight loss as a form of genocide since it was, as they saw it, directed at the 
eradication of fat people. (Solovay and Rothblum 5) While most contemporary FA and 
HAES advocates would probably not go along with this radical notion of weight loss as 
genocide8, most probably would agree with Shelley Bovey that ‘fat issues’ reveal “the 
dark side of humanity, the side that seems to have a compulsion to victimise, to oppress, 
to stamp out.” (Quoted in Fat and Proud 142) For them, it is not Sarah’s body that must 
change (in fact, for most of these commentators, Sarah almost certainly cannot 
permanently change her body size, shape or composition), rather it is American society 
and culture that must change, since, they believe, it places such an excessive, irrational 
and unfair value on thinness and since it is so biased against fat people. FA and HAES 
commentators thus view the high rate of failure of weight loss attempts not as evidence of 
the immorality or weakness of individual fat people but rather as evidence that long-term 
maintenance of a change in weight (whether loss or gain) is simply not possible for the 
vast majority of people. Many FA and, especially, HAES proponents would argue that 
Sarah, like everybody else, would benefit from healthy eating and adequate exercise, and 
even that these measures might bring about changes in weight. However, they reject the 
notion that most fat people would be thin if they just ate less and exercised more.  
Significantly, the claim that Sarah would benefit from healthy eating and exercise 
is typically made on strongly objectivist grounds. Like proponents of the dominant model, 
most HAES and some, though by no means all, FA commentators draw on empirical 
evidence to make the case that certain kinds of foods and activities are, in themselves, 
                                                          
8 Although Kathleen LeBesco does describe the search for a ‘fat gene’ as a form of ‘consumer eugenics’. 
(“Quest for a Cause” 65) This is not quite an accusation of ‘genocide’, but it is a pretty strong moral claim.  
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conducive to health. As Lupton puts it, proponents of these approaches to fatness “adopt a 
scientific essentialism similar to that offered by the orthodox medical perspective.” (2013 
84)  Like proponents of the dominant model, they are assuming that there is a mind-
independent fact of the matter about health, although they disagree about what that fact is. 
They regard science as the best possible source of knowledge about fatness, health and 
the relationship between the two. They typically argue that the scientific method has often 
been misapplied when it comes to fatness, not that the method itself is flawed. In other 
words, they reject some of the specific claims of the dominant model, yet they remain 
committed to positivism and naturalism. They regard fatness as a real physical difference, 
even though they attribute most of the problems of fat people to fatphobia or to what has 
been called the ‘tyranny of slenderness’9 rather than to fatness itself. From this point of 
view, the mistake of the dominant model is not that it mischaracterises health but rather 
than it misconstrues the relationship between fatness and health. Health itself is still 
understood, on this model, in entirely objectivist terms.  
As we saw in Chapter One, however, some FA commentators take a constructivist 
rather than an objectivist approach. Some FA commentators are, in fact, deeply sceptical 
of the dominant model understanding of health, not only as it has been applied to fatness, 
but in itself. As such, these commentators tend to reject naturalism. Charlotte Cooper 
writes that:  
Our arguments about the relationship of health to fatness are based on what we 
think we know about issues such as disease and the neutrality of medical science. 
                                                          
9 The term was introduced by Kim Chernin in her 1981 book, The Obsession: Reflections on the Tyranny of 
Slenderness. Many contemporary FA advocates consider Chernin, like Susie Orbach, to have elided the 
experiences of fat people by conflating them with the experiences of slim women who considered 
themselves fat, or who, perhaps, were ‘fat’ only by the standards of high fashion. Nonetheless, Chernin’s 
consciousness-raising approach to the ‘tyranny of slenderness’, like Orbach’s Fat is a Feminist Issue, may 
be seen as a step on the intellectual road to contemporary fat studies, and her analysis remains influential.  
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What we accept as the objective truth is more likely to be the result of a 
complicated system of cultural attitudes and values. (Fat and Proud 70) 
This is a clear contradiction of the notion that the methods of the natural sciences provide 
the best or only possible access to the world as it is in itself. Indeed, the very goal of 
accessing fatness, health or the world as they are in themselves is not the primary one for 
many constructivist FA critics. Rather, their analysis often focuses on the political, the 
social and the cultural. LeBesco writes that, “Medicine is a major institution of social 
control. [...] the language of health and risk has become a repository for a new kind of 
moralism.” (LeBesco, “Fat Panic and the New Morality.”) For these constructivist 
commentators, one cannot improve the dominant-model definition of health with a simple 
“Add fatties and stir” manoeuver. Rather, that model itself requires radical critique. That 
critique has been, to a remarkable extent, dominated by Foucauldian anaylsis, on which 
fatness, like health more broadly, is seen as a locus of ‘biopower’ or a battleground in 
‘biopolitics’. Susan Bordo writes that, “Almost everyone who does the ‘new scholarship’ 
on the body claims Foucault as its founding father and guiding light.” (Unbearable 
Weight 17). Lupton says that:  
From the [Foucault-influenced] perspective, medical and public health 
researchers and practitioners play an important role in the defining, regulation 
and surveilling of bodies, pronouncing on what should be considered ‘normal’ 
and what should be considered liable to expert intervention. Foucault’s analysis 
of the medical gaze as it constitutes and disciplines patients’ bodies is related in 
the critical [fat studies] literature to the ways in which medical discourses 
prescribe the ‘proper’ weight and size of bodies and define certain bodies – 
including fat bodies – as pathological and others as normal. (2013 25) 
On this Foucault-influenced account, health itself comes to be seen primarily as a 
conceptual way of ordering and understanding the world, which serves to realise and 
justify the power of some people over others. By labelling fat people as ‘unhealthy’ – 
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and, in some cases, as wilfully so – it is alleged that proponents of the dominant model 
disempower fat people and render them ‘docile’. From this point of view, encouraging fat 
people to persevere in and to self-police their weight loss efforts (and, almost inevitably, 
their weight loss failures) is a way of disciplining fat people, of training, shaping and 
schooling them. This argument centers on the idea that, as Lupton puts it:  
... the imperatives on managing and reducing body weight that are articulated in 
government policy documents and state-sponsored health promotional materials 
are part of the apparatus of neo-liberal state power that seeks to regulate, 
normalize and discipline its citizens to render them more productive. (2013 39) 
Thus, while contemporary FA critics may not regard advocating weight loss as attempted 
genocide, they still present the medicalized construction of ‘obesity’ and ‘overweight’ as 
a tool of social control and oppression. They reject the naturalism of the dominant model, 
with its naïve trust that the methods of natural science can be applied to any field 
whatsoever. They discuss the ways in which the application of medical science to fat 
people has failed fat people, and they discuss the social, cultural and political causes and 
consequences of that failure. This emphasis on the constructed aspects of fatness 
sometimes occurs at the expense of a full discussion of the physical reality of fatness. It 
sometimes seems almost as though FA critics avoid discussing the more direct physical 
experiences of fatness, including those of weight loss, as if to acknowledge these would 
be simply to arm the enemy. In a sense, they are almost like apostates of naturalism, 
committed to leaving it behind and yet still understandably superstitious in the face of its 
power. The underlying failure to deal with positivism manifests itself here too. The idea 
seems to be that, if there is no mind-independent fact of the matter, or if, at least we can 
have no pure, neutral, objective access to that reality, then there must be no reality, and 
there can only be, as it were, construction all the way down. On this basis, and like 
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proponents of the dominant model, many proponents of FA seem at times wilfully to 
ignore certain aspects of lived experience because those experiences do not fit their 
theory. 
An example of this is the fact that, as Cooper notes, “... a majority of fat people, 
even among [FA] activists, still desire weight loss.” (Fat and Proud 172-173) It is 
mysterious that, even amongst those who profess the impossibility and uselessness of 
weight loss, there are still some who desire it. Could it be that fat people – even fat 
activists themselves – are so thoroughly brainwashed into the belief that thinner is better 
that they cannot overcome the programming? Or is it that thin privilege is so alluring that 
even those who object to its existence are not immune to its charms? Certainly these may 
well be factors. However, there is also the possibility that there are people for whom 
weight loss actually would be beneficial in and of itself, regardless of the political 
situation in which they find themselves. That is, I think it is possible – even, in fact, likely 
– that there are people for whom the desire for weight loss is a sane and realistic response 
to their lived experience, rather than simply a learned or socially conditioned response to 
the trauma of inhabiting a ‘spoiled’ (see, e.g., “Queering Fat Bodies/Politics”) or 
‘othered’ (Lupton 2013 28) identity. Indeed, I would also suggest that, while their 
numbers may be relatively small, there are people who maintain significant weight loss 
and who benefit hugely from doing so, and it is a mistake to discount their experience, 
regardless of whether one considers it possible or desirable for the majority of fat people 
ever to share that experience.  
I believe that the difficulties fat people experience in connection with their fatness 
cannot all be dismissed as socially constructed. In order to bracket out, temporarily, the 
controversial issue of the extent to which one can control one’s fatness, consider, for a 
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moment, Sarah’s height. At five feet and four inches tall, Sarah is of average height for an 
American woman. (McDowell et al.) But even if she were much taller or much shorter, 
nobody would view Sarah’s height as being a result of her own behavior. Height is not 
without cultural significance or socially constructed import – shorter men, particularly in 
the USA, where the statistical norm for men is relatively tall (McDowell et al.), could no 
doubt attest to that – but it lacks the moral resonance that has come to be attached to 
weight and, especially, to fatness. Even for women, some degree of tallness is, in many 
ways, considered desirable (though, it is worth noting the possibility that tallness is 
valued partly because of its association with slenderness). On the whole, though, “you 
can’t be too rich or too thin” has a resonance that “you can’t be too tall” could not hope to 
match. Also, we know that in some cases, extreme tallness or extreme shortness may be 
associated with, or even symptoms of, illness, disease or disability, but in most cases, we 
still consider height to be a matter of normal and natural human variation, the variations 
forming a bell curve. In short, we understand height much as FA and HAES 
commentators believe we should understand weight. 
Even so, people experience direct physical limitations because of their height. 
Being at either extreme on the height bell curve conveys disadvantages, and being closer 
to the middle tends to convey advantages. Being at one extreme or the other may also, of 
course, bestow advantages in certain circumstances; for example, if one wanted to play 
professional basketball, being unusually tall would be important. By and large, however, 
the built environment will tend to favor those closer to the middle of the bell curve. Seats, 
shelves and mirrors tend to be placed at heights that are comfortable and usable for the 
majority of people, and this can be inconvenient and frustrating for those at one extreme 
or the other, even in the absence of any approbation or judgement from those around 
them. Nobody blames extra tall people for their height, and nobody considers them 
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capable of changing it; nonetheless most people would probably consider it unreasonable 
to expect that all airplane manufacturers increase the distance between rows of seating in 
order to accommodate those over six feet tall. Sarah, being five feet and four inches tall, 
may have difficulty in reaching top shelves in stores. It has been the case for many years 
that shorter people have been unable to reach certain shelves. Nonetheless, there has been 
no major drive, for example, to limit the height of top shelves in stores or to require by 
law the provision of step ladders for customers. Nobody expects that people like Sarah 
could or should get taller, nonetheless nobody seriously expects businesses to go out of 
their way to make every product immediately accessible to her either. This, I suspect, is 
widely seen simply as a matter of practicality.10 It is useful for stores to be able to display 
as many products as possible, even if it means displaying some products out of reach of 
some customers. Consumers are used to this practice and, if silence and inaction can 
fairly be construed as unconcern, most don’t seem to regard it as a big enough problem to 
need changing. It is inconvenient to be shorter in a store which puts a lot of products on 
high shelves. Taller customers will often help their shorter fellows, though, and store 
employees typically regard it as a routine part of their job to assist if needed. They may 
even have access to tools to help them do so.   
The comparison with height gives insight into the case of fatness. It shows both 
the strength and weakness of the constructivist FA account of fatness. First, the 
comparison with height emphasizes the very real impact of the social and cultural 
understanding of fatness as the result of moral failure. Unlike height, fatness is seen as 
                                                          
10 This is not to deny or discount all the political and fiscal realities that may be packed into claims about 
‘practicality’ in a consumer capitalist situation like that prevailing in the contemporary USA. One might 
well make a strong argument for the claim that businesses are not primarily concerned with customer 
comfort or even with practicality but with profit. My claim here is about how the decisions of businesses 
are perceived rather than about their actual motivations.  
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being a matter for individual control, and as such people are not only less willing to help 
accommodate fat people, but, in fact (as we saw earlier in this chapter with the argument 
against the use of plus size models), may strongly resist any perceived suggestion or 
expectation that they should do so. Whereas a tall person may happily volunteer to help a 
short person get something from a tall shelf, sharing one’s seat with a fat person on public 
transport – especially on an airplane – is now seen as a terrible hazard of modern life. In 
the case of the high shelf, public sympathy is almost invariably with the short person who 
cannot reach. He or she is the ‘victim’ or sufferer of this (usually minor) inconvenience. 
In the case of the traveller on shared transport, however, popular sympathy is often not 
with the fat person who has to travel uncomfortably crammed into his or her seat but 
rather with his or her neighbor, the thin(ner) person who is forced to sit in close proximity 
to a fat person, and perhaps to have his or her own space limited by the incursion of the 
fat person’s body. It is extremely rare for a person’s height to change significantly in 
adulthood, and almost unheard of for a person’s own behavior to bring about such a 
change. One’s weight, on the other hand, is known to be affected by one’s behavior. 
While long-term weight loss maintenance is extremely rare and extremely difficult, it is 
possible, at least for some people. These facts, taken in conjunction with a widespread 
cultural antipathy towards fatness and fat people, can make for an uncomfortable travel 
experience for fat people as well as those around them.  
A recent example is the letter written by Australian Rich Wisken to an airline after 
he claimed to have had to sit near an obese man on a flight. (Shears “Airline Passenger’s 
Complaint”) Wisken’s letter was widely shared across multiple Internet platforms, with a 
majority of commentary treating it as a hilarious take on a common inconvenience of 
modern life. The inconvenience in question, of course, was not that of being a fat person 
in a world designed for thinner people, but rather that of being a thin person forced to sit 
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next to a fat one. In the case of height, shortness is (or can be) a problem for the short 
person and tallness is (or can be) a problem for the tall person. With fatness, on the other 
hand, it is often the case that both the fatness and the fat person him- or herself are 
primarily discussed as problems for others. Given this situation, it is understandable that 
FA commentators choose to emphasize the social, cultural and political context in which 
fatness is understood, and to treat this context, rather than the fat body itself, as the site of 
the main problem of fat people.  
Second, however, the comparison with height makes it clear that, regardless of the 
moral, social and cultural baggage around a given type of body, in and of itself, a bodily 
feature can give rise to both advantages and disadvantages. This highlights a weakness in 
the FA account, namely, that this account elides the ways in which the fatness of someone 
like Sarah is, in itself, a problem for her. Because it assumes the positivist standard of 
knowledge, the constructivist FA approach assumes that, unless one can access the mind-
independent reality of the material world, one can make no claims about the physical in 
itself. From the FA point of view, Sarah’s fatness is not a problem worthy of discussion, 
because we don’t have access to the kind of neutral, objective information that would be 
needed to make claims about her fatness in itself. Rather, Sarah’s problem is that she lives 
in a society in which her fatness is arbitrarily and unjustly construed as a sign of moral 
failure on her part.  
But the comparison with height suggests that this does not necessarily capture the 
full extent of the problem of Sarah’s fatness, and that her fatness itself may be a physical 
problem. For Sarah, her fatness may be said to have disadvantages which would exist 
regardless of the social, cultural or political climate in which she lived, just as, to take 
another example, being left-handed can be a disadvantage even though it has largely lost 
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its ‘sinister’ cultural associations. Whatever their causes, Sarah’s inability to walk 
quickly, or to run, or to stand up for very long, constitute immediate physical limitations. 
Insofar as her fatness plays a role in these limitations – and there are good reasons based 
in lived experience to believe it might – then her fatness can be said to be a problem in 
itself. A corollary to this point, which I mentioned above, is that FA commentators tend to 
insist that weight loss just is not possible, and thus to dismiss the notion that weight loss 
might, for some fat people, be a solution to a problem. It is entirely possible to 
acknowledge that fatness may be a physical problem without denying the many and 
obvious difficulties of weight loss, or the social, cultural and other aspects of the 
problems associated with fatness. Ignoring these aspects of Sarah’s situation can easily 
start to seem like a determined refusal to acknowledge evidence that does not fit one’s 
chosen narrative.  
It is important at this point to note that FA critics do not universally deny that 
there are distinctly physical problems attached to fatness in itself, particularly for those at 
the very highest weights. On the Shapely Prose blog, Kate Harding published a guest post 
from a pro-FA woman named Heidi who was planning to undergo weight loss surgery, a 
procedure to which both Heidi and Harding had previously expressed strenuous 
opposition. In her comment accompanying the guest post, Harding explains that: 
I’ve been reading Heidi’s blog for almost a year now. As I said to her in 
comments way back when, she’s the first person who ever made me believe there 
are occasional exceptions to the rule that weight loss surgery is always a bad idea. 
Heidi changed my mind because she was brave enough to write about the painful 
reality of increasingly feeling like a prisoner in her own fat body, of losing the 
ability to be independent, to do basic things the rest of us take for granted. I still 
wish there were a better option than surgery for her -- so does she. But I sure 
don’t have a better idea at this point. (“Guest Blogger Heidi”)  
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Many FA writers are themselves, like Heidi, very fat. They know with particular intimacy 
the difficulties that can accompany extreme fatness. They do not deny the physical 
realities of these difficulties. Rather, they regard them as largely unavoidable. For them 
the problem of fat people is political not because the physical aspect of fatness does not 
ever present difficulties but because the physical aspect of fatness cannot be altered. 
However, few have taken up this point in the explicit way that Harding does in her 
response to Heidi. For the most part, the emphasis of FA writers is firmly on the social, 
cultural and political aspects of fatness. For someone like Sarah, this may make it more 
difficult to identify with FA, since many of its proponents appear not to share or even to 
acknowledge her sense of, in Harding’s words, “feeling like a prisoner in her own fat 
body.” (ibid.) As Cooper points out, they may in fact fully understand why Sarah wants to 
lose weight and they may even share that desire themselves. For good or ill, however, this 
is not the party line they typically share with the world.  
 Ultimately, the comparison with height drives home the fact that the difference 
between the dominant model and the FA and HAES alternatives is one, primarily, of how 
they frame fatness as a problem. Each starts with a frame through which they view 
fatness, and each seems at times to be so wedded to this frame that they continue 
doggedly to use it no matter what it obscures. The dominant model rests on the 
assumption that the problem of fatness is, essentially, the problem of making fat people 
thin, and this is justified by an appeal to an objectivist model of health. From the FA and 
HAES points of view, however, the problem of fatness is essentially the problem of 
fatphobia. Objectivist FA and HAES critics argue that, while the scientific method may 
be sound, scientists, like the population in general, are often biased against fatness and fat 
people, so that their findings are effectively skewed in favor of the dominant model of 
fatness. Constructivist FA critics argue that the very notions of objectivity, fatness and 
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health are themselves socially constructed and must be exposed to the light of criticism 
rather than taken for granted. Each of these perspectives both captures and loses 
something crucial about Sarah’s situation. The objectivist dominant model captures the 
physical difficulties Sarah faces as a fat person, but hides the ways in which these may be 
connected to aspects of her situation other than her fatness, and also hides the fairly 
limited likelihood that she will actually manage to change her fatness on a long-term 
basis. The objectivist FA and HAES critics capture the ways in which Sarah’s physical 
fatness may not be the whole of her problem, but they tend to hide the ways in which her 
fatness itself may be part of her problem, and they all too often fail to address the fact that 
some once-fat people, albeit a minority, have become thin and experience themselves as 
all the happier and healthier for it. Finally, the constructivist FA critic embraces 
completely the need to examine the social, cultural and political aspects of Sarah’s 
situation, while all but ignoring the physical problems she personally connects to her 
fatness, as well as dismissing her desire for weight loss as so much mystified nonsense.  
 The shared commitment to positivism and/or naturalism is a significant limitation 
on all of these models of fatness and health. Commentators on all sides of these debates 
assume a positivist standard of knowledge, whether they believe it to be achieveable (by 
naturalist means, usually) or not. Unfortunately, this shared assumption means that no 
participant seems really to push any of the others to account for their ontological 
assumptions about fatness and health. I believe it is possible to outline a model of health 
that can make sense of lived experiences like those of fatness, but in order to outline such 
a model, it is necessary to eradicate the positivist and naturalist assumptions, and start 
again from lived experience. In the next chapter, I begin this outline,  drawing on 
phenomenological and existential resources, particularly the work of Edmund Husserl and 
Simone de Beauvoir. Then, in the fourth and final chapter, I will apply that 
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phenomenological-existential model of health outline to fatness and, in particular, to 
Sarah, showing how it overcomes some of the weaknesses of the models I have critiqued 
in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF HEALTH 
Introduction 
 In Chapter Two, I looked at competing ways of framing fatness as a problem, each 
of which is founded on a particular model of health. I argued that each of those models of 
health is limited by its explicit or implicit commitment to positivism and also, in most 
cases, to naturalism. As I showed, these limitations are made very clear when one applies 
each model of health to the situation of a particular fat person, because each of these 
models fails to capture some aspect or other of the lived experience of fatness. I thus 
concluded that a radically different model of health is needed. In this chapter, I want to 
use phenomenological and existential resources to sketch such a model. Ultimately, I 
describe health in functional rather than substantial terms, arguing that health must be 
understood as an action rather than a state, a characteristic of doing rather than as a way 
of being.  
In the first section of this chapter, I draw on phenomenological descriptions of 
health and illness, and particularly on the account offered by Fredrik Svenaeus in The 
Hermeneutics of Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health (2001). I will argue for a 
phenomenological account of health that is somewhat different from that offered by 
Svenaeus, since I suggest Svenaeus does not go far enough in embracing the active 
essence of health. In many ways, my disagreements with Svenaeus are centered on the 
language he uses, which serves to obscure this active nature. Nonetheless, there is much 
in Svenaeus’ description that is insightful and important. In particular, I consider 
Svenaeus’ claim that health is experienced, first and foremost, as a sense of ‘being at 
home in the world’, a sense that is largely taken for granted unless and until it is ruptured 
by illness or disease. I argue that this is indeed a fundamental structure of the experience 
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of health in oneself. Svenaeus describes this structure of experience in Heideggerian 
terms, however, I argue that it is also fruitful to consider it from a Husserlian point of 
view.  
There are two main points made by Husserl that I take as central to my description 
of health. Firstly, I use Husserl’s concept of ‘attitude’ [Einstellung] in order to describe 
the first-person experience of health in oneself. Unlike Svenaeus’ language of ‘being at 
home’, which suggests passivity, Husserl’s account of attitude, I shall argue, emphasizes 
action. Secondly, drawing on Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy -- Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of 
Constitution (henceforth Ideas II), I take up Husserl’s description of the lived body as ‘an 
organ of the will’ (159). Here again, Husserl’s account of embodiment is inextricably 
linked with action. On Husserl’s account, to be an embodied subject is, in large part, to 
experience one’s own body in the mode of “I can”, as in “I can walk” or (to use one of 
Husserl’s own examples) “I can play the piano” (ibid. 266). On the basis of these 
Husserlian insights, I argue that action is central to health because health is a mode of 
embodiment, and action is central to embodiment. In fact, I argue that to ‘be healthy’ is to 
be acting in a certain way. However, it remains to give an account of just what kind of 
action manifests health. For this one requires a criterion by which to differentiate healthy 
from non-healthy action. To this end, I draw on Beauvoir’s account of action in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity.  
I use Beauvoir’s account of authentic action in order to describe health as the 
bodily aspect of such authenticity. To be healthy, on my account, is to be striving to will 
oneself and others free in and through the body. Such striving can only be understood by 
means of intersubjective experience of a person and his or her life. It is not disclosed fully 
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either in the person’s own bodily experience or in other people’s experiences of the 
person, but rather in both, over time and intersubjectively. Neither the person’s own inner 
sense of his or her capacity for action, nor his or her actual capacity is itself the defining 
feature of his or her health. Rather, his or her health is manifested in how he or she acts 
on this capacity and how this action affects himself or herself and others. I refer to this 
model of health as the ‘embodied authenticity’ model.  
In Chapter Four, I shall return to the example of fatness in order to show how the 
embodied authenticity model applies to a particular bodily feature. I return to the example 
of Sarah, the fat woman I described in Chapter Two, as well as drawing on some real life 
examples, in order to show that this model of health avoids the pitfalls of objectivism 
without collapsing into constructivism or subjectivism, and is thus a stronger model than 
those currently available.  
Phenomenological Descriptions of Health 
In the previous chapter, I criticized models of health that, I argued, fail to account 
for lived experience. In this section, I highlight some key insights from phenomenological 
descriptions of health which, I argue, can form the basis of a stronger model. In this 
chapter, I draw extensively on the insights of Fredrik Svenaeus in The Hermeneutics of 
Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health (henceforth Hermeneutics of Medicine). I 
find Svenaeus’ Heideggerian account of illness and health to be very rich. By taking a 
phenomenological approach, Svenaeus avoids many of the problems I have outlined with 
naturalism and positivism, yet without resorting to subjectivism or constructivism. His 
Heideggerian model presents health as a rhythmic, balancing attunement of a person 
situated in a world, rather than either as a physical feature of some body or as nothing but 
a social construct. Although I ultimately offer a somewhat different account of health, I 
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consider it worthwhile to rehearse some of Svenaeus’ points and to discuss them in some 
detail.  
In describing health, Svenaeus starts with illness because, he writes, “In many 
ways the phenomenon of illness seems to be far more concrete and easy to get hold of 
than the phenomenon of health.” (Hermeneutics of Medicine 78) Indeed, much of the 
philosophical debate around health, especially in contemporary times, has centered on the 
question of defining disease or illness.11 When we take up phenomenology, we suspend 
abstract theorizing and return to experience. We seek first to describe rather than to 
explain experience. In this context, at least at first, it may well be illness and disease that 
push themselves to the forefront, inviting description and analysis, while health fades into 
the background. In one’s own person, illness and disease grab one’s attention with 
“feelings of meaninglessness, helplessness, pain, nausea, fear, dizziness or disability.” 
(ibid.) When we perceive others as ill, our experiences often include strong emotional 
components such as fear, pity and even disgust. Illness and disease command attention, 
whether we experience them ‘from inside’ in our own bodies or ‘from outside’ in the 
bodies of others. Health, in contrast, tends to fade into the background of experience. 
Indeed, when we do have strong, positive experiences of health, they often arise 
specifically in contrast to experiences of illness, for example when we have recently been 
ill and are feeling better, or when we see another person who is ill and feel a moment of 
gratitude for our own health. When we perceive ourselves as healthy, there is no 
                                                          
11  Boorse (1977; see especially pages 551-553) draws a distinction between “disease”, which is the 
underling dysfunction of the body, and “illness” which is the individual person’s experience of that 
dysfunction as manifested in, say, pain or nausea. Other writers have followed Boorse in making this 
distinction. I do not take up that distinction here. In order to distinguish between the disease “in itself” and 
the person’s experience of the disease, one has to make the assumption that illness starts with a dysfunction 
in the physical body, and that this dysfunction is somehow mind-independent. In other words, one must 
accept the positivist thesis. At the outset of a phenomenological investigation, one cannot accept any such 
thesis because there is no experiential basis on which to rest it.  
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particular physical feeling that clearly and always suggests health in the way that, say, 
pain and nausea always suggest illness. When we perceive another person as healthy, we 
do not directly perceive their health, but rather, we perceive some trait or other of theirs 
(such as their beauty or physical prowess) as a manifestation of health. Such 
manifestations of health given in experience are always somewhat elusive compared to 
the insistent, demanding manifestations of illness. But from the phenomenological point 
of view, this elusive nature of health is not a block to our describing it – rather it is part of 
what we must describe. Thus, we can say it is a feature of health that it tends to be in the 
background of experience.  
Gadamer goes so far as to say health is ‘hidden’. (On the Enigma of Health 107) 
Gadamer writes that, “Health does not actually present itself to us.” (ibid.) He says that, 
in order to see this, “We need only reflect on the fact that it is quite meaningful to ask 
someone ‘Do you feel ill?’, but that it would border on the absurd to ask someone ‘Do 
you feel healthy?’.” (ibid. 113) This claim may seem slightly exaggerated, at least from 
the point of view of an English speaker. It is very common to ask a person who has been 
ill if he or she feels better or to express the wish that he or she will feel better soon. Of 
course, in such expressions, what is being invoked is not an absolute feeling of health, but 
a relative feeling that is ‘better’ compared to illness and so is not quite the same thing as 
asking a person, out of the blue, as it were, if he or she feels healthy. To ask someone if 
he or she feels better is really to ask, “Are you still experiencing illness or is that 
experience now absent?” All this makes it quite clear that health is elusive, perhaps 
indeed even hidden. However, it is too much to say that health does not present itself to 
us in experience at all. Health does in fact present itself to us, but not at the level of 
simple empirical experience of the kind in which illness is given. Health does not present 
itself with the immediacy of a cough or a sneeze. Rather, health presents itself over time 
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and intersubjectively. Health is elusive but it is given in experience. Indeed, the very 
elusiveness itself is an aspect of this experience. Health tends to fade into the background 
of self-experience precisely because when one is at one’s most healthy, one is engaged 
with the world, acting towards goals and projects. Nonetheless, such action itself 
manifests health – indeed, I go so far as to say it is health -- particularly when viewed 
over time and intersubjectively. 
Svenaeus accounts for the elusive nature of health using the Heideggerian concept 
of homelikeness (Heimlichkeit).12 (ibid. See especially pages 92-118.) He writes that:  
Health is to be understood as a being at home that keeps the not being at home in 
the world from becoming apparent. The not being at home, which is a basic and 
necessary condition of human existence, related to our finitude and dependence 
upon others and otherness, is, in illness, brought to attention and transformed into 
a pervasive homelessness. (93)  
On Svenaeus’ account then, health is, at the existential level, a sense of being at home 
that draws our attention away from the other, uncanny (unheimlich)13 aspect of our 
situation in the world. Or, to put it the other way around, illness forces us to face up to the 
unhomelikeness of existence. Health, as being at home in the world, manifests itself in a 
sense (often unacknowledged and pretheoretical) that the world works or fits with us and 
that we work or fit in the world. However, Svenaeus cautions that:  
[Health] should not, however, be confused with other positive moods like well-
being or happiness. Such moods also colour [sic] our understanding, but in a 
much more obvious and manifest way than health. Health is a non-apparent 
                                                          
12I note that Svenaeus himself says his reading of Heidegger is not ‘orthodox’. (The Hermeneutics of 
Medicine 92). Here, however, I draw on Svenaeus’ own account of health, and I mean to indicate neither 
acceptance nor rejection of his reading of Heidegger.  
13 ‘Uncanny’ is the standard English translation of Heidegger’s philosophical use of the term ‘unheimlich’. 
The German word for ‘unhomelike’ is not ‘unheimlich’ but ‘unheimisch’. Nonetheless, the etymological 
link between ‘unheimlich’ and ‘unhomelike’ is evident and significant in this context.  
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attunement, a rhythmic, balancing mood that supports our understanding in a 
homelike way without calling for our attention. (94) 
Svenaeus’ caution here may be driven by the phenomenological observation that 
experiences of happiness and well-being demand our attention just as much as 
experiences of illness. The particular experiences are quite different, but they have the 
same ability to intrude, to take over our focus and to demand our response. Health, as 
Svenaeus describes it, is experienced at a different level, according to a different 
structure. Health manifests itself in a pattern that persists in and through multiple 
experiences rather than being itself a particular experience.  
There are important ways in which Svenaeus’ account makes sense of lived 
experience. In contrast to the naturalist and/or positivist accounts of health described in 
Chapters One and Two, this concept of health as homelikeness does not rely on the 
assumption that the human body is a material thing no different than any other, or that the 
methods of the natural sciences are the best and only means by which to establish the 
health or otherwise of a given human body. Nor does it reduce health either to a 
subjective feeling or to a mere social construct. This point is important. As Svenaeus 
admits, a structure of first-person experience cannot be the essential or defining feature of 
health. This would amount to the subjectivist claim that to feel healthy is to be healthy. 
Clearly, such a claim would be problematic. It might escape the trap of naturalism, but it 
would not manage to avoid the weakness associated with what I have called constructivist 
accounts of health, according to which there is no truth about health, only various 
conglomerations of subjective claims and concepts. Above all, it clashes with our lived 
experience of health, which reveals, sometimes quite dramatically, that it is possible to 
feel healthy and yet not be so.  
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As many people know all too well, one may feel on top of the world, but not 
actually be healthy in the everyday sense of the word. In Illness: The Cry of the Flesh 
(henceforth Illness), Havi Carel describes one of her earliest experiences of (what she 
later learned was) her illness:  
[My friends and I] are walking towards the farm we are staying in... I am eager to 
hit the trail and confident because I have been exercising a lot lately and feel fit 
and full of life. ... I bounce and walk forwards, happy, energetic, bursting with 
joy. We walk at a brisk pace, chatting and enjoying the views and the sunshine. 
The terrain changes and we are now walking uphill. Suddenly, things become 
difficult for me. I lag behind; I can no longer chat to my friends. ... I am worried: 
how could I be so unfit? Why isn’t my body responding to all the exercise? I 
thought I’d be leading the group, but instead I am soon labelled the slow one, the 
struggler. (Illness 19)  
Here, Carel goes from feeling comfortable, at home and capable, to feeling worried, 
confused and frustrated. At the beginning of the walk, her experience is characterized by 
the homelike attunement described by Svenaeus, on top of which she has a strong feeling 
of well-being. However, the immediate physical reality of illness explodes Carel’s sense 
of homelikeness, forcing her to confront severe limitations.  
In response to experiences like those of Carel, Svenaeus emphasises the point that 
what he calls homelike attunement is not just a matter of how one understands the world, 
but also of how one is capable of acting in it. To be healthy, for Svenaeus, is not just to 
feel capable of acting in a particular way but also actually to be so capable. Thus, 
phenomenologically, for Svenaeus, the essence of health is given not in Carel’s feeling 
that she can act in a certain way – as she learned all too painfully, such a feeling may not 
survive subsequent experience – but rather in her actual level of ability to act. In 
developing his own phenomenological theory of health in the light of this distinction, 
Svenaeus considers what he calls the holistic theory of health offered by Nordenfelt. 
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(Hermeneutics of Medicine 68-75) This theory of health centers on the potential for 
action. For Nordenfelt, “...health is the ability to realize one’s vital goals given standard 
circumstances.” (ibid. 69) But in drawing on Nordenfelt’s theory, Svenaeus does not wish 
to return to a physicalist conception of health; one of the reasons Svenaeus gives for 
valuing Nordenfelt’s theory is that it understands health as a characteristic of persons 
rather than merely one of bodies. (ibid. 68) As such, this holistic theory comes closer to 
capturing the lived experience of health than do the kind of naturalistic theories I 
described in the previous chapter. However, as Svenaeus also argues, Nordenfelt’s theory 
still discusses health either in terms of “the objects in the world and the causal 
connections that hold between them” (ibid. 101) or in terms of “the meaning of words 
used in talking about the world” (ibid.). To put it in the terms I have been using in this 
dissertation, Nordenfelt’s theory offers both the possibility of an objectivist account of 
health and the possibility of a constructivist account; however, it does not offer us an 
overarching way to explain just how the subjective/constructed and the objective can be 
different aspects of the same thing. It is just this lack that a phenomenological account 
aims to fill.  
One way in which a phenomenological account can fill this lack is by valuing 
different manifestations of health without unduly privileging empirical ones. Consider 
that, in Havi Carel’s description above, what first presented itself as an experience of 
health was quickly followed by a whole succession of experiences of illness. If one looks 
at Carel’s account from a naturalistic point of view, this may seem like proof that medical 
science ought to be taken as the final arbiter of whether one is healthy or not. Based on 
her own experience, right up until she found herself struggling to breathe, Carel had no 
awareness that she might be unhealthy, let alone why or in what way. It may seem, then, 
to the naturalist that only empirical investigation could have revealed the facts. Thus, the 
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naturalist concludes that the illness was there at the objective level of facts, but Carel 
herself did not know about it until her body was investigated empirically. In fact, from 
this naturalist point of view, Carel was, so to speak, tricked by her first-person 
experience. A naturalist commentator might thus conclude that Carel thought she was fit 
and well, but really, at the level of facts, her body was not functioning properly and so she 
was ill. Presumably, that naturalist might say, there were some moments in the past when 
Carel had been healthy, but once her body ceased to function in the empirically-verifiable 
‘proper’ way, she became ill. This account of Carel’s experiene is problematic because it 
amounts to the claim that how a person feels bears no necessary relation to how healthy 
he or she really is. This goes too far. There may be times, such as that described by Carel, 
when the ongoing flow of experience reveals that something had already been going 
wrong with a person’s health even while she still felt well. Nonetheless, first-person 
experience often does coincide well with health or illness, though the coincidence is not 
perfect. Broadly speaking, when we are healthy, we feel well and capable more often, and 
when we are ill we feel well and capable less often.  
Meanwhile, viewed from the subjectivist or constructivist point of view, Carel’s 
illness really only started to exist when she and those around her started to perceive it and 
have thoughts about it. This, too, is problematic, since it does not give adequate weight to 
the empirical evidence which revealed that Carel’s difficulty and discomfort was 
connected with a particular bodily state or process. To take seriously the first-person 
perspective means to take seriously -- if critically -- all experiences, including those of 
the medical experts who undertake empirical investigation of the body as a material, 
physical system. Such scientific evidence is not (contrary to the operating assumptions of 
objectivists) always and necessarily more reliable than ‘inner’ experience of oneself, but 
nor is it (contrary to the operating assumptions of constructivists) always and necessarily 
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untrustworthy. Carel’s difficulty breathing did not become a problem merely because she 
started to perceive it as one; rather, her difficulty breathing was one of the first ways in 
which she perceived the broader problem that existed in her body as a physical thing and 
not just in her perception. That broader problem was then perceived from a different 
angle by the various medical experts who considered Carel’s body in its physical aspect 
and drew conclusions about how it was functioning relative to what they would have 
expected. It is a serious error to treat the lived body as though it were only a physical 
thing, but it is also a serious error to treat it as though it were not a physical thing at all 
but only a succession of free-floating subjective experiences and concepts. Of its essence, 
the lived body is given in different kinds of experience and from different perspectives. 
Neither the naturalist nor the constructivist approaches to health can make sense of these 
multiple perspectives on the same thing. As I argued in Chapter Two, this gives rise to 
serious theoretical and practical difficulties. 
Nordenfelt’s theory is an attempt to overcome these difficulties. But deep down, it 
does not really challenge that notion of a chasm between the subjective and the objective 
aspects of health. And, in the end, as Svenaeus says, “…Nordenfelt’s theory stays true to 
a third-person rather than a first-person perspective.” (ibid. 104)  Svenaeus regards 
Nordenfelt’s emphasis on linguistic analysis to be at the root of this problem. In making 
this argument, Svenaeus highlights a broader issue with traditional objectivist theories of 
health. According to Svenaeus, for Nordenfelt, “…it belongs to the meaning of the words 
‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ that the person referred to is disabled. In the phenomenological 
theory however, the meaning-analysis extends to cover not only language use, but the 
entire worldiness of the person.” (ibid. 101) Svenaeus raises an important point here, one 
which emphasizes the need for a phenomenological account. Linguistic analysis of 
discourse on health and illness is no substitute for phenomenological description of them. 
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In fact, I would suggest that to emphasize the role of language as Nordenfelt does is to 
misconstrue the relationship between experiences, concepts and language, placing a 
distance between them that does not occur in lived experience but only in abstract 
theorizing. From the phenomenological point of view, using terms like ‘pain’ or 
‘suffering’ is not merely a way of talking about a kind of disability caused by abnormal 
functioning. Rather, pain and suffering are themselves very often direct manifestations of 
the disability or abnormal function. In cases of imagined or psychosomatic discomfort, 
the pain and suffering could even be said to be the problem. Indeed, part of the reason 
such-and-such a mode of functioning is regarded as less than optimal is because it 
involves pain or suffering of some kind. To take the objectively-observable physical 
aspect as primary, to assume that it is the ‘real’ cause of the problem, is to make a 
metaphysical assumption not only about the nature of illness but about the nature of 
reality as whole. Focusing on lived experience, one finds no basis for the assumption that 
the empirical is somehow more real than other modes of experience (though nor, pace the 
constructivists, does one find evidence that it ought to be dismissed). Thus, from the 
phenomenological point of view, when, for example, Carel describes her experience of 
struggling to breathe and keep up with her friends, she is not explaining how she felt 
because her body was functioning less than optimally; rather, she is directly describing 
that impaired functioning itself as it was given to her in experience. She is describing it 
from her own point of view, as it first became apparent to her in and through her body. 
Nordenfelt’s holistic theory, as it is described by Svenaeus, has the advantage that it does 
not dismiss the embodied first-person perspective. It does not, however, account for the 
relationship between this perspective and that of a third-party onlooker such as a doctor. 
Rather, the holistic theory (again, as described by Svenaeus) ultimately privileges the 
objective or third-party perspective by treating individual experiences of healthy or ill 
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embodiment as if they were themselves side-effects rather than experiences of health or 
illness.  
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the holistic theory gives more space to the first-
person perspective than do traditional objectivist theories like the dominant model of 
health I described in the previous chapters. This is partly because of the central role of the 
concept of goals in the holistic theory. On the holistic account, “...health is the ability to 
realize one’s vital goals given standard circumstances.” (ibid. 69) However, this implies 
that, for the purposes of assessing health, whether or not one actually pursues these goals 
is irrelevant. In other words, from the point of view of the holistic account, ultimately, 
health still means having a body with certain kinds of physical features, regardless of 
what one does with this body. In this sense, the holistic theory outlined by Nordenfelt 
does indeed collapse back into objectivism as Svenaeus notes. Objectivist models of 
health tend ever more strongly towards a fixation on measurements of the body, tacitly 
treating health as though it were something that could be measured directly by empirical 
means. From the holistic theory point of view, the ‘healthy’ measurements are not valued 
intrinsically, but rather are valued because they are associated with better human 
functioning. The more the dominant model of health takes hold, however, the greater the 
tendency in the broader culture to talk as though this link with better functioning did not 
exist. As the case of fatness shows particularly well, proponents of the dominant model 
often talk as though to have the ‘right’ bodily measurements is identical with being a 
healthy person. The holistic theory may seem on the face of it to resist this identification 
by emphasizing the importance of goals and potential for action. But still, from the 
holistic theory point of view, being healthy ultimately means having a certain kind of 
body, the kind of body that can function to achieve the vital goals of the person conducive 
to his or her happiness over the long run. And, although he criticizes Nordenfelt for 
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privileging the third-person perspective, even Svenaeus’ phenomenological theory, for all 
its strengths, still makes this related mistake of privileging the potential to act over action 
itself.  
For Svenaeus, the Heideggerian concept of attunement is central to health. He 
sums up his Heideggerian account of health thus:  
I have proposed that we should look on health and illness as, respectively, 
homelike and unhomelike ways of being-in-the-world. Homelikeness here refers 
to the patterns of meaning of the existential (attuned, bodily and articulated 
understanding) which make coherent transcendence of a self (person) into the 
world possible. (ibid. 114) 
This account, as I have noted, has great strengths and certainly offers major advantages 
over the objectivist and constructivist accounts I have criticized. It quite simply makes 
much more sense to value bodily features according to how they facilitate meaningful 
action rather than either to value them based solely on how they relate to some 
biostatistical norm (the objectivist, naturalist approach) or to treat every valuation of them 
as equally arbitrary and invented (the constructivist approach). But even this account, 
which emphasizes the potential for action, fails to embrace fully the temporal dimension 
of health.  
In my view of health, it matters what happens next; one cannot capture health in a 
snapshot, but only over time. Svenaeus himself acknowledges, “...health is not an 
unchanging state but a process.” (Hermeneutics of Medicine 98) Yet, in some crucial 
ways, he still talks as though one can be healthy in a particular moment, if one has, at that 
moment, the bodily potential to act in certain ways. I thus suggest that this theory, despite 
its richness and usefulness, still fails to embrace the importance of the temporal 
dimension of the experience of health. Svenaeus writes that health is a process, but 
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ultimately still describes it as a state. Thus, we still need to explore further what it means 
that health is a process. In what follows, I consider the notion that experiences of health 
are given over time because health itself unfolds over time. If health really is (as lived 
experience indicates) a process rather than a state, then to grasp health, one must see not 
just a body but a person, and to see a person is to see an ever-changing flow of situations, 
even, indeed, a life. If this is true, I will argue, a body cannot, strictly speaking, be healthy 
at all, although it can manifest health; rather, the essence of health is such that a person 
can be healthy, that is, a person can act, do or live healthily.  
Imagine a person who goes for a routine medical screening and is pronounced to 
be in rude good health. Every objectivist, naturalist measurement – blood pressure, BMI, 
cholesterol, and many others – is found to be in the desired range. The person has no 
illnesses, diseases, impairments or disabilities. Now imagine that this person leaves the 
medical center and proceeds straight to her home, locks herself inside and refuses to leave 
for the next six months. She does nothing but sit on the couch all day watching TV, not 
communicating with anybody, not showing up for work, eating nothing but take-out 
deliveries. At the end of six months, there is a good chance that a similar set of medical 
tests would reveal some significant changes, and it is very likely that a decline in health 
measurements would be noticed. The point I wish to make via this admittedly far-fetched 
scenario is that, while her body certainly had the potential for all kinds of healthy action, 
she herself, as a person, did not go on to be healthy. At some point what might have been 
a simple rest became a process of living unhealthily. If one assumes a thoroughgoing 
dualism about the person, one might argue that the body was healthy but the mind or soul 
was not. That is, however, a difficult position to defend on the basis of lived experience, 
since one does not experience persons as radically separate from their bodies, but rather 
one experiences both oneself and others in and through bodies. It makes more sense 
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simply to acknowledge that health is best understood as an ongoing process. The point is 
not that the person in this example was healthy and no longer is, though one can 
reasonably put it that way given the everyday usage of the term ‘healthy’. In my view, for 
the purposes of understanding health philosophically, it is more useful to say that she was 
living in a healthy way and then, perhaps gradually, one decision, one action at a time, 
began to live in an unhealthy way. Essentially, the change that took her from ‘healthy’ to 
‘unhealthy’ manifests itself in her behavior, and only afterwards in her body. This is not 
to say that a person can only be deemed to have been healthy after he or she has lived his 
or her whole life, but rather that health can only be understood and assessed by taking 
into account how the person lives in and through his or her body over time and with 
others. The primary hallmark of health as given in experience, whether first-person or 
otherwise, is not how one has the potential to act at a given moment, but how one actually 
does act.  
This is not to say that potential is irrelevant. Obviously, one can only perform an 
action for which one has the potential. It is rather to acknowledge that the presence of 
potential is no guarantee that it will be realized, and thus to suggest that merely having 
the potential is not the same thing as being healthy. Svenaeus writes that, in order to 
investigate phenomena like health and illness, we need to focus on “the meaning of 
human experience situated in the world as acting, attuned and embodied.” (ibid. 82) This 
is, in my view, the crucial point, and Svenaeus does not go far enough in developing it. 
Svenaeus is right that health is experienced in what he calls attunement and embodiment 
as well as in action. However, when it comes to health, I believe that if we focus on the 
potential rather than the actual, we may be able to describe certain aspects of attunement 
and embodiment reasonably well, but we will always end up giving short shrift to action, 
and thus to the crux of health itself. 
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By focusing on action, on the other hand, we give due weight not only to the 
temporal but also to the intersubjective nature of the experience of health. Human action 
is always essentially interaction. The world of our lived experience is essentially a shared 
world. To act is to act in, through and on this world, and thus our actions affect other 
people, and their actions affect us. Health, whether our own or that of others, is 
conditioned not only by the physical realities of our bodies and situations, but also by the 
other subjects around us. Consider, for example, the fact that, as constructivist 
commentators on health point out, one culture may construe a particular variation in a 
bodily feature or function quite differently from how that variation is construed in other 
cultures. Even if we come to a different understanding of some feature or function, we are 
always conditioned in some way by the dominant understanding(s) of our culture(s). In 
the case of fatness, constant reference is made to this kind of cultural variation. It is 
frequently claimed – and not just by constructivists – that fatness used to be considered 
beautiful, that it used to be associated with good health, and so on. Opponents of the 
dominant model of health often claim that this model itself affects in all kinds of ways, 
including with respect to their health. In “Fat Stigma – Not Fat – Is the Real Problem”, 
for example, Linda Bacon argues that anti-fat bias is itself conditioning some fat people 
to be less healthy. (“Fat Stigma – Not Fat.”) An action-centered model of health works 
very well to explain this kind of interaction between the ‘objective’ and the ‘constructed’ 
aspects of health, without reducing health itself to either one. There is a constant interplay 
between the material and psychological aspects of our situations, each shaping and 
forming the other. In this context, we may have bodily potentials that are not likely to be 
realized, or we may have action goals that could not be fulfilled with our bodies they way 
they are.  
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That is to say, one may have the ability to conceive of a particular goal or action 
as valuable, and in this sense, one may choose this goal or action. However, there is no 
guarantee that it will be possible to pursue this goal or action in any concrete way. The 
world in which one chooses and acts is always a world that is already shaped by the 
choices and actions of others, such that one will always be confronted with limits when 
one makes a choice. Even when faced with such limits, however, an individual still has 
choices. Indeed, any given fact about the world may, depending on one’s situation, be 
either a limit or an opportunity, or both simultaneously. This is a discussion to which I 
return in the third section of this chapter. For now, the crucial point is that one does not 
choose or opt in a vacuum; rather, one’s possibilities are conditioned by the surrounding 
world and in particular by the behavior of other people and so merely having the bodily 
capability to make a choice does not mean one has a real live option in this regard. 
Merely having the (bodily) potential to live healthily is not the same as living healthily, 
nor is it any guarantee that one will. Bodily potential is, as it were, a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for health.  
That said, I do not wish to dismiss the idea that experiences of bodily potential are 
experiences of – or at least strongly connected to – health. In fact, I do agree that potential 
is central to health, and that experiences of bodily potential are strongly related to health. 
In the next section, I draw on Husserlian phenomenology to describe the structures of 
experience in which bodily potential is experienced. These are crucial to any 
phenomenological description of health, not only because the experiences themselves are, 
as it were, significant precursors to healthy action but also because experiences of 
potential are themselves likely to dispose the person to act in healthy ways and thus, at 
least in the terms of my model, to be healthy. For my purposes, a significant value of 
Husserl’s description of embodiment is the way it does not focus only on potential itself 
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but constantly points in the direction of action. Husserl’s framework for describing 
embodiment allows us to describe the potential for health not just as a bodily feeling of 
well being, but as a bodily feeling of capability, inextricably linked with action and not 
merely with potential.  
The Husserlian perspective 
In this section, I employ Husserlian phenomenology in the description of health. 
In departing from Svenaeus’ account in this way, I do not wish to claim that the 
Heideggerian point of view is without merit, or that the Husserlian approach is the best or 
only way to describe health phenomenologically. Rather, I simply outline why I think 
Svenaeus’ rejection of Husserl is premature, and then outline the Husserlian resources I 
believe are of use in describing health.  
Svenaeus chooses not to take a Husserlian approach because he views Husserl’s 
account of embodiment as fundamentally inadequate. He imputes to Husserl a “... focus 
upon consciousness instead of upon embodiment...” (Hermeneutics of Medicine 82). 
According to Svenaeus, while Husserl does offer a theory of embodiment centered on the 
concept of kinaesthesis, ultimately, in Husserl’s account, “The lived body does not in 
itself texture and structure the acts, by, for example, offering resistance.” (ibid.) From 
Svenaeus’ point of view then, Husserl’s phenomenology does not offer the resources 
needed to give an account of health and illness. At the level of lived experience, Svenaeus 
charges that Husserl does not give us the theoretical tools needed to address concrete 
phenomena such as “pains, resistance [and] shivers” adequately. (ibid.)  
Svenaeus draws especially on Ideas I in his account of Husserl. In Ideas I, it is fair 
to say that Husserl does not give extensive accounts of the role of embodiment in 
experience. But I suggest it is similarly fair to say that it would make little sense for him 
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to do so in the context of that work. Ideas I is an introduction to the foundational 
principles of phenomenology. In this work, Husserl is at pains to emphasize the need to 
take all experiences on their merits, rather than filtering them through metaphysical 
assumptions about their causes or sources. For the purposes of such an introduction, it 
would be utterly contradictory to distinguish, a priori as it were, between experiences 
which have their root in the body and those which do not, because there would be no way 
to make such a distinction without bringing in exactly the kind of metaphysical 
assumption phenomenology is supposed to avoid. There is even a sense in which 
distinguishing bodily from non-bodily experiences before undertaking description is to 
move back again towards naturalism or positivism, by assuming that, in order to work as 
a method of knowledge production, phenomenology must be able to grapple with 
physical things as they are understood in the context of contemporary science. In Ideas I, 
Husserl is arguing for the need for the phenomenological method and then introducing 
(one version of) that method. It is in the application of the method that the role of the 
body becomes clear, and indeed Husserl does treat of this role more fully when he 
describes and discusses particular structures of experience in, amongst other works, Ideas 
II and, later, the Crisis. I believe that Husserl does offer valuable resources for addressing 
questions of the body, including those as concrete as shivers, pain and resistance. 
However, to make use of these resources, one must begin from a Husserlian starting 
point, without assuming anything about the metaphysical nature of bodily (or any other) 
experiences. In particular, I suggest that the fundamental structure of the experience of 
health can be understood as what Husserl calls an ‘attitude’, one which centers on the 
experience of the lived body as the locus of “I can”. Understanding health in this way 
serves to emphasize the centrality of action to health.  
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Svenaeus expresses the process of health in Heideggerian terms, describing it as 
an attunement characterized by homelikeness. I suggest that this ongoing ‘homelikeness’ 
can, however, also be usefully expressed in Husserlian terms as an attitude. “Attitude” is 
the English word that is generally used to translate Husserl’s technical usage of the 
German word “Einstellung”. In the Vienna Lecture, Husserl says that: 
Attitude, generally speaking, means a habitually fixed style of willing life 
comprising directions of the will or interests that prescribed by this style, 
comprising the ultimate ends, the cultural accomplishments whose total style is 
thereby determined. The individual life determined by it runs its course with this 
persisting style as its norm. (Crisis 280) 
I suggest that the potential for health is apprehended in first-person experience as a 
‘persisting style’ of this kind. I have argued that any phenomenological account of health 
must have action at its center. Husserl’s concept of attitude, which he characterizes here 
as centered on the will, is thus a useful concept by which to describe the structure of the 
first-person experience of health. Ultimately, attitude is not just about how one 
understands the world, but about how one acts in it. A look at the etymology of the term 
emphasizes this point. “Einstellung” has the literal sense of ‘being in a stance or in 
position’. (“Einstellung”, Oxford Duden German Dictionary.) In German, the word 
“Einstellung” is used in a way that emphasizes action. It is sometimes used to refer to the 
hiring of employees (note that the cognate English verb “to install” is occasionally used in 
a related sense, as in to install a friendly ruler in another country), and can also mean 
“setting”, in the sense of the settings on a computer or another machine, or “focus” in the 
context of photography. (ibid.) Each of these usages emphasizes that the word Einstellung 
does not mean a static being-in-position, but rather it also has a more pregnant sense of 
being in the position to do something or, perhaps, to facilitate the doing of something, or 
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to condition what is done or how it is done. Not every usage of Einstellung in German has 
this strongly active sense, but by and large the word has strong overtones of action.  
I suggest that there exists an attitude [Einstellung] that corresponds with health.  
The correspondence is not perfect; as we have seen, it is quite possible to feel healthy and 
yet not be so. This does not prove that there is no relationship between the feeling of 
being healthy and health itself; it only shows that direct self-experience as given at any 
particular moment in time is only one of many possible perspectives from which the 
health of a person may be experienced. The attitude related to health is a disposition or 
tendency to apprehend and interact with the world in a certain (i.e. healthy) way. The 
presence of this attitude is no guarantee that one is in fact acting healthily, just as being in 
the scientific attitude is no guarantee that one is in fact doing rigorous science. The 
central claim of my argument is that health is something one does, not something one is. 
Therefore no attitude can fully capture this, since an attitude is a disposition to act rather 
than an action itself. This, in my view, is the benefit of using the Husserlian concept of 
attitude to describe the structure by which one apprehends the potential for health in 
oneself. Describing health as ‘homelikeness’ encourages the idea that health is a state 
rather than a process. I choose instead to use the Husserlian concept of attitude, because I 
wish to emphasize the active nature of health. ‘Attitude’ always points towards action. It 
is not an action, nor does it guarantee action, but it is a structure that predisposes one to 
act. In fact, since, in English, the word ‘attitude’ still conveys something like a static 
point of view rather than a tendency to perceive or act in a certain way, I shall use the 
term ‘disposition’ instead. Thus, the healthy disposition is a structure in which health is 
made apparent in first-person experience, but it is not the only way in which health is 
made apparent, nor is this disposition, in itself, the essence of health.  
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The key structure of the healthy disposition is the “I can” structure that Husserl 
describes in Ideas II. Husserl describes the difference between a mere material thing and 
a lived body 14 in the following terms: 
Sheer material things are only moveable mechanically and only partake of 
spontaneous movement in a mediate way. Only Bodies are immediately 
spontaneously (“freely”) moveable, and they are so, specifically, by means of the 
free Ego and its will which belong to them. […] The ego has the “faculty” (the “I 
can”) to freely move this Body -- i.e., the organ in which it is articulated -- and to 
perceive an external world by means of it. (Ideas II 159-160; emphasis in the 
original.) 
What marks out lived bodies from material bodies is that lived bodies are essentially 
connected with what Husserl refers to as a ‘free ego’, which is articulated in the body and 
perceives the world through it. Crucially, this ego also has the ability to move the lived 
body freely, immediately and directly, and to act in and through the world by means of 
this lived body. This, we may conclude, is just what it means to call such body ‘lived’. 
Thus, this sense of “I can”, this faculty or capacity for immediate movement and direct 
action is an essential structure of the experience of having a body. My ‘faculties’, that is 
my abilities and potentials for action, are central to my subjectivity. Husserl writes that:  
The Ego, as unity, is a system of the “I can”. … I have power over my Body, I am 
the one who moves this hand and who can move it, etc. I can play the piano. But 
this does not last forever. I can forget how, I can fall out of practice. I exercise 
my Body. In the case of the most common activities, I do not generally lose my 
skill. But if I have been laid up sick for a long while, then I have to learn how to 
walk again, though it comes back quickly. However, I can also have a nervous 
disorder and lose the mastery of my limbs; “I can’t do it.” In that respect, I have 
become an other. (266)  
                                                          
14 In the translation I cite here, Rojcewicz and Schuwer use ‘body’ to refer to a material thing and ‘Body’ 
(with a capital B) to refer to the lived body. 
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This accounts partly for the elusive nature of health in self-experience. Much of the time, 
I do not abstract from my experience the fact that I can do physical things. This ability is 
so inexpressibly central to my experience of being, and my experience of myself, that it is 
only in the most rarefied moments of philosophical experience that I think about it at all. 
Experience of oneself in the “I can” structure is an inner manifestation of the potential for 
health. It is the attitude that is conducive to health, or the attitude in which we may act 
healthily, just as the scientific attitude is the attitude in which we investigate the world, 
and the attitude in which the world gives itself for scientific investigation.  
The ‘healthy disposition’ has some important similarities to what Husserl calls the 
natural attitude, indeed, the healthy disposition may be said to be a part of the natural 
attitude. (See, for example, Ideas I, §27.) In the natural attitude, the world is just there for 
me; I do not question the existence of the world – I do not ask how or why it is, nor 
wonder how or why I came to be in it – I just live in it. This is similar to the 
‘homelikeness’ to which Svenaeus refers. Similarly, in what I am calling the healthy 
disposition, I am focused on my action, and not necessarily aware of or reflecting on my 
ability to act. The healthy disposition is one in which, very often, I, as a lived body, a 
bodily subject, am immersed in the world and thus focused outward, not inward, doing, 
not thinking. In the healthy disposition, because I feel ‘homelike’, I am not generally 
forced to confront my embodied situation by reflecting on my body. Instead, I can just 
live in and through it, focused on my goals rather than on myself as pursuing them.  
The healthy disposition differs from the natural attitude in one key respect, 
however. The natural attitude is essentially inimical to reflection; to reflect is, by 
definition, to be in an attitude other than the natural attitude. The healthy disposition, in 
contrast, does not necessarily preclude self-awareness. One can be aware of the healthy 
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disposition as a feature of any particular experience, just as one may be aware of oneself 
as being in a theoretical attitude while one is doing philosophy. While health is typically 
in the background, as I have noted above, it can be, as it were, fore-grounded under 
certain circumstances. For example, when engaging in one’s favorite sport or exercising 
outdoors on a beautiful day, one may become aware of a strong feeling of ability and 
good functioning while remaining in the healthy disposition. One may be aware not only 
of one’s own faculties, one’s “I can”, but of one’s actual healthy action. Similarly, when 
one has been sick but is now better, one can be aware of the lack of pain and discomfort 
that had recently been there and notice that one is doing more and better, but this does not 
mean one is no longer in the healthy disposition. The healthy disposition does not 
evaporate as one becomes aware of it. Experiences in the healthy disposition may include 
reflective moments in which I am aware of my own feeling of, as Svenaeus would put it, 
being at home in the world. The feeling of fulfilling potential may remain in the 
background or it may come to the fore in a satisfying experience of accomplishment.  
However, again, a subjective feeling of accomplishment is not necessarily the 
hallmark of healthy action. An obvious example is that of the drug addict, who prioritizes 
acquisition and use of drugs above all other goals. He or she may experience great 
satisfaction in the moment of getting or using drugs, indeed, may come to feel ‘at home’ 
only when using drugs, but it would be hard to defend the claim that an addict is acting 
healthily by getting and using drugs. Husserl points out that there is a constant interplay 
between potential and action. What I can do obviously conditions what I do, but what I do 
also conditions what I can do:  
The subject is ever and again active according to its faculties and, in turn, 
constantly transforms them, enriches, strengthens, or weakens them by means of 
its own action. A faculty is not an empty ability but is a positive potentiality… 
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Finally, everything refers back, in an understandable manner, to primal faculties 
of the subject and from there to acquired faculties having their source in earlier 
lived actuality. (Ideas II 267) 
Primal faculties include my direct ability to move my hands. The existence of these 
faculties allows me to acquire other faculties, such as playing the piano. The addict, 
particularly while on drugs, may, in the short term, have a very strong experience of 
heightened faculties. Often, for example, an amphetamine user really does feel increased 
energy and heightened potential for vigorous physical movement. This increased ability 
to move, just like the user’s euphoria, is real. The difficulty is that it is not sustainable. 
Over time, the effects may require higher and higher doses or may just diminish 
inexorably. Moreover, the cost, whether monetary or other, is likely to go up. Eventually, 
the drug user may find that not only is he or she no longer acquiring new faculties but his 
or her primal faculties are diminishing. Sometimes, as in cases of addiction, it may well 
be others who clearly observe these increasing costs before or instead of the addict 
himself or herself. In other words, it is often intersubjective experience that reveals the 
true impact of an action on one’s health over the long term. The addict himself or herself 
may feel fine, indeed, he or she may even feel better than before. In the early stages of 
addiction, his or her body may look quite normal when viewed as a material thing. 
However, even at a relatively early stage, others may be able to see the unhealthiness in 
his or her actions. The unsustainable nature of the choices the person is making may be 
available to intersubjective experience before they become available either to subjective 
or to objective experience of the person.  
The Husserlian account of embodiment in Ideas II, and the notion of the healthy 
disposition that I derive from that account, highlights crucial structures in the experience 
of health. The experience of oneself as being able to act meaningfully in the world is 
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strongly related to health. First, it is related to health because this feeling often (though, as 
we saw with Havi Carel and with the imaginary drug addict, not always) occurs when one 
is healthy. Second, being in the healthy disposition itself conditions one to act in a healthy 
way. This attitude disposes on to actualize one’s primal faculties in such a way as to 
acquire further faculties. However, this experience of oneself as being able to act 
meaningfully may not always correspond with health itself; that is, it may not always be 
followed by action that is healthy. Husserl’s account of embodiment is closely focused on 
action and thus, I argue, represents a valuable starting point from which to describe 
health. Even so, describing first person structures of the experience of embodiment, no 
matter how action-centered, will never describe health itself. Healthy action very often 
corresponds with the healthy disposition and with the feeling of bodily potential, but it 
does not always do so. In order to differentiate between healthy action and other action, 
one needs to consider human action not just at the level of individual faculties, but in the 
broader context of the intersubjective lifeworld. For this, I turn to Simone de Beauvoir, 
whose account of action in The Ethics of Ambiguity is immensely rich. Beauvoir’s 
account of action centers on the notion of freedom as an absolute value. On her account, 
actions are ethically defensible to the extent that they are aimed at the realization of 
freedom both for oneself and for others. In what follows, I draw on this account to argue 
that freedom ought also to be the guiding criterion by which we differentiate healthy from 
non-healthy action.  
Health as Authentic Embodied Action 
I have argued that health is manifested in actions, rather than simply in the 
potential for action. One may experience oneself as pursuing such action in what I have 
termed the healthy disposition, an attitude [Einstellung] in which one perceives oneself 
and the world as amenable to meaningful action. But not all action is equally healthy, 
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even if one experiences it as such. Simply experiencing oneself in the mode of “I can” is 
no guarantee that one’s action is truly healthy. In order to give a full account of health, we 
still need a criterion by which to evaluate the healthiness or otherwise of particular 
actions or patterns of action. For that purpose, I want to introduce Beauvoir’s account of 
action, and then show how it can provide the necessary criterion. In the next chapter of 
this dissertation, I will then show how this criterion forms the basis of an account of the 
relationship between fatness and health that fits better with lived experience.  
Beauvoir describes the human situation in terms of freedom and facticity. As long 
as one is conscious, one always has choices, but one always chooses in the context of a 
world over which one’s power is not absolute. We have freedom to change the world, but 
that freedom is limited by facts that we cannot change. Beauvoir argues that the goal of 
all human action must be to maximize freedom for all human beings, as best we can given 
the factical situation in which we find ourselves. She writes: 
The truth is that in order for my freedom not to risk coming to grief against the 
obstacle which its very engagement has raised, in order that it might still pursue 
its movement in the face of failure, it must, by giving itself a particular content, 
aim by means of it at an end which is nothing else but precisely the free 
movement of existence. (ibid. 29) 
Authentic human action is action which makes sense in, and of, our situation, without 
denial or deception. In order to be authentic, my actions must be ones that I choose to 
endorse while fully acknowledging the reality of my situation, both what I can do and 
what I cannot. They must be actions that make sense to me when I am not pretending, to 
others or to myself, that my situation is other than it is. Unless my choice is made in full 
recognition of that fact, not only will it be unachievable but even the attempt itself will be 
empty, resting only a flimsy and easily torn framework of denial and deceit.  
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Given the way it encompasses every kind and aspect of human action, I believe 
Beauvoir’s conception of action and freedom is an extremely valuable resource for 
describing health. The biggest problem with the dominant model of health is its 
objectivism. Beauvoir – inspired, albeit in part and indirectly, by Husserl’s anti-
naturalism – rejects such a conception of the world. As we have seen, constructivists have 
long argued that health is not a simple matter of physical biology. But the constructivist 
ends up inadvertently endorsing the central notion of objectivism – that whatever really 
exists must be mind-independent, material and (in itself) meaningless. While I reject 
thoroughgoing objectivism or constructivism, I acknowledge the legitimate concerns 
raised by proponents of those positions. The objectivist concern that we take seriously the 
facts of the matter is legitimate. Meanwhile, the constructivist concern that we take 
seriously the social and cultural aspects is also important. Health, like any other aspect of 
the human situation, has both factical (objective) and transcendent (constructed) aspects. 
In discussing the interplay of freedom and facticity, one can address these concerns. 
Beauvoir’s account of action avoids objectivism but also constructivism. She describes 
action in a way that does not try to reduce reality either to subjectivity or to objectivity 
but rather acknowledges both aspects. As such, this account can provide a useful criterion 
for healthy action.  
In Chapter Two, I used the example of height in discussing the impact of various 
physical features on health. I now return to that example. Imagine that I am five feet tall. 
This is a bodily fact which, for all intents and purposes, I cannot change. This fact has an 
impact on what bodily faculties (to use Husserl’s term) I can acquire. However, this 
impact may be constituted as a limit or an opportunity. There are things I cannot do at 
five feet tall that I could do if I were six feet tall. There are also things I can do at five feet 
tall that I could not do if I were six feet tall. My height is a factical aspect of my situation, 
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neither necessarily good nor necessarily bad. For many people, unless they are very 
unusually tall or short, their height is not an especially significant fact in their lives. It 
provides neither hard limits nor exceptional opportunities. However, there are ways in 
which it may present itself as a significant limit or opportunity. In the contemporary USA, 
for example, there is a cultural expectation that men will be taller than their female 
romantic partners, thus short men and tall women may find themselves under-represented 
in popular culture or may feel that they are somehow less attractive than those who fall in 
a more statistically normal height range for their sex. Short people of any sex or gender 
may find it harder to reach those troublesome top bookshelves. Other things being equal, 
short people find it easier than tall people to become successful jockeys, while tall people 
find it easier than short people to make it as basketball players. Some people are so 
unusually tall that they find it difficult to walk through doors, get into cars, lie full-length 
in beds and so on. Some people are so unusually short that they cannot reach even the 
books five feet from the ground, let alone those seven or eight feet up. Being at either end 
of the bell curve is probably going to impact significantly on the way one functions in the 
world. If there are disadvantages to being some height or other, usually, one has to find a 
way around them. This is a matter of transcendence, it is a manifestation of freedom. I 
cannot do this, but I can do that. For most people, it is possible to live a fulfilling life even 
if one is much taller or shorter than average. Sometimes being unusually tall or short can 
offer opportunities that would not otherwise be available. Even in the most extreme cases, 
freedom still opens up possibilities: One’s height is a fact, not a fate.  
The same can be said, at least to some extent, of pretty much any physical feature. 
But some features are more likely to affect one’s life profoundly than others. For 
example, the lung disease described by Havi Carel (sporadic pulmonary 
lymphangioleiomyomatosis) is especially debilitating, because human beings need to take 
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in oxygen and exhale carbon dioxide all the time just in order to stay alive, and thus every 
human action is impeded by breathing difficulties. In Husserl’s terms, breathing is central 
to one’s primal faculties; if I cannot breathe, my ability to move my body in any way 
whatsoever is severely compromised. In existentialist terms, one’s freedom is 
significantly conditioned by difficulty breathing. Carel has to make all kinds of 
adjustments to her life because of the fact that she now gets out of breath so easily. She 
writes: 
I had to start using oxygen. I had to put up with the stares in the street, the nose 
bleeds, the breathlessness. I had to slow down. I had to ask for ground-floor 
rooms for my teaching. ... I looked at a hill I could cycle up easily two years ago, 
with difficulty one year ago, and turned around, knowing full well I couldn’t 
cycle up it at all any more. (63) 
Carel has come up against a limit imposed by her facticity. She has to find different ways 
to do the things she used to do. Some things, she can no longer do at all. These are 
limitations on her freedom. As Beauvoir shows, freedom always necessarily operates 
within limits. This is simply a fact of the human condition. But some limits are harder to 
overcome than others. Because breathing is so basic, so fundamental, so necessary to 
every life activity, difficulty in breathing is an especially difficult limitation to overcome. 
This means that, other things being equal, sporadic pulmonary LAM has a bigger impact 
on health than being five feet tall. For most people, being five feet tall doesn’t affect that 
many life activities, whereas having LAM significantly conditions the choices and 
options one has.  
Both LAM and one’s height are empirically observable facts about one’s physical 
body. This Beauvoir-influenced account of health does not, however, rest on a strong 
distinction between the objective facts and the constructed realities of one’s situation. My 
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choices are not only conditioned by physical facts like my height or my lung function. 
They are also conditioned by the society I live in, the people around me and the nature of 
our interactions. It is clear, for example, that being black in an anti-black society strongly 
conditions one’s options in particular ways. This also conditions one’s health, since it has 
a huge impact on the courses of action that are available to one. This impact is in no way 
less real than the impact of a condition like LAM. In a phenomenological description, it 
would be a mistake to draw a hard line between the objective and the constructed or 
social aspects of a situation, because phenomenological investigation reveals how blurry 
and variable that line is. When it comes to health, the interplay between the physical, 
mental, cultural, social and political aspects of experience is constant and inevitable. It is 
a limitation of objectivist theories that they differentiate between physical and mental 
interactions. From the phenomenological point of view, so-called physical experiences 
and so-called mental experiences are inextricably linked. For example, an emotion such 
as anger, fear or joy manifests itself in both physical and mental ways, affecting both my 
bodily function and movement and also my thoughts. In such a case, the experience is 
both mental and physical. One is not having two simultaneous experiences, one physical 
and the other mental. Rather, one is having an experience which has both mental and 
physical manifestations.  
This multi-faceted view of experience allows us to discuss health in terms of 
action without returning to an objectivist or biostatistical account of functioning. By 
taking into account all the features of one’s situation, we can introduce a criterion for 
healthy action that centers on the accomplishment of meaningful goals. We can address 
the example of the drug addict by introducing the temporal and intersubjective criteria. 
Getting and using drugs is, for the addict, not an action that realizes his or her own 
freedom or the freedom of others. What makes it unhealthy is that this process 
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continuously limits one’s options more and more, and, indeed, may also limit the options 
of those around one. In this scenario, by getting and using drugs, the addict is closing off 
more and more possibilities. It is the actual performance of the action that is the problem. 
What is unhealthy is the pouring of one’s resources of time and energy into the pursuit of 
this project that is not conducive to freedom. It is no different to a five foot tall person 
trying to reach an eight foot high bookshelf. It is pointless.    
In the previous section of this chapter, I described what I termed the healthy 
disposition. In the healthy disposition, one apprehends the world as a sphere full of 
possibilities for meaningful action, and oneself as capable of such action. To put it 
another way, in the healthy disposition, one feels free. The Beauvoirian account of action 
that I have outlined in this section, however, makes clear that to feel free is not to be free. 
I claimed that it is mistake for a theory of health to conflate the potential for action with 
action itself. Health, I argue, is manifested not in the ability to act but in action. In effect, 
I am applying to health Sartre’s claim that there is no reality except in action. (See 
Existentialism is a Humanism) Beauvoir’s account of freedom mirrors this claim: It is not 
one’s theoretical possibilities that define one, but one’s actions. What matters is not what 
one could do but what one does. Beauvoir’s ethics centers on the authentic pursuit of 
freedom. I wish to suggest that health is best understood as the physical aspect of this 
pursuit. When a person is acting, as best he or she can, to further his or her own freedom 
and the freedom of others, he or she is striving for authenticity, indeed, is manifesting 
authenticity in the only way a person can. Meanwhile, and directly related, his or her 
body is manifesting health, and he or she is healthy. Thus, a body with the potential to act 
in a particular way is a crucial condition for the possibility for health – and indeed, for 
freedom – but having such a body is not itself health any more than being conscious and 
thus having choices is itself freedom. This is where my account of health departs quite 
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radically from that offered by Svenaeus. As I have shown, drawing on ideas from Husserl 
and Beauvoir, health is not just a matter of potential. Rather, it is, essentially, 
unavoidably, about action and actuality.  
Conclusion 
I have said that I depart from Svenaeus because I do identify health with 
authenticity where he rejects this identification. It must be noted, however, that we have 
quite different senses of the term ‘authenticity’ in mind. Svenaeus rejects Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity as a manifestation of health, because, according to Svenaeus, 
Heidegger uses ‘authenticity’ to refer to a way of understanding the world rather than a 
way of acting in the world. That understanding of authenticity is quite different to what I 
have in mind here. I use the term ‘authenticity’ to refer to the clear-eyed embrace of the 
ambiguity of the human situation advocated by Beauvoir throughout The Ethics of 
Ambiguity. For my purposes, then, to be authentic is to engage in action on the basis that 
oneself and one’s situation will always be one of both freedom and facticity and thus one 
will inevitably face failure again and again. Health is, as I argue further in the next 
chapter, the bodily manifestation of such engagement. 
One concern with this account of health is that it is too broad. By describing health 
in the way I have just done, one might be accused of losing the distinction between health 
and overall well-being or flourishing. I offer three responses to this concern. First, the 
perceived need to corral and separate the specifically physical aspects of health may itself 
be partly influenced by an underlying objectivist notion that facts are to be found at the 
physical, empirical level, and that if we do not focus on that sphere we lose any hope of 
objectivity. This privileging of the supposedly objective, as I hope I have shown by now, 
is a mistake. Second, however, there is a sense in which this concern is legitimate. Quite 
often, when we talk of health, we are referring to a feature of embodiment and only 
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equivocally do we apply the term to one’s overall well-being. I do not mean to conflate 
health with general flourishing. Rather, I suggest that we understand health as a way of 
being in a lived body such that one is undertaking projects and actions that are meaningful 
and conducive to one’s own continued freedom and that of others. As I have noted, one 
cannot neatly differentiate between the physical and other aspects of being in a lived 
body. Nonetheless, my concept of health does center on the embodied aspects of 
experience, as I hope to make very clear in the next chapter, in which I apply this model 
to the case of fatness. Third, and finally, in response to the concern above, I return to the 
observation that, while illness comes to the fore in experience, health often fades into the 
background. Thus, while illness and disease often manifest themselves, at least partly, in 
very clear and discrete sensations that can be located in particular parts of the body, it is 
part of the essence of health that it is experienced in a broader, less discrete way, as a 
pattern of acting and doing and living. In short, I am claiming that, to the extent that I am 
undertaking the physical actions needed to accomplish my authentically-chosen goals, I 
am healthy. But when I am unhealthy, my body itself is, for some reason or other, a 
limitation on my options for this kind of action.  
I am claiming that health is the bodily manifestation of authenticity. By this I 
mean, first, that I take health to be an ongoing process rather than a state, a way not just 
of being in general, but specifically of acting and doing. Second, health is not ‘in’ the 
body, nor is it manifested only in physical ways. Third, while empirical investigation of 
the body gives useful data that can predict bodily functioning, health itself can only be 
experienced in the context of a person’s lifeworld, not in her body. Fourth, not everyone 
has the same way(s) of being healthy, and not every healthy body looks the same, because 
what health means for a given person depends on her goals, commitments and values. 
Fifth, despite the previous point, one cannot simply ‘make up’ one’s own definition of 
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health, any more than one can simply ‘make up’ one’s own morality; in order to have any 
meaning at all, any conception of health must stand up to intersubjective critique, or it is 
just a denial, a fantasy, a resignation. In the next chapter, I return to the example of 
fatness, and use it to explicate each of these points in more detail. In doing so, I show 
how my phenomenological-existential model of health avoids the pitfalls of the dominant 
objectivist model and also those of the constructivist alternative.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMBODIED AUTHENTICITY MODEL OF 
HEALTH APPLIED TO FATNESS 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the previous chapters of this dissertation, I have argued for the need 
for a new model of health that does not rest on the problematic approaches that I have 
termed objectivism and constructivism. In Chapter Two, I used the example of fatness to 
argue that neither of these approaches enables an understanding of health that squares 
with lived experience. In Chapter Three, I argued for a model of health centered on 
action, which, I argued, avoids the respective pitfalls of objectivism and constructivism. I 
refer to this model of health as the embodied authenticity model. I described the main 
structure of the experience of health as an attitude [Einstellung] in the Husserlian sense. I 
called this attitude the healthy disposition. The characteristic structure of experience in 
this attitude is “I can”. I also, however, argued that health is best understood not as a 
quality of bodies but of actions. Thus, our focus must shift from potential action 
(experienced in one’s own body in the “I can” structure) to realized action. To this end, I 
described healthy action, which, I argued, is the embodied aspect of authenticity.  
In this chapter, I return to my example of fatness to show the usefulness of this 
embodied authenticity model of health. In the first section, I clarify what I mean by 
fatness by giving a phenomenological account of fatness itself. In the second section, I 
return to Sarah, the imaginary fat woman I introduced in Chapter Two, as well as drawing 
on real-life examples, to demonstrate how my model of health applies to fatness. In the 
third section, I address the notion of body acceptance. I argue that none of the currently 
available models of health actually allow for authentic body acceptance. Rather, to 
borrow a distinction Beauvoir makes in The Ethics of Ambiguity, they encourage various 
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kinds of resignation under the guise of acceptance. (28) The dominant model encourages 
almost every person to see his or her body as somehow inadequate and to resign himself 
or herself to an endless battle to change it in the hope of making it more acceptable. In the 
case of fat people, this, of course, means weight loss. The fat acceptance alternative 
seems to advocate body acceptance, but it often veers off into a bad-faith resignation 
when it takes it as axiomatic that safe, permanent weight loss is impossible and 
unnecessary for every person. The HAES model is perhaps more open to the possibility 
of safe, long-term weight loss, though it still insists that this is not an outcome that can be 
chosen, but that it can only ever be a side effect of healthy behavior. In contrast, I argue 
that part of what it means to accept one’s body is to accept that a lived human body can 
change and be changed, even in some cases by direct action on the part of the person. 
This acceptance is a crucial aspect of healthy action. This does not mean that every 
person can safely and healthily make himself or herself thin, and as such this acceptance 
does not place any burden on fat people in general to become thin. It does, however, 
mean, that body acceptance can be compatible with specific goals for bodily change, 
including changes to one’s body size, shape and composition. In my view, this represents 
a significant practical advantage of the embodied authenticity model of health.  
A phenomenological account of fatness 
In applying the embodied authenticity model of health to fatness, I claim that 
fatness is not necessarily a health problem but that it may be one. In order to clarify this 
claim, it is useful to start by giving a phenomenological account of fatness itself. From 
the phenomenological point of view, fatness is neither purely a physical feature nor 
purely a constructed category. Fatness is a physical feature as constituted by people, both 
fat people themselves and others around them. As many writers have pointed out, in the 
contemporary USA fatness is amongst the most meaning-laden bodily features. In terms 
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of how people and bodies are categorized in this context, fatness does not loom as large 
as race or sex/gender, but it is rapidly catching up with certain other phenomena of 
embodiment, such as visible disability, in terms of its social and cultural significance. 
Like visible disability, a person’s body size, shape and composition are often regarded as 
conveying not only the person’s level of physical ability but also his or her level of 
emotional and mental well-being, his or her lifestyle, and perhaps even his or her life 
history. They can even be taken as a manifestation of his or her moral character. This 
cultural milieu conditions every particular experience of a given fat body, and indeed it 
conditions the judgements we make about fatness and fat people in general. It influences 
how individual fat people are experienced both by themselves and others. There is no 
question but that our experiences of fatness are conditioned by the culture in which we 
find ourselves. Nonetheless, fat bodies really are different to thin bodies, and not just 
because we ‘construct’ them differently. As I argued in Chapter Two, fatness is not 
merely a cultural condition; it is a physical difference.  
To say that fatness is a physical difference is to say that some bodies, as physical 
things, have the quality of fatness while others do not. Very broadly, to say that a person 
is fat is to say that his or her body (or some significant part of it) has a greater than 
normal amount of adipose tissue. For the purposes of giving a phenomenological account 
of fatness, I use the term ‘normal’ here to refer broadly to biostatistical norms for the 
population(s) of which a given person is part. However, such statistics must always be 
subject to critical scrutiny. A person may be part of many groups, and any one of these 
groups may itself be conditioned by social and cultural factors, some of which may in 
turn be conditioned by understandings of fatness. For example, poor people are more 
likely to be fat, but there is debate over whether being poor makes you fat, or being fat 
makes you poor, or both, or neither. (For an overview of the debate, see “Does Social 
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Class Explain the Connection Between Weight and Health?”) Meanwhile, within the 
population of fashion models employed by agencies, for example, a person could have 
more adipose tissue than is normal for the surrounding population and yet be very slim by 
the standards of wider society. In this case, any assessment of the claim that a given 
model is or is not fat must take into account other aspects of the situation, such as the fact 
that models are typically chosen for their slenderness and that slenderness is valued 
perhaps above any other quality in models. Thus, fashion models, as a group, cannot be 
taken to be representative of the wider population or of humanity as a whole when it 
comes to body size, shape or composition. Comparable considerations apply when we 
look at fatness as it is experienced amongst different racial or ethnic groups. The point is 
that, in making claims about who is fat, one cannot simply measure and go. There is a 
need for critical reflection on measurements. This does not mean, however, that fatness is 
purely a relative quality, or that it is nothing but a matter of interpretation. The difference 
between a fat body and a thin one still ultimately comes down to the presence or absence 
of the actual physical stuff of adipose tissue.  
In Unbearable Weight, Susan Bordo describes an item on a television show called 
“20/20” in which young boys are shown pictures of fashion models: 
The models were pencil thin. Yet the pose was such that a small bulge of hip was 
forced, through an action of the body, into protuberance – as is natural, 
unavoidable on any but the most skeletal or the most tautly developed bodies. [...] 
These young boys, pointing to the hips, disgustedly pronounced the models to be 
“fat”. (186) 
As Bordo’s analysis of this incident shows, these fashion models in the television show 
could not reasonably be described as having an unusually large amount of adipose tissue. 
Indeed, almost no mainstream fashion model at work today could be so described – even 
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those who are considered “plus size”.15 But nonetheless the boys were using “fat” in a 
way that makes sense in their context. In this context, the beauty ideal (especially for 
women) is no longer merely slender, it has also become, as Bordo puts it, “... a tighter, 
smoother, more contained body profile.” (ibid. 187) Bordo concludes that our concept of 
fatness is no longer just about size. This makes some sense of the prevalence of fat talk 
amongst and about young women who are not overweight or obese by medical standards. 
When such women call themselves “fat”, they are not necessarily labelling themselves as 
too big or too heavy, but rather as too flabby, too soft, too lumpy. Fatness is no longer just 
about quantity of flesh, it is now about quality too. This also explains why there is some 
truth in the claim that, if Marilyn Monroe were alive today, she would be “fat”.16 While it 
is not true that Monroe wore a contemporary USA size 16, or that she was ever 
overweight or obese by modern medical standards, it is true that she has a softer 
appearance than many contemporary female models or film stars, with a larger bust and 
wider hips relative to her waist than would now be fashionable in many circles.  
I suggest that there are, in fact, three main ways in which fatness is manifested in a 
physical body. These are size, shape and composition. With respect to size, fat bodies 
tend, on average, to be larger than thin ones. To be fat is to have more adipose tissue, and 
thus, other things being equal, to have more mass and more weight than others of one’s 
height, bone structure or level of muscularity. Admittedly, though, a very short person, 
                                                          
15 This demonstrates clearly why “fat” and “obesity”, though strongly linked, require separate analysis. There 
is no way that the models could be called “obese” given their appearance and the meaning that  term 
currently has in the contemporary USA. But, as I argue following Bordo, they could meaningfully be called 
“fat” given one of the meanings that “fat” has in the contemporary USA. 
16The question of whether or not Marilyn Monroe would now be considered “fat” is one that has exercised 
many people in recent years, particularly on various internet forums. For an overview of the dispute, and 
arguments that Monroe was not a contemporary US size 16, see “For the last time, What size was Marilyn 
Monroe?”. 
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for example, might be fat while still being smaller overall than many other people. This is 
partly because the fat body differs from the non-fat body not only in size but also in 
shape. The shape of the fat body often does not ‘echo’ the shape of the skeleton as nearly 
or as neatly as that of the slender body. A thin arm, for example, will often be narrower 
between the elbow and the shoulder than it is at the joints, just as the joints themselves are 
generally wider than the bones they connect. A fat arm, however, can be wider between 
the joints, narrowing as it nears them. The outline of the ribs is often clearly visible in the 
abdomen of a thin person, particularly when the person causes his or her ribcage to move 
by breathing deeply. This is much less often the case in a fat person. This forms a pattern 
of body shape that is observable in experience. Finally, one can say that fatness is 
manifested in body composition. Body composition is less visible than size and shape, but 
even in ordinary everyday experience, there are telltale signs. Like bones, muscles may 
also be less visible in those who are fat. Both fat and thin people may be very muscular, 
but the muscles tend to be more visible in those who are less fat. To be fat is not just to 
have more adipose tissue than others, but to have adipose tissue make up a greater 
proportion of one’s body.17 In ordinary experience, this may make for a softer, more 
rounded appearance to the body.  
Clearly, size, shape and composition are not separate in concrete experience. 
Rather they are different aspects of, or different ways of describing, what is ultimately 
one phenomenon, the fat body. There is also, of course, a wide variety of body shapes 
amongst both fat and non-fat people. Some fat people have fat limbs and relatively 
                                                          
17 As I mentioned in Chapter One, having a high proportion of adipose tissue does not always entail being 
fat; there are people whose BMI is in the normal range yet who have an unusually high amount of adipose 
tissue and a low level of muscle. Such people are sometimes referred to as ‘normal weight obese’ or, 
colloquially, as ‘skinny fat’. 
133 
 
slender midsections or vice versa. Many but not all fat people have more pronounced 
bellies, larger breasts or fuller backsides relative to their overall size, since these are parts 
of the body on which adipose tissue often accumulates. What I have described here are 
patterns that arise in ordinary experience of fat bodies. They are not definitional, nor are 
they intended to categorize bodies in an absolute or pure way. I see two major benefits to 
this way of describing fatness. First, it is able to allow for different kinds of fatness, and 
second (and very much related) it is able to account for degrees of fatness. 
One of the weaknesses of the currently available models of fatness is that they do 
not allow for different kinds of fatness each of which has a different relationship to 
health. At one level, as Bordo points out, we have come to acknowledge that fatness is 
not just about quantity but also about quality. Yet when it comes to discussing the 
relationship between fatness and health, no account is taken of variations in quality of fat. 
Quantity is taken as definitional. A stronger model of health could account for the 
significant differences that are given in experience between the fatness of a Japanese 
sumo wrestler and the fatness of a sufferer from binge eating disorder (BED), even if their 
weights and BMIs and hip-to-waist ratios are the same. Earlier models of health allowed 
for such differences by considering different possible causes of fatness. (See Gilman 2008 
and 2010) Increasingly, however, as numerical measurements have been taken to define 
rather than simply to indicate fatness, and as excessive consumption and insufficient 
exertion have been taken to be the definitive cause of fatness, such nuance has been lost. 
Now, neither the dominant model nor the Fat Acceptance alternative is really able to 
account for different kinds of fatness. The dominant model defines fatness in numerical 
terms and understands it as the direct and invariable consequence of excessive 
consumption and inadequate exertion. This leaves no room for the notion of healthy 
corpulence that existed, for example, in the time of Charles Dickens’ The Pickwick 
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Papers. To twenty-first century Western eyes, as Gilman points out, everyone in the 
‘Phiz’ illustrations of The Pickwick Papers looks fat. But Dickens and his contemporaries 
appear to have made a clear distinction between the fatness of the well-fed and healthy 
Pickwick, on one hand, and the fatness of Joe, who is clearly considered unhealthy, on the 
other. (Gilman 2010 5)  
Meanwhile, for proponents of FA, there is no connection at all between health and 
weight, and so there is no room for kinds or degrees in that connection. These 
commentators often take it as axiomatic that fatness is neither a cause nor a consequence 
of ill-health. As such, they do not allow for differences between (for want of better terms) 
a healthy corpulence and an unhealthy obesity. The embodied authenticity model, 
however, can account for different relationships between health and fatness in different 
bodies. This model considers the body not just as a physical thing but as a site of human 
agency, and it considers not only what the person could do but what he or she actually 
does. Thus, the fatness of the sumo wrestler is different to that of the BED sufferer 
because they have come about in different ways and have radically different impacts on 
the agency of the person. This is a point to which I return later in this chapter.  
The other strength of the embodied authenticity model for understanding fatness 
itself is that it can account for degrees of fatness. It is easy to contrast a very fat body 
which has visible rolls of adipose tissue with a very thin body in which bones are visible, 
or with a very lean, athletic body in which the outlines of the veins and muscles can 
clearly be seen. It is much more difficult to draw clear lines circumscribing all those who 
are thin in one group and all those who are fat in another. It is, in fact, impossible. Nor, 
however, is it necessary. From the phenomenological point of view, the existence of in-
between cases does not negate the categories. Broadly speaking, it is both meaningful and 
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useful to speak of fat people and thin people as groups, notwithstanding the existence of 
people who straddle or hover between categories. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the 
drive to delineate absolute categories is based on the problematic notion that categories 
must be pure in order to be of any use at all. But, as I argued, this is a mistake. In reality, 
there are many ways in which categories can be useful even if every individual body does 
not fall neatly into only one category.  
When one describes fatness phenomenologically one of the things that clearly 
emerges is that fatness admits of degrees. It is gradual. This is the kind of phenomenon 
fatness is. Just as some people are neither especially short nor especially tall, there are 
people who are neither especially fat nor especially thin. But, just as with tallness and 
shortness, there are still many ways and situations in which it is both meaningful and 
useful to speak of fat people as a group, and even to contrast them with thin people, 
notwithstanding the fact that some people fall between these two categories. This means 
that, for the purposes of discussing health, we can speak meaningfully of a relationship 
between health and fatness even if neither health nor fatness are pure categories and even 
if that relationship varies considerably from person to person. 
Those who wish to deny the usefulness of the categories of fat and thin sometimes 
point to the seemingly arbitrary way in which the words ‘fat’ and ‘thin’ are used, as in 
Bordo’s example of the young boys calling the model fat. However, even in cases like 
this, there is a kind of logic, albeit problematic, to the use of the term ‘fat’. Most models, 
and women depicted in mass media in general, are extremely thin. They appear to have 
almost no body fat. Their body shapes follow very closely the outlines of their skeletons. 
The outlines of their muscles, if they are at all muscular (though very often they are not), 
tend to be clearly visible. They tend to be at the lower extreme of the weight and size bell 
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curves of the population. In short, statistically speaking, exceptionally thin women are 
way over-represented amongst the ranks of successful singers, models, actresses and 
television personalities. When a woman in this milieu is called fat, it may indeed seem 
crazy by everyday standards. And, very often, such a use of the term ‘fat’ does represent 
the kind of quasi-anorexic and even misogynistic thinking described by Bordo and others. 
Only by a ridiculously restrictive standard could most of these women be described as fat. 
But nonetheless, the difference that causes them to be labelled fat is the same as that 
which causes actual fat people to be perceived as such. Their skeleton and musculature 
are less visible compared to those of the other women around them or compared to 
observers’ expectations of what women look like in this context.  
I don’t mean to defend the application of the term ‘fat’ to everyone who is not 
extremely thin. This application is philosophically, politically and practically problematic. 
I do however wish to point out that this application is not as utterly arbitrary as some 
critics would suggest. Such application ought not be taken to render the term ‘fat’ itself 
meaningless, nor should it be taken as evidence that fatness is merely constructed. Rather, 
the fact that it seems counter-intuitive to label a thin model as fat just shows that we do 
have lived experience of fatness as a real physical difference, as a quality which some 
bodies have and others do not. It is precisely in the light of that shared lived experience of 
fatness that we are able judge what we perceive as misapplications of the term ‘fat’. 
When discussing the relationship between fatness and health, it is important to understand 
that fatness is a phenomenon in experience and not a mere concept or a pure construction, 
but also that it is a phenomenon that admits of variation in quantity and quality. There 
really is such a thing as fatness, but there are kinds and degrees of it. The embodied 
authenticity model of health, unlike previously available models of health, accounts for 
the possibility not only that such kinds and degrees of fatness exist but also that each of 
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them can impact on health in different ways. In order to further explain this claim, I now 
return to my example of Sarah, and also consider some real-life examples.  
Sarah, Fatness, and the Embodied Authenticity Model of Health 
In Chapter Two, I described Sarah, an imaginary fat woman. As we saw in that 
chapter, viewed from the point of view of the objectivist dominant model of health, Sarah 
is unhealthy because she is fat, and she can only be healthy if she loses weight. 
Meanwhile, from the point of view of Fat Acceptance, whether in its more objectivist or 
constructivist versions, Sarah’s fatness has no connection to her health, and losing or 
gaining weight would not, in itself, make her any more or less healthy. As I argued in that 
chapter, neither of these models captures the relationship between Sarah’s fatness and her 
health.  
From the point of view of the embodied authenticity model, however, there is a 
relationship between Sarah’s fatness and her health, although it is complex and only 
becomes clear in the light of intersubjective analysis of her life as a whole. On the model 
of health I am proposing, we can only meaningfully call Sarah healthy or unhealthy when 
we consider Sarah’s empirical data and functioning in relation to her own goals, and 
when we consider those goals from a critical, intersubjective point of view. That is, 
Sarah’s health depends not only on the state of her body, but on the way in which her 
body conditions her choices and possibilities, and whether that conditioning is or is not 
conducive to the advancement or achievement of her goals, and whether those goals 
themselves stand up to intersubjective scrutiny. I have suggested that health primarily 
manifests itself in action towards a project or goal to which one is committed. In 
particular, health is thus manifested in the attitude I call the healthy disposition, and more 
broadly in authentic action. In the rest of this section, I show how each of these applies in 
Sarah’s case.  
138 
 
In the healthy disposition, one experiences the world, in and through one’s body, 
as a situation in which one acts and in which one’s actions have meaning and purpose. In 
this disposition, one experiences one’s body in the mode of “I can”, that is, as a locus of 
potential. On the basis of this particular kind of experience of embodiment, one 
understands oneself as having a broad, though by no means unlimited, range of options 
for action of a kind that is conducive to one’s own goals and projects. As I discussed in 
the previous chapter, not all bodies are equally conducive to manifesting the kind of self-
experience that is characteristic of the healthy disposition. Not every body has the same 
kind or degree of “I can”. A person who suffers from chronic back pain may experience 
strong resistance when trying to engage in physical activities even as basic (for most 
people) as standing or sitting upright or taking deep breaths. In this chapter, my concern 
is specifically with fat bodies. How, if at all, does being fat affect one’s experience of 
embodiment? Does fatness impact on one’s range of “I can” potentialities? Can a person 
be fat but yet be in the healthy disposition?  
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Sarah finds it difficult to walk long distances and, 
especially, to walk up hills. From the objectivist point of view, and particularly that of the 
dominant model, this is a direct result of Sarah’s fatness. If she were to lose weight, she 
would find it easier to walk long distances or up hills. From the Fat Acceptance point of 
view, Sarah’s difficulty cannot be said to be a consequence of her fatness because not all 
fat people experience such limitations. From the point of view of the embodied 
authenticity model, Sarah’s fatness certainly has an impact on her potential. Indeed, from 
the point of view of this model, every aspect of every feature of a body conditions the 
abilities and potentials of the person. The question, strictly speaking, is not whether 
Sarah’s fatness affects her potential but rather how it does so. The question is, on the 
whole, whether it tends to present resistance, or to present opportunity, or both, or neither. 
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Sarah herself believes that her fatness contributes directly to her difficulty in 
walking. She recalls times when she was less fat and when walking was easier. In  the 
present, she experiences her own body as heavy. That is, she feels weighed down by her 
fat, which she perceives as excessive. Certainly, this experience, like any other, is 
culturally mediated. Sarah is conditioned by her society to perceive her own body as too 
big and too heavy. However, this social and cultural conditioning is not enough to 
account for Sarah’s experience of difficulty standing up out of a low chair, for example. 
When she has to get out of a low chair, Sarah experiences her own legs as lacking the 
physical strength needed to push herself up to a standing position. She needs to use her 
arms too, leaning on the arms of the chair to help her stand, or even if possible asking a 
friend to take her hand and help pull her up. Sarah experiences this lack of strength at the 
most basic, pre-theoretical level. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Husserlian description 
of embodiment shows that such experience is foundational to all self-experience. No 
experience occurs in a vacuum, and every experience occurs in a lifeworld, and is 
therefore conditioned by other experiences. Thus, Sarah’s experience of her inability to 
stand up out of a chair, and her experience of this inability being linked to her fatness, is 
connected to her other experiences of herself as fat and of her culture’s understanding of 
that fatness. Nonetheless, there is something about this experience that is not reducible to 
a matter of construction or social conditioning. This is an experience of a specifically 
bodily limitation. Sarah experiences herself and her body in that moment in the structure 
of “I cannot”. And it is not only in reflection that Sarah links this “I cannot” with her 
fatness. Rather, the physical experience itself includes the feeling that she is, so to speak, 
too heavy for her own legs, that there is just too much weight there to be lifted in this 
way. Sarah does not struggle to stand up and then judge on reflection that it must have 
been because she is too fat. Rather, she directly experiences herself as having difficulty 
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standing up out of the low chair because she is too fat. This difficulty in standing up is, in 
fact, one of the ways in which she experiences her fatness. The ability to stand up from a 
seated position, whether on the ground or in a chair or simply squatting down, is a very 
fundamental human faculty. It facilitates many other actions. Moreover, the inability to 
stand up easily from a seated position is indicative of muscle weakness that probably 
affects many different basic life activities.  
One’s tendency to be in the healthy disposition is clearly impacted by such 
experiences of embodiment, and this in turn strongly conditions one’s scope for authentic 
action. The more one experiences any aspect of one’s body in an “I cannot” way, the less 
one apprehends one’s body as a site of possibility. If one experiences one’s body more in 
the mode of “I cannot” than in the mode of “I can”, then there is a good chance that one 
will do fewer and fewer of the kinds of things that draw on, and thus actually increase, the 
full range of a body’s faculties. From the existential point of view, this reduces the range 
of possible ways in which the person’s freedom can be manifested. Thus, the absence of 
the healthy disposition, on one hand, and the inability to do the physical things one wants 
and needs to do, on the other hand, constantly re-enforce each other. The more Sarah 
struggles to get up out of chairs, the less readily she tries to stand up. The more 
uncomfortable it is for her to walk a long distance, the less willing she is to undertake 
walks. This, in turn, makes it even more uncomfortable for her to walk. In Husserl’s 
terms, not only does she lose her acquired faculties but, over time, even the scope of her 
primal faculties -- such as her ability to move her arms and legs -- actually becomes 
compromised. On the converse side, as Husserl also points out, use of the primal faculties 
allows one to acquire more faculties, and even after losing one’s faculties, they may be 
quickly regained if one again acts on them. After being laid up in bed with an illness, one 
may have to relearn how to walk, but this faculty returns quickly. (ibid. 266) This means 
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that, Sarah’s choices have a strong and direct impact on her future possibilities. If she 
chooses to move more, she increases her bodily faculties, that is, her range of physical 
possibilities. Action that increases one’s bodily faculties, and thus one’s overall 
possibilities, is healthy action.  
When one is in the healthy disposition, one tends towards such healthy action. The 
healthy disposition thus re-enforces itself. When Sarah is in this attitude, she feels capable 
of accomplishing physical things in the world. She thus feels capable of the kind of action 
that is likely to expand her range of bodily faculties and thus her overall range of 
faculties, or, as it were, the scope of her “I can”.  For example, if Sarah were to find that 
she loves yoga, and yoga becomes important to her, she may wish to have a flexible body. 
In Husserl’s terms, yoga can be seen as a faculty that Sarah could acquire. But her ability 
to acquire this faculty depends on the primal faculties she already possesses. Having a 
body that tends towards flexibility might also make it more likely that Sarah would be 
drawn to and enjoy yoga in the first place. In her current situation, Sarah struggles to 
reach her feet to tie her shoelaces, so she would probably find it hard to imagine herself 
getting much out of a yoga class, and so she is probably less likely to take up yoga. Both 
the presence and absence of the healthy disposition will tend to re-enforce themselves. 
The less Sarah is able to do, the less she feels able to do and the less she feels able to do, 
the less she does. In turn, the less she does, the less she is able to do, and so on. When one 
views Sarah’s case from this point of view, it becomes clear that her physical possibilities 
also condition her possibilities in general.  
In fact, there is no clear way to delineate the experience of physical limitation 
from other limitations. If one’s body is limited, one’s options are limited, and this impacts 
every aspect of one’s life. Consider a real-life example, that of Christina Corrigan. In her 
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book, Tipping the Scales of Justice, Sondra Solovay relates the tragic story of how 
Corrigan, a “good capable student” became a “junior high drop-out”:  
For a student who needs to avoid stairs, getting to the main level [of the local 
junior high] requires  walking up [a long] hill, rather than cutting across the lawn 
... For someone of Christina’s size and limited mobility, neither option was 
practical. (Tipping the Scales of Justice, Chapter 1, “Prejudice in Practice”) 
Corrigan’s weight clearly and directly contributed to her inability to complete her 
schooling, which would have had a massive impact on her future opportunities had she 
lived into adulthood. Corrigan weighed 680 lbs when she died at the age of thirteen. Her 
mother was later found guilty of neglecting her. Her inability to climb the hill to school, 
like Sarah’s difficulty in standing up out of a low chair, seems very likely to have been a 
direct result of her fatness (even if that fatness itself was caused by something quite other 
than the usual dominant-model suspects of over-consumption and under-exertion). In this 
case, Christina’s fatness was clearly limiting her embodied options. The less Christina 
was able to move, the less she did move, and thus movement became even more difficult 
for her. Eventually, movement all but ceased to be a live option for her. At the time of her 
death, it was reported that she had not been outside her house for three months, and that 
she had been unable to move from the floor on which she was lying. In Husserl’s terms, 
we can say that Christina’s primal faculties had become compromised by her fatness 
(again, even allowing for the fact that her fatness may itself have had some other medical 
cause). Clearly, this limitation was not only physical, but also seems inevitably to have 
had an impact on her intellectual and social development as well.  
According to Solovay, Corrigan’s difficulty in attending school was not just 
centered on her difficulty in physically getting to the building. It was also exacerbated by 
the fact that she would have to be “on display” (ibid.) while walking into school. The 
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potential for embarrassment and humiliation thus also constituted a limitation on 
Christina’s options. It does indeed seem extremely likely that a young girl like Christina 
Corrigan would feel very self-conscious and frightened at the thought of being looked at 
and seen. Sarah, who is half Christina’s size and, unlike Christina, an adult, often finds 
herself reluctant to be seen in public because of her fatness. Sarah never goes to the 
beach, for example, because she feels too embarrassed to wear a bathing suit in public but 
also feels she would stand out too much if she wore anything else on the beach. This 
feeling of self-consciousness is a common experience amongst fat people. Sarah feels a 
very strong conviction that she cannot allow herself to be seen in a bathing suit. She 
experiences it as a strong limit beyond which she feels truly unable to go. She may even 
feel it physically, in the form of a shudder of humiliation when she imagines being seen 
in a bathing suit. That said, she does not experience this limit in the same way that, or at 
the same level at which, she experiences her inability to stand up out of the low chair 
without using her arms. Nor does she experience this limit in the same way that Christina 
Corrigan would have experienced her inability to walk up the hill to school. Being seen in 
public in a bathing suit seems unbearably humiliating to Sarah, and this expectation of 
humiliation is something that limits her options. However, she does not experience this 
limit directly or only in her body. Her bodily faculties are not compromised. That is, it 
does not immediately or directly impact her bodily experience of herself in the mode of “I 
can”. She is not under the illusion that she is physically incapable of being on a beach 
while wearing a bathing suit.  
In fact, for a person like Sarah, fatness may give rise to a strong sense of 
alienation from her body, and this in turn does indeed condition her situation in ways that 
impacts her health. At the most basic level, Sarah’s fear of humiliation may condition her 
behavior and choices in such a way as to limit her bodily faculties over time. Just as the 
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wider society ‘others’ fat people, treating them as monstrous, treacherous and dangerous, 
so the fat person sees his or her own body the same way. The notion that every fat person 
has a thin person trapped inside him or her18 is a cultural manifestation of this alienation, 
with its suggestion that adipose tissue is like a disguise or a covering that is imposed upon 
or worn, however reluctantly, by the true inner person who is always thin. This kind of 
alienation may well make individual fat people less likely to want to participate in the 
kinds of physical activities that both require and develop bodily faculties. It is all but 
impossible at the level of lived experience to differentiate between the purely physical 
and the social, cultural, emotional and psychological experiences that may also shape a 
person’s situation and thus impact his or her bodily faculties and health. From the point of 
view of the embodied authenticity model of health it is neither possible nor necessary to 
draw such distinctions. The point is to observe the patterns of lived experience and how 
they condition one’s bodily actions, and how these actions are or are not conducive to the 
pursuit and realization of meaningful goals.   
Clearly, alienation from one’s body is not an experience peculiar to fat people. 
There is, however, a particular kind of alienation, experienced very distinctly in the body, 
that is more likely to arise for fat people (though it is not unique to them in every 
particular), and that is the experience of not fitting in. This experience has a direct impact 
on one’s attitude. It conditions one’s experience, making it much less likely that one will 
be in the healthy disposition, and making it more difficult to engage in authentic action 
not only in strictly physical terms but in a broader understanding of action. If one’s 
primary bodily experience is more “I cannot” than “I can”, one is less likely to engage in 
                                                          
18 Consider, for example, the subtitle of Weight Loss Surgery: Finding the Thin Person Hiding Inside You, a 
2003 book aimed at those seeking weight loss surgery, or the film Shallow Hal (2001), in which Gwyneth 
Paltrow plays a fat woman whose “inner beauty” is depicted as a thin version of her.   
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any kind of activity, and that can lead to marginalization, depression and certainly to ill 
health. Fatness can – even though it does not necessarily – condition one to experience 
oneself in the “I cannot” mode.   
Fat people often experience themselves as unable to fit in, both physically and 
figuratively. Often, in the USA, the phrase ‘fit in’ is used figuratively to indicate a person 
who functions successfully with others in a given situation, behaving in such a way that 
he or she has, or appears to have, a good deal in common with those around him or her. 
For many fat people, however, this phrase is not only metaphorical but literal. They don’t 
fit in figuratively, because they don’t fit in physically. Although the specific experiences 
vary depending on the person’s situation and on the size and shape of his or her body, 
many fat people share the experience of feeling, and indeed of being, too big for their 
surroundings. Not fitting through turnstiles, in restaurant booths, or in the aisles or seats 
on buses or airplanes are all common experiences, as is not fitting into clothes. This literal 
not fitting in contributes to a broader mental and emotional sense of otherness and 
difference, a sense that one does not fit in socially and culturally as well as physically. 
Every time one fails to fit in a seat or a pair of jeans or whatever it may be, one is 
reminded in the strongest way that one does not fit in figuratively either. In Chapter Two, 
I mentioned that Sarah would like to support her local independent movie theater, but she 
cannot fit comfortably in its seats. This means that she rarely gets to go to movies with 
her friends. They share her reluctance to patronize the large chain cinema, and she is too 
embarrassed to draw attention to her fatness by pointing out that she cannot fit in the 
seats, so she just tends to avoid the issue. Under these circumstances, it is difficult – 
though not, of course, impossible – to perceive one’s body as a site of possibility. This 
remains true regardless of any other bodily features or potentials one might have.  
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In the context of all this social pressure, it is understandable that Fat Acceptance 
proponents emphasize the need for fat people to accept themselves and challenge the 
social and cultural milieu rather than constantly trying to change themselves. When one 
considers cases like that of Christina Corrigan, it is particularly understandable that these 
commentators wish to challenge the notion that all consequences of fatness are entirely 
the fault and responsibility of the individual fat person. A more recent tragic case is that 
of Vilma Soltesz, who died when the airline that had flown her out of the USA and 
multiple other airlines all failed to fly her back home because their European bases did 
not have the equipment needed to help her board a flight. (“Airlines settle $6M lawsuit”) 
In the face of such an appalling case, it is easy to understand and identify with the anger 
directed at airlines and others by FA activists. It is also easy to understand their insistence 
that it is social attitudes to fatness that must change, rather than the bodies of fat people 
themselves. Ultimately, the FA perspective sees no responsibility on the part of any fat 
person – or any person at all – to change his or her body, while placing all the 
responsibility on the society and culture at large to accommodate every person’s body. 
One of the strengths of my embodied authenticity model of health is that it can make 
sense both of the individual person’s responsibility to adapt to his or her situation in ways 
that enable meaningful action while also acknowledging the responsibility of others, 
including institutions and groups, to facilitate meaningful action of as many kinds and by 
as many people as possible.  
Beauvoir’s ultimate criterion for ethical action is the notion that each of us has a 
responsibility to will oneself and others free. That is, each of us has a responsibility to act 
in such a way as to maximize both our own and others’ potential for meaningful action 
towards authentic goals. When we apply this criterion to health, it becomes clear both that 
individuals have a responsibility to cultivate health in their own bodies and that 
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corporations, groups and societies have a responsibility to accommodate individual’s 
bodies as they are where at all possible. In the case of Sarah, she does have an ethical 
responsibility to seek out ways to maximize her ability to do the things that matter to her. 
This may involve getting fitter and stronger (though not necessarily thinner) so it is easier 
for her to get up out of chairs and walk long distances, for example. However, this 
individual responsibility does not negate the responsibilities of her friends, her 
community and her society to help her maximize her ability and to refrain from putting 
needless hurdles in her path. This particular apportioning of responsibility may be 
unpalatable to some FA commentators, particularly those who strongly resist the notion 
that there is any ethical onus on the individual to be healthy. In my view, however, refusal 
to acknowledge this ethical obligation renders would-be empowerment into cold comfort, 
would-be authenticity into bad faith, and would-be acceptance into resignation. 
Acceptance versus Resignation: The dominant model, FA and HAES 
reconsidered 
In the contemporary USA and elsewhere, many people share a concern with 
fostering body acceptance, particularly on the part of women. There seems to be a 
widespread belief that it is undesirable, indeed, that it is unhealthy, to hate one’s body. 
However, I believe that none of the currently available models of health allow for true 
body acceptance, especially on the part of fat people. Under the dominant model, it makes 
no sense for a fat person to accept his or her body as it is, because it is unhealthy to be fat 
and it is possible to change it. The dominant model typically chimes with the sanitized 
version of body acceptance manifested in Dove’s Campaign for Real Beauty. In this 
advertising campaign, Unilever’s beauty product brand Dove used models with a more 
diverse range of body sizes and a more diverse range of races and ethnicities. (“The Dove 
Campaign for Real Beauty.”) In this campaign, which has now been ongoing for ten 
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years, fat women have been represented, but in most cases they have been only slightly 
fat and have, in every other respect, matched up with the dominant contemporary beauty 
ideal. The message seems to be that it is okay to accept your body as long as your body is 
basically acceptable19. If it is too fat, then of course you cannot and ought not accept it.  
In contrast to this approach, FA activists tend to advocate strongly for body 
acceptance by people of all sizes, shapes and compositions. They argue that most fat 
people cannot become thin and that even if they did, this would not make them healthier, 
and that anyway, there is no moral onus on anybody to be healthy. This, however, is not 
acceptance but resignation. HAES advocates come closest to advocating true acceptance, 
because they advocate healthy actions and choices, and regard a ‘healthy’ body as an 
effect of such actions and choices. However, they still insist that, over the long term, 
one’s body size, shape or composition may be side effects of personal activity but are not 
outcomes that can be deliberately chosen. I do not believe that this is always necessarily 
the case.  
This choice of emphasis is, as I have said, understandable, but it is problematic in 
light of the fact that some fat people do get thin as a result of their own choices and 
actions. Certainly, it seems to be true that most weight loss attempts fail in the long-term. 
But some succeed. Surely given this fact, and taking it in conjunction with fat people’s 
own testimony about their perceived desire and need to be thinner, it is worth 
                                                          
19 Of course, inevitably, even these slightly-less-than-skinny women’s bodies were unacceptable to many 
commentators, who were quick to make this known as publicly – and apparently, in many cases, as cruelly 
– as they could. As Jennifer L. Pozner wrote, “The tone of this debate turned nasty, quickly, with women's 
self esteem in one camp and men's fragile eyes in another as typified by a second Sun Times writer's 
comments that these ‘disturbing’ and ‘frightening’ women should ‘put on clothes (please, really)’ because 
‘ads should be about the beautiful people. They should include the unrealistic, the ideal or the unattainable 
look for which so many people strive.’ Besides, wrote Lucio Guerrero, ‘the only time I want to see a thigh 
that big is in a bucket with bread crumbs on it.’” (“Dove’s ‘Real Beauty’ Backlash.”)  
149 
 
investigating further those comparatively rare cases of successful weight loss. For 
example, FA critics are quite right to point out the lack of evidence for the assumption 
that all fat people over-eat, and to further point out that not all fat people are fat because 
of such over-consumption. But there is evidence to suggest that at least some fat people 
do over-eat and that at least some fatness is caused by over-eating. One of the benefits of 
allowing for a range of different relationships between fatness and health is that it allows 
for the possibility that some people might be living very healthily when their size, shape 
and body composition truly is in the fat range, while others may be fat for other reasons 
that are not conducive to their health. On this basis, we can empower individual fat 
people to decide, in the light of intersubjective self-reflection, whether the particular kind 
of acceptance advocated by FA or HAES is the appropriate response to their fatness. This 
involves, amongst other things, acknowledging that it matters why a person is fat and how 
they got that way.  
To speak as though no fat person can ever get permanently thin, ignoring or 
discounting the minority who do, is to encourage resignation rather than acceptance. In 
phenomenological terms, it represents a failure to take lived experience seriously, and, in 
existentialist terms, it is an instance of bad faith. Earlier, I discussed Husserl’s account of 
embodiment in Ideas II. Here, Husserl offers a convincing description of the central role 
that action plays in embodiment. To experience oneself as embodied is to experience 
oneself as having a range of potentials for action in the world, such as, “I can walk across 
the room” or “I can pick up that cup.” (Ideas II 266-7) What I can do, and what I perceive 
myself as being able to do, is inexpressibly central to my self-understanding. These 
abilities and perceptions are given in direct bodily experience, not only in reflection. 
Another way of expressing this is that we experience our bodies in and through our sense 
of “I can” or, indeed, our sense of “I cannot”. For example, to suggest that Sarah’s 
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difficulty getting out of chairs is not related to her fatness is to fail to take seriously her 
experience of her own embodiment. Her difficulty in getting up out of low chairs is one 
of the ways in which she experiences her body, and it is one of the ways in which she 
experiences her fatness. It does not follow from this that everyone who shares similarities 
of body size, shape or composition with Sarah must also share this experience. Consider 
the example I mentioned earlier of a sumo wrestler. Sumo wrestling is an athletic 
endeavor, demanding rigid adherence to a program of training and nutrition that, in the 
experience of participants, increases rather than decreases their physical potential. In the 
case of the sumo wrestler, his fatness is directly experienced as a benefit to him, at least 
in competition. The difference between Sarah’s fatness and that of a sumo wrestler, in 
terms of health, does not lie in the fat itself but in how it came to be there and how it 
conditions their respective bodily faculties. To admit that Sarah’s fatness is limiting her 
bodily potential and therefore her freedom is not to insist that every fat person is similarly 
limited by his or her fatness. Sarah might be better off to explore possible ways of 
changing her body size, shape and composition. But it does not follow that a successful 
sumo wrestler also could or ought to make such changes. This is a matter that must be 
considered by the individual, in the context of his or her life, in consultation with those 
around him or her, and in light of his or her goals and values.  
From the existentialist point of view, one cannot authentically ‘accept’ the lived 
body as though it were a brute object incapable of change. To accept one’s body, for a 
human being, is to accept that one’s body is subject to change. Furthermore, authentic 
body acceptance must acknowledge that this change is sometimes the result of one’s own 
chosen behavior, and this change may include changes to one’s body size, shape or 
composition, sometimes short-lived but sometimes – admittedly in fewer cases – long-
lasting. True body acceptance means accepting the possibility of change and deciding 
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what kind of change one wants to pursue and what resources one is willing to devote to 
that pursuit. For many fat people, true body acceptance may well mean acceptance of the 
fact that, in their particular case, thinness simply requires more resources than they are 
willing to give, that it may, for example, require constant hunger or tiredness or many 
hours a day exercising. In  such a case, pursuing thinness is, to use Beauvoir’s analogy, 
like beating one’s fist against a stone wall.20 (Ethics of Ambiguity 28) But this is not 
always necessarily the case. FA and, especially, HAES writers do us a valuable service 
when they point out that not all fat people are unhealthy. However, when they argue on 
this basis that fatness and health are unconnected, they are failing to take seriously the 
testimony of fat people, just as proponents of the dominant model have done. Many, 
many fat people report themselves as feeling unhealthy, or as feeling uncomfortable, 
awkward, in pain, despondent or depressed. Often, the fat people themselves consider that 
their weight is a contributing cause, if not the cause of, these feelings. Certainly, as I 
discuss above, a proportion of this discomfort is born of living in an anti-fat world. But it 
is a mistake to conclude that all the discomfort is so born, and that there is no inherent 
physical difficulty associated with being fat, that is, I think it is a mistake to conclude that 
the ill health associated with fatness is only a social construction. This is just as 
inauthentic as is the notion that every fat person can become thin and that this will result 
in better health in every case. This mistake is a direct result of the all-or-nothing dualism 
                                                          
20  Beauvoir clearly means this as an example of a behavior that is futile. She describes it as ‘a useless 
gesture’ that ‘debases itself in a vain contingency.’ (Ethics of Ambiguity 28) However, there are forms of 
martial arts training in which one deliberately beats ones hands over and over against a stone wall or 
similarly unyielding surface. In that case, the goal is actually to strengthen the hands in order to increase 
one’s capabilities. In such a case, the action is quite compatible with Beauvoir’s ethics. This demonstrates, 
first, the impossibility of any action being inherently and necessarily inauthentic, and, second, the centrality 
of the goal in evaluating an action. If my goal is to move the wall, beating it with my fists is pretty futile. If 
my goal is to toughen up my hands as part of my martial arts training, however, it is an action that is 
entirely defensible.  
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of the positivistic understanding of health, whereby health – or, indeed, any aspect of 
reality – either must be utterly mind-independent or must be ‘all in our heads’. In 
practical terms, eliding individual experiences of fatness as a problem is, ironically, a 
kind of victim-blaming in itself. The dominant model holds fat people culpable for 
choosing to be fat, but the FA alternative holds them culpable for wanting to be thin. On 
the dominant model, fat people could choose to get rid of their problem by getting thin; 
on the FA alternative, they could do so by choosing to view their fatness as a neutral 
physical feature and not as a problem.  
Neither of these options is as straightforward as some of its proponents would 
have us believe, though. In fact, as I noted in Chapter Two, even amongst FA activists, 
there are many who wish and even strive to become thin. That is, even those who 
advocate the acceptance of fatness at a social and cultural level sometimes find it difficult 
to accept it at a personal level. In the light of all this dissonance between the aspiration 
and the actuality of acceptance, one might ask whether what is being advocated is 
acceptance or resignation. This is an important question both from a philosophical and a 
health point of view. From the philosophical point of view, resignation is different from 
acceptance. Resignation is the sense that one must take things the way they are because 
there is no possibility of change. Beauvoir writes: 
In the face of an obstacle which it is impossible to overcome, stubbornness is 
stupid. If I persist in beating my fist against a stone wall, my freedom exhausts 
itself in this useless gesture without succeeding in giving itself a content. Yet 
there is hardly a sadder virtue than resignation. It transforms into phantoms and 
contingent reveries projects which had at the beginning been set up as will or 
freedom. (Ethics of Ambiguity 28) 
From the FA point of view, trying to make a fat person thin is a stupid kind of 
stubbornness. In Lessons From the Fat-o-sphere, Harding and Kirby write that ‘giving 
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up’ dieting is not the same thing as settling. They explicitly encourage self-development 
and challenging oneself and pursuing various goals, however they insist that weight loss 
ought not to be one of those goals:  
You will probably never be permanently thin, unless you are already, but other 
than that, the sky’s the limit. You can be anything or anyone you want to be, in 
theory. ... And that person trapped inside you really might be cooler than you are 
right now. She’s just not thin. (ibid. 221) 
They present this not as resignation but as acceptance. “There’s a big difference between 
saying you can’t be anything other than what you are right now and you don’t have to be 
anything other than what you are right now.” (ibid. 220) However, the surrounding 
discussion makes it pretty clear that, for these authors, if you are fat, you cannot be thin, 
at least not in the long run. This discussion encompasses both the FA point that it is 
acceptable to be fat, and also the HAES point that one’s body might change as a result of 
health but that this will always be a side-effect at most.  
From the embodied authenticity point of view, the health value of Sarah 
attempting weight loss depends on a number of factors. It depends on how important it is 
to Sarah to be thin(ner). It depends on what it will ‘cost’ her to be thin(ner) in terms of 
time, energy, money and other resources. It depends on how thin it is possible for her to 
get and how she feels about this outcome. Presumably pretty much anybody can get fairly 
thin if he or she is willing or able to starve for long enough. It is possible that some fat 
people would die of starvation before getting into the ‘normal’ weight range, however 
most people probably could get very thin if they were able or willing to reduce their 
caloric intake enough. But the resultant starvation would most likely cause at least as 
many problems as it would solve in the body. Ultimately, starvation leads to death. If the 
result of pursuing thinness is that one dies, then it cannot be an authentic goal, because it 
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is self-defeating. While there may be rare exceptions, most people who want to be thin 
want to be alive and thin. That is, they want to be thin but also able to do other things. 
They want to be able to live while thin, not just lie on their deathbeds or in their graves 
thin. To pursue thinness to the point of death is thus to contradict oneself and to defeat 
and negate one’s own goal and therefore one’s own freedom.  
Beauvoir uses the term “serious” to describe the experience of values as external 
and objective. Taking such values seriously is an example of bad faith or inauthenticity. 
Sarah is in bad faith to the extent that she takes the most extreme anti-fat ideas seriously 
in Beauvoir’s sense. If she treats these values as somehow present in the universe itself, 
independent of any mind or society or culture, then she is ignoring the fact that she 
herself has choices in how she responds to these values, thus she is denying her freedom. 
On the other hand, she can take these values as an aspect of her situation to which she is 
free to respond in various ways. She may take the FA line, and simply reject these values 
whole cloth, and, with them, reject any notion that she can or ought to change her body. 
Of course, this is to assume that Sarah could in fact choose to change her attitude to her 
fatness by an act of will in the first place. As Murray (2005) points out, this assumption 
does not square with the lived experience of embodiment, which shows that the body 
itself shapes and conditions our attitudes. But even if she could manage to effect this 
change of attitude, Sarah would still be in bad faith. As Beauvoir notes, “…the body itself 
is not a brute fact. It expresses our relationship to the world… .” (ibid. 41) This echoes 
Husserl’s account of embodiment. To be in a lived body is to have possibilities for 
movement and engagement with and in the world. Simply to be embodied is to have such 
possibilities and these possibilities place a responsibility on us to choose the better 
possibilities. Viewed from the point of view of the embodied authenticity model of 
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health, Sarah can really only accept her body if she is willing to accept that she is capable 
of changing her body.  
Conclusion: Fatness, Health and Freedom 
If one’s body is subject to change as a result of one’s choices and actions, then it 
follows that one is responsible for one’s body. On my model, it is possible to act in such a 
way as to increase one’s potential for healthy action. It is also possible to choose to act 
healthily. On my model, by definition, such action is conducive to the freedom of oneself 
and others. As such, based on this embodied authenticity model of health that I propose, 
one can be said to have an ethical obligation to be healthy. FA and HAES commentators 
have resisted the notion of an ethical obligation to be healthy since this notion has been 
used as a stick with which to beat fat people in so many circumstances. In order to avoid 
facilitating such use, many FA commentators have gone so far as to insist that health is a 
morally neutral matter. Often, this insistence rests on a liberal assumption that ‘my body 
is none of your business’. (See, for example, “Do I Owe It To Anybody To Lose 
Weight?” and “Fabulously Fat Friday: But What About Your Health?”) However, if 
Beauvoir’s claim is true, and we have an ethical obligation to will ourselves and others 
free, then there is an ethical obligation on us not only to try to be healthy ourselves but to 
foster the health of others where it is possible for us to do so. On Danceswithfat blog, 
Ragen Chastain writes that:  
In my dream world everyone would have full and easy access to non-biased 
information about food and nutrition available to them, and would have access 
(including affordability, cooking method and time to prepare and the ability to 
learn the skills to make) the foods that they would choose to eat, and live in an 
environment where they are not judged for their choices. (“The Food Morality 
Thing”)  
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From the point of view of the embodied authenticity model, Chastain is entirely right, up 
until the point at which she says that, in the ideal world, nobody would be judged for their 
choices. If by judged, she means shamed, bullied, ‘othered’ or mistreated, then she is 
quite right. However, it cannot be said that one has no right to critique the food choices of 
another. Beauvoir, writing of the difficulties that arise when we attempt to intervene in 
the life of another, says that:  
We blame a man who helps a drug addict intoxicate himself or a desperate man 
commit suicide, for we think that rash behavior of this sort is an attempt of the 
individual against his own freedom; he must be made aware of his error and put 
in the presence of the real demands of his freedom. ... It is no more necessary to 
serve an abstract ethics obstinately than to yield without due consideration to 
impulses of pity or generosity... (136-7) 
Under certain circumstances – for example, with a loved one – one has not only the right 
but the responsibility to critique another person’s food choices with the goal of helping 
that person make the choices that are most conducive to his or her freedom. Indeed, as 
Beauvoir points out, very often the reason we are in a position to intervene in the life of 
another is because we already have a concrete bond with them. As she puts it, “... love 
authorizes severities which are not granted to indifference.” (ibid. 137) It is true that, at 
many times and in many ways, the concept of health has been used as a guise under 
which to smuggle anti-fat prejudices into various discourses. It is also true, as FA critics 
point out, that the bodies of fat people, especially women, are often ‘policed’ by those 
around them in ways that are not warranted by the relationship obtaining between the 
people involved. However, it does not follow from this that nobody has any right to 
attempt to influence the health of another in any way, or to expect that another should 
strive to be healthy. There is a qualitative difference between a close friend expressing 
concern about Sarah’s continued weight gain, on one hand, and a stranger on the street 
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shouting at her to, ‘Go on a diet, fatty!’ The latter is unjustified, on the embodied 
authenticity model of health, because it shames and upsets Sarah and is overwhelmingly 
likely to limit rather than to expand the range of options that Sarah has available to her. It 
shuts down rather than opening up her paths to freedom. The stranger on the street has no 
responsibility to intervene in Sarah’s health, let alone a right to mistreat or abuse her. 
Moreover, shouting at somebody in the street renders him or her passive and offers only 
limited and undesirable options for response. Her friend, on the other hand, has a genuine 
concern for Sarah’s wellbeing. The friend wants what is best for Sarah. The friend is 
willing to speak to Sarah in a respectful and open way, and to listen to what Sarah says in 
return, and to support Sarah afterwards in whatever choices she makes. The willingness 
not only to point out the problem (as one sees it) but to help with the solution is important 
in Beauvoir’s schema. As she says, “... a man whom I snatch from the death which he had 
chosen has the right to come and ask me for means and reasons for living.” (ibid. 137) 
From the point of view of the embodied authenticity model of health, intervening 
in the health of another is permitted at the time and in the manner most conducive to the 
overall freedom of the person. One may, for the right reasons and under the right 
circumstances, critique the health and health-related choices of another. On this model, 
such critique is not a matter of arbitrarily attaching judgement by linking health with 
some outside, constructed criterion. Rather, this ethical impulse is already inherent in the 
embodied authenticity model of health. If we take health to be manifested in the 
embodied aspect of authentic action, then it becomes impossible to separate health 
concerns from ethical concerns. However, it also becomes impossible to insist on a one-
size-fits-all approach to health, because the body (or diet, or medication, or whatever) that 
is conducive to authentic action in one person may not be in another. In this way, the 
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embodied authenticity model allows for a concept of health that is shared by everybody 
without being arbitrarily or wrongly imposed on anybody.  
Thus it is clear that freedom is central to the embodied authenticity model of 
health. This model of health centers on action. One is healthy, on this model, to the extent 
that one is acting in a way which is conducive to one’s freedom and that of others. This is 
intended to evade the problem with those functionalist models of health which rest on the 
notion that a particular set of life activities is inherently valuable for every single person. 
In the next and final chapter of this dissertation, I explain in more detail what Beauvoir 
means by freedom, and why she thinks freedom ought to be regarded as an absolute 
value, capable of grounding an ethics. I argue that, if health is manifested in action, then 
freedom must also be the guiding principle on which we distinguish between healthy and 
non-healthy action. On this basis, I argue that one does have an ethical obligation to strive 
for health. However, as I have noted in this chapter, that does not translate to an ethical 
obligation to be thin or, indeed, to have any particular kind of body. As such, highlighting 
this ethical obligation encourages and empowers individuals to take responsibility for 
their health without making them ashamed of and guilty about their bodies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have outlined what I refer to as the embodied 
authenticity model of health. On this model, a person is healthy when he or she is 
engaged in authentic, embodied action. In defining authentic, embodied action, I draw on 
both Husserl and Beauvoir. Husserl points out that, in essence, action begets potential and 
thus further action. On the basis of this account of embodiment, I argue that to be 
embodied in a healthy way is to be undertaking the kinds of physical action that will tend 
to increase one’s long-term potential for physical activities of many kinds. Simply being 
able to perform many physical tasks, however, has little intrinsic value aside from the 
pleasure of movement. Such ability, on its own, is not enough to constitute a standard 
against which action may be not only measured but evaluated. Drawing on Beauvoir’s 
ethics, I argue that the value of healthy physical activity is that healthy action is 
conducive to freedom. Freedom, then, is a crucial theme of this dissertation.  
In this concluding chapter, I thus explain further what I mean by freedom, and 
how freedom functions as a criterion for healthy action. Finally, I return once more to my 
example of fatness, concluding that, when we view freedom as central to health, we need 
not abandon the concerns either of proponents of the dominant model or of FA and HAES 
critics, but in fact we can address the respective legitimate concerns raised by each group.  
Freedom in The Ethics of Ambiguity 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir describes human agency and freedom as 
fundamentally ambiguous. She argues that the human situation is always, necessarily, 
such that we are both free and not free. For Beauvoir, we are in some respects all but 
unlimited in what we can think, dream and imagine. But we are also situated in a shared 
world, which is in many ways beyond our control and which, as a result, places limits on 
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our potential for action. The fact that I am limited and conditioned by my situation does 
not negate my agency or potential, however, but gives it meaning. The fact that I can 
walk through the door is meaningful and useful partly because I cannot walk straight 
through the solid wall easily and without hurting myself. Indeed, it is only in light of my 
goals that any particular thing or fact in the world comes to be a limit or a site of 
opportunity, and any given thing in the world might be a help or a hindrance depending 
on one’s goals. The door that, when opened, allows me access to my home can also be 
closed to keep intruders out.  
As Beauvoir notes, it is tempting to think that, ‘really’, in our true nature or 
essence, we are either free or not free, and, according to her, most philosophers have 
succumbed to this temptation. As she puts it, “As long as there have been men and they 
have lived, they have all felt this tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there 
have been philosophers and they have thought, most of them have tried to mask it.” (ibid. 
7)  Philosophers, that is, have looked for theories that make it seem possible to evade or 
escape ambiguity. For Beauvoir, however, freedom is the manifestation of human 
transcendence amidst facticity. Freedom and facticity are inextricably, necessarily linked 
in the human situation. Beauvoir says, “The will is defined only by raising obstacles...” 
(ibid. 28) That is, we only get the opportunity to be free when we have something to 
choose or decide about. Freedom is not something that exists in us prior to action, it is 
something that becomes manifest only when an occasion arises in which one must 
exercise it. Freedom, on this account, can be said to be intentional in the 
phenomenological sense of that term. That is, there is no freedom in the abstract; to be 
free is to be free to do some particular thing or set of things. To put it in Husserlian terms, 
freedom and facticity constitute one another. Without a factical situation against which to 
‘push’, I cannot manifest my freedom. Meanwhile, it is its ability to condition freedom 
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that gives something meaning as a fact. In short, as difficult and uncomfortable as it is for 
us to grasp, we are both essentially free and essentially unfree.  
According to Beauvoir, it is not possible to evade this ambiguity. We may, 
through dishonesty and bad faith, attempt to do so, but we can never really do so. The 
very attempt to evade freedom is itself a manifestation of that freedom, since it is a 
choice. Thus, the only authentic choice is to ‘take up’ freedom by choosing to will it. 
Only ‘willing oneself and others free’ ultimately makes sense. This means that, for 
Beauvoir, the only valuable and justifiable way to realize one’s potential is to do so with 
the clear-eyed intention of maximizing future possibilities and future potentials not just 
for oneself, but for others too. To choose in this way is to accept one’s ambiguous 
situation in all its complexity and contradiction. Beauvoir is critical of previous 
philosophical attempts at ethics which, in her view, have tried to evade ambiguity, 
because, as she sees it, these philosophies, taken to their logical conclusion, make 
morality impossible. In her view, it is only by embracing freedom itself that we can 
actually be moral. She writes that: “Freedom is the source from which all significations 
and all values spring. The man who seeks to justify his life must want freedom itself 
absolutely and above everything else. … To will oneself moral and to will oneself free are 
one and the same decision.” (ibid. 24) Freedom is the means by which we manifest all 
other values. It is the condition for the possibility of our striving for goods and goals, 
whatever we take those to be. To put it crudely, if we want the human community to be 
more moral, we must want it to be more free, since freedom is the precondition for 
morality. In fact, this is the only desire that can be authentic in the face of facticity. The 
facts of our situation are that we cannot force others to be moral, but we can foster their 
freedom. This, in turn, makes it possible for them to choose freely to be moral 
themselves. Rather than trying to insist that everyone ought to behave according to a 
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particular set of ethical rules, Beauvoir argues that individual people ought to take 
responsibility for their own actions and seek creative solutions to what they perceive as 
problems. For Beauvoir, we cannot make each other be moral, because nobody can take 
up the freedom of another, but we can enable each other, as much as possible, to take up 
our own freedom. Without freedom, our ‘morality’ would be meaningless anyway; there 
can be no such thing as enforced morality. By treating freedom as the end of action, 
Beauvoir avoids dogmatism while yet maintaining that there is a criterion by which some 
kinds of human striving may be justified over other kinds.  
This criterion is not one of success in the traditional sense. For Beauvoir, even 
when we embrace freedom as a goal, we must accept the inevitability of failure and the 
essential limitedness of the human situation. We can never be purely free, and thus our 
attempts to take up freedom are always doomed to fail. Indeed, it is always necessarily 
the case that, by giving myself a goal, I am also creating an obstacle for myself. My 
choosing a goal is a manifestation of my potential, and therefore my freedom, but it is 
also necessarily conditioned by the factical limitations of my situation. For one thing, 
when I choose a goal, I’m creating the need for the work it will take to achieve that goal. 
Then, also, the work I need to do to achieve that goal will take my time, energy and 
resources, none of which is unlimited, so that by choosing to do one thing, I am also 
limiting myself with respect to other goals. I am putting obstacles in the way of my 
pursuing other alternative choices. Moreover, the work I do to achieve my chosen goal 
will also have consequences I cannot foresee and cannot control. By choosing a goal, I 
am committing myself to a desire for the world to be a certain way. But the world will 
never turn out exactly the way I want it to be, so in some sense, I will always fail. But this 
does not have to render my choices meaningless or my actions pointless. That only 
happens if I assume that the sole value of my goals is in their perfect accomplishment. I 
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need not see things this way. If my action itself is meaningful and valuable to me, if I can 
throw myself into the attempt, accepting the inevitability of failure and accepting (to the 
best of my knowledge and ability) every other aspect of my situation, then my choice is 
authentic because it is truly free, and there is value in the realization of the corresponding 
action. For Beauvoir, one might say not that virtue is its own reward but that the exercise 
of freedom is its own fulfilment.  
Freedom and embodiment 
Our embodiment is central to the ambiguity of the human situation. The lived 
human body, unlike other material bodies in the world, is a site of consciousness; it is a 
subject as well as an object. As such, the body is a site of both freedom and facticity. As 
Sonia Kruks puts it, for Beauvoir, “The materiality of the human condition is what both 
enables us to engage in free, creative action in the world and constrains us and delimits 
what we may do.” (Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity, 7) The lived 
human body, unlike other material bodies in the world, is inherently and essentially 
ambiguous.  It is only in and through our particular concrete bodies that we can be free, 
even though, paradoxically, these bodies also limit our choices. Freedom, for Beauvoir, is 
not  some metaphysical power of the mind or soul of to choose one option over another.  
It is the ability to act concretely -- that is, in and through the body -- towards some goal or 
project. Thus, Beauvoir’s theory of action is embodied through and through. As Iris 
Marion Young writes:  
[In existentialist theory]  The person always faces the material facts of her body 
and its relation to a given environment. Her bodily organs have certain feeling 
capacities and function in determinate ways; her size, age, health, and training 
make her capable of strength and movement in relation to her environment in 
specific ways. Her skin has a particular color, her face determinate features, her 
hair particular color and texture, all with their own aesthetic properties. Her 
specific body lives in a specific context ... (“Lived Body Vs. Gender”, 16) 
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As one of the founding mothers of this tradition of existentialist theory, Beauvoir does 
indeed offer such a concrete account of the human situation. Beauvoir’s theory of action -
- and her ethics -- can thus be applied to specific individual actions.  
To return to the example of height21, if I am only five feet tall, I cannot, without 
help, reach the top shelf of a bookcase that is eight feet tall. On the other hand, being a 
conscious human being, I can find a way around this. I can stand on a chair, or ask 
someone taller to help, or keep all my favourite books on the lower shelves. I am 
conscious, and this consciousness gives me the power to transcend the limitations put on 
me by facticity. My potential to act is not just a matter of how my body is, but also of my 
mental states, beliefs, and the various other aspects of my situation that condition me one 
way or another.  
To will myself and others free, I must choose actions that seem conducive to 
freedom given the facts of my situation. To choose as though my situation was other than 
it is would be to fall into bad faith. If I have convinced myself that I am over six feet tall, 
then it makes sense, in light of that conviction, for me to keep trying to reach the top 
bookshelves unaided. Furthermore, if I have also convinced myself that reaching those 
shelves is incredibly important, I could spend hours reaching and reaching, trying to get 
those books. But honest, intersubjective appraisal would quickly cast doubt on the value 
of these actions. Isn’t there some other way I could store my books that would free me up 
to do other things? Aren’t I just limiting myself unnecessarily by choosing to devote all 
this time to high-shelf-reaching? Being only five feet tall, I will never reach those books 
by myself, and I am wasting my time by trying. I am effectively creating a factical 
                                                          
21 Again, as in Chapter Two, I use this example precisely because it does not have the same amount of  
socio-cultural ‘baggage’ that some other bodily features, including weight, do have.  It is often constituted 
as ‘just’ a physical feature.  
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obstacle in my life where there need not be one. I am, in Husserlian terms, constituting as 
a limit something that I could quite well choose to constitute as a site of opportunity. 
Above all, in practical terms, I am pouring resources into a project that can never succeed 
and that, even if it did, would not be very satisfying to me or anyone else. This is deeply 
inauthentic because I would only do this if I were not facing my situation honestly. It is 
an action that only a person in denial would choose.  
But simply giving up on the books is not authentic either. Maybe I suddenly come 
to a realization that I simply cannot reach those books unaided, and so I decide to act as if 
they don’t matter to me at all, regardless of what is in them, how much I want to read it or 
any other possible value those books may have to me. This is not acceptance but 
resignation, and, as Beauvoir says, “There is hardly a sadder virtue than resignation. It 
transforms into phantoms and contingent reveries projects which had at the beginning 
been set up as will and freedom.” (ibid. 28) The childish retort characterized by “Well, I 
didn’t want that silly book anyway” is a denial as much as the insistence on acting as if I 
am over a foot taller than I really am. The problem with such choices, as Beauvoir sees it, 
is not that they flout some objective moral value, because that would require the existence 
of mind-independent morals in the world, a possibility she rejects. (ibid. 14-15) For 
Beauvoir, however, freedom itself is a universal value, and throwing oneself into such 
choices is an attempted abdication of freedom. For Beauvoir, “What is the point of this 
action?” is not a rhetorical question, but a genuine, ethical challenge to oneself or to 
another person. The central criterion of Beauvoir’s ethics is the idea that one ought 
honestly to be able to answer, “Freedom” to that question. In my model of health, this 
criterion is applied specifically to the bodily aspects of action, so that health is understood 
as embodied authentic action.  
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Thus, it is more than analogy that links freedom with health. Freedom is only 
realised in and through the body, and thus to be maximally free is to operate optimally in 
and through the body -- in other words, by ordinary usage of the term, to be healthy. This 
means, amongst much else, that one has an ethical obligation to be healthy. This claim is, 
on the face of it, abhorrent to many in the FA and HAES movements. However, in the 
next section, I show that this claim, when explained in terms of the embodied authenticity 
model of health, is actually entirely consistent with the liberatory aims of FA and HAES.  
Freedom, Facticity and Fat 
As I discussed in the conclusion of the last chapter, it is all but axiomatic for many 
in the Fat Acceptance and Health at Every Size communities that there is no moral onus 
on anybody to be healthy. Kate Harding and Marianne Kirby write:  
... despite what this culture often suggests, health is not a moral imperative. You 
are not a bad person if you just don’t like working out or eating vegetables, if you 
have priorities other than trying to live to be one hundred, or if you have a 
disability that keeps you from ever truly feeling “healthy”. (Lessons from the Fat-
o-sphere 18) 
The resistance to the notion of a moral imperative to health is no doubt driven at least in 
part by the desire to resist the moralizing of fatness that has often been used as an excuse 
for the inhuman treatment so often meted out to fat people. This desire is wholly 
understandable, even laudable. However, it is a mistake to conclude that there is no moral 
imperative on anybody to be healthy. Rather, from the point of view of my embodied 
authenticity model of health, each of us is responsible for our own health and indeed for 
the health of those around us, since to will a person healthy is to will a person free. I 
suspect that those who are critical of the notion of a moral imperative to health might, in 
fact, find little to object to in this Beauvoirian claim.  
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Consider the following claim, again from Harding and Kirby:  
We’re so conditioned to believe not only that broccoli is good for us and ice 
cream is not, but that broccoli will make us better people, and that ice cream will 
make us worse. You’re going to have to remind yourself over and over again that 
this is bullshit. For starters, ice cream is full of protein, calcium, and vitamin A. If 
your blood sugar is low, your body will welcome the carbs in it. Likewise, if 
you’re really hungry, your body will welcome the filling fat. Does this mean ice 
cream is “good”? No. It means ice cream is food, which is morally neutral. ... It is 
fueling your body—and if what your body really needs at a given moment is a big 
dose of calcium or protein, then ice cream is actually a much better choice at that 
moment than broccoli would be. (ibid. 31) 
The central claim here, as I see it, is that since it is sometimes better to eat ice-cream and 
sometimes better to eat broccoli, there can be no absolutely ‘good’ or ‘bad’ foods, and 
thus there is no basis on which evaluative or moral judgments can be made about food 
choices. As with the definition of the fat body, we come up against the constructivist 
notion that if we cannot have pure categories and absolute principles, we may not have 
categories and principles at all. As I argued in Chapter Two, this is a serious theoretical 
error. From the point of view of both lived experience and nutritional data, it makes 
perfect sense to argue that broccoli is, on the whole, a more nutrition-dense food than ice 
cream, but that, under certain circumstances, ice-cream would be the better food choice. 
There is no contradiction there.  
More crucially for my purposes, however, Harding and Kirby also make the 
mistake of suggesting that if we cannot have absolute, invariable lists of ‘good foods’ and 
‘bad foods’, then food in itself must be morally neutral. But actually, what we eat affects 
what we can do. Our food choices thus have direct impact on our freedom and facticity, 
conditioning our scope for choice and pursuit of goals. If there is a moral imperative to 
will oneself free, then there is a moral imperative to act towards one’s health, as best one 
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can given one’s factical situation. Thus, from the point of view of the embodied 
authenticity model of health, there is a moral imperative to pursue one’s own health, but 
this does not mean that there is a moral imperative always to eat broccoli and never to eat 
ice-cream. As Harding and Kirby make clear, that would be silly. Rather, the moral 
imperative is to eat -- and, indeed, to exercise, wash oneself, and do whatever else is 
needed to maintain health -- in the way that seems, on honest reflection, to be the most 
conducive to one’s long-term freedom and that of others. It is hard to see how Harding 
and Kirby or other FA and HAES advocates could object to that, given their clear and 
heartfelt desire to liberate fat people and others. 
In fact, when it comes to fatness, the embodied authenticity model of health put 
into practice would look a lot like HAES. HAES emphasizes action -- exercise, eating and 
so on -- that is conducive to well-being. It regards the physical measurements of the body, 
particularly size, shape and composition, to be side effects of one’s choices and 
behaviors. This is also, for the most part, how I imagine the embodied authenticity model 
would play out. One chooses what is conducive to freedom for oneself and others. As 
long as one is engaged in an ongoing way in healthy action, and as long as one is 
pursuing one’s authentically chosen goals in and through the body, then whatever kind of 
body one has is, and must be, a healthy body.  
One difference, however, is that the embodied authenticity model does not insist 
that everyone must treat changes to the body as always and only unintended side effects. 
Rather, one may choose to change the body -- or, rather, to atttempt to do so. The moral 
imperative is to choose authentically, in light of honest intersubjective critique, goals that 
are conducive to one’s ongoing freedom and that of others, and to pursue these goals in 
similarly freedom-oriented ways. There is nothing wrong, in this framework, with 
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choosing thinness as a goal, or, indeed, with choosing fatness as a goal. The moral 
problem would arise only if one chose to pursue this goal at the expense of freedom. So, 
if I could be thin only by starving myself to the point of constant exhaustion and illness, 
then it would be morally wrong for me to continue to pursue thinness, or for others to 
force me to do so. Pursuing thinness in this way is like spending all my life trying to 
reach those high bookshelves that are too tall for me. It is a waste of time, a denial of 
facticity, and thus a travesty of freedom. On the other hand, if I have good reasons to 
believe that changing my body size, shape or composition would contribute positively to 
my freedom, or to that of others, then I do have the moral responsibility to consider that 
option. In Husserl’s terms, it may be the case that I can increase my bodily faculties by 
acting to change my body in some way. There is nothing wrong with such attempts to 
change. In short, I wholeheartedly agree with the FA and HAES point that there is no 
moral onus on anybody to be thin. However, there is a moral onus on everyone to act in 
ways that are (or seem) most conducive to having the freest possible body, and there is no 
reason, in principle, why that could not include deliberate attempts to change one’s body 
with respect to size, shape or composition.   
None of this in any way negates the important political points raised by FA and 
HAES advocates. In response to a reader question about why she does not ‘allow debate’ 
about the merits of Fat Acceptance on her blog, Ragen Chastain wrote:  
The truth is that fat people have the right to exist in fat bodies without shaming, 
stigma, bullying or oppression regardless of why we are fat, what it means to be 
fat, or if we could become thin.  There are no other valid opinions about 
that.  Our rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and basic human respect 
should never be up for debate. 
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In this, Chastain is absolutely correct. Those who have used the concept of health to 
justify the abuse and ill-treatment of fat people, or of any group or individual, are not only 
mistaken about health, they are, willy-nilly, working against health. On my model, the 
best way to facilitate the health of others is to maximise their freedom. Thus, while I 
argue that there is a moral imperative to be healthy, I also insist that this can never justify 
mistreatment of an individual or a group on the grounds of their ill-health. Indeed, to 
mistreat someone because you take them to be unhealthy is akin to throwing gasoline on 
somebody because you take them to be on fire. It is, at very best, misguided and counter-
productive. Beauvoir’s ethics centers on the claim that to will a person moral and to will a 
person free are one and the same thing. For the embodied authenticity model of health, to 
will a person healthy is another manifestation of the same will, and it is defensible on the 
same grounds.  
Conclusion 
 At the end of Chapter Three, having introduced the embodied authenticity model 
of health, I listed five claims that are central to this model. By way of summary and 
conclusion, I now return to these five claims, commenting on how each applies to fatness. 
First, I claimed that health is an ongoing process rather than a state. This means that one 
cannot simply measure a person and make inferences about his or her health. Thus, it is 
quite correct to say that there is no range of weights that is optimally healthy for every 
single person. Second, I claimed that health is not ‘in’ the body, nor is it manifested only 
in physical ways. This means that when we discuss health we need not and cannot limit 
ourselves only to physical features or, but we can and must also consider the social, 
cultural and political situation of the person, using these to inform our understanding of 
the person’s health. Thus, any assessment of the health of fat people in general or of any 
particular fat person in the USA today must properly take into account the social context 
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of the ‘tyranny of slenderness’ and the moral panic about the ‘obesity epidemic’. Third, I 
claimed that health itself can only be experienced in the context of a person’s lifeworld, 
not in her body considered as a physical thing. This means that the closer one is to a 
person, the better placed one is to give an overall assessment of his or her health. 
Empirical investigation by experts is of use in understanding certain aspects of health, but 
the person and his or her loved ones ought to be taken as the last and best arbiters of his 
or her health. Thus, whether a person is too fat is a qualitative question that can only be 
answered by means of intersubjective reflection by the person him- or herself together 
with those who are intimately involved in his or her life in some way. Fourth, I claimed 
that health differs from person to person in the sense that what health means for a given 
person depends on her goals, commitments and values. Again, this means that one is too 
fat if one’s fatness is impeding one’s pursuit of one’s authentically-chosen goals. 
Empirical data may be of use here in helping a person to consider his or her situation in 
comparison with that of others, but it is only one piece of data, and it is less important 
than the intersubjective reflection mentioned above. Fifth, I claimed that despite the 
person-relative nature of health as embodied authenticity, one cannot simply ‘make up’ 
one’s own definition of health and then insist that one is healthy on the basis of this 
definition. It may not be possible to measure the health of an individual empirically, but it 
is possible to evaluate  a person’s health by reflecting on how he or she is acting, in and 
through his or her body, in pursuit of goals that are of genuine value to him or her and are 
conducive to his or her freedom and to the freedom of those around him or her.  
These claims, taken together, mean that the embodied authenticity account of 
health avoids the pitfalls that I have identified with both objectivist and constructivist 
models of health. Applied to fatness, I believe this model makes more sense than either 
the dominant model or the FA or HAES alternatives. This is not to say that I advocate for 
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a whole-cloth rejection of empirical investigation of health; as I have said, the data 
yielded by such investigation is useful in helping people to make informed (and thus 
authentic) choices. Meanwhile, as I discuss above, I also see much of value in FA and 
HAES. It is my hope that the embodied authenticity model allows one to make use of the 
strengths of the previous models but without falling into their errors.  
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